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Abstract
This thesis is based upon four very simple premises:
1. managers, not shareholders make the investment decisions for the firm;
2. managers do more than just say “yes” or “no” to investments, they can
also exert effort that affects the payoff from investment;
3. executive compensation schemes can cause managers to hold more stock
than is optimal for diversification purposes; and
4. many investments can be delayed and involve irreversible capital costs
as well as uncertain payoffs.
Combining these four premises gives the two central questions this thesis
attempts to answer:
1. How does the level of managerial stock-ownership affect the investment
decisions managers make for the firm? and
2. given the answer to (1), how does this affect the shareholder’s decision
to hire a manager?
In this thesis I use a continuous time “Real Options” framework to answer
these questions. The form of the utility function assumed for the manager
has a huge impact on the tractability of the modelling. The assumption
of Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility as opposed to Constant
Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) causes the manager’s valuation of the cash
i
flow (the very first step of the modelling) to become wealth dependent. This
in itself is an interesting issue, but it also poses interesting numerical issues
and makes the later steps of the analysis intractable. Because of this we split
the substantive analysis of this thesis into two parts. In the first we assume
CARA utility in order to remove wealth dependence from the valuation and
obtain a “clean path” to the end goal of a dynamic model of hiring, effort
and irreversible investment. In the second we focus on CRRA utility thus
allowing the manager’s valuation to depend on his financial wealth. We then
explain the resultant numerical issues, and the appropriate approach to their
solution.
ii
“It’s not a problem, it’s a
challenge.”
- Guthrie (2006)
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Part I
Motivation and Framework
1
Chapter1
Introduction
In the last 40 years we have witnessed a startling shift in the way that
managers are paid to run firms. Figure 1.1 shows that in the 1970’s CEOs of
S&P 500 firms were paid almost entirely in cash. In the 1980’s equity-linked
compensation begins to increase at a moderate rate before skyrocketing in
the 1990’s to the point where equity based compensation now dwarfs cash
compensation.
Interestingly, the level of equity-linked compensation drops sharply in 2002.
Figure 1.2 shows that this downward trend has continued in recent years
with “long-term incentives” falling. It is not only the proportion of total
compensation that is linked to equity that has decreased in recent years,
Figure 1.3 shows that there has also been a compositional shift away from
stock options towards restricted stock.
2
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Figure 1.1: Executive compensation over time
Source: Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck (2004)
Additionally, Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000) empirically examined exec-
utive compensation schemes and found that 92% of the firms in their sample
have policies restricting trading by insiders and 78% have explicit blackout
periods during which trading is prohibited by insiders. Similarly, Kole (1997)
found that 79 of 371 Fortune 500 firms in her sample have such restricted
stock plans. The average minimum holding period before any shares can be
sold ranges from 31 months for firms with a medium level of research and
development to 74 months for firms with a high level of research and develop-
ment. For more than a quarter of the plans, the stock cannot be sold before
retirement.
When presented with evidence showing that executive compensation has gone
from being almost entirely cash in the 1970’s to around 50% restricted stock
and options in 2004, and that this equity exposure often has trading restric-
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Figure 1.2: Compensation Mix
CEO Expected Total Direct Compensation Pay Mix
20032002
68%
16%
16%
19%63%
18%
Salary Bonus Long-term incentives
23%
62%
15%
2004
Source: Wall Street Journal and Mercer Consulting (2004)
Figure 1.3: Incentive Mix
Long-Term Incentive Pay Mix
20032002
76%
12%
12%
62%
20%
18%
Stock options Restricted stock Performance units/shares
57%23%
20%
2004
Source: Wall Street Journal and Mercer Consulting (2004)
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tions, the questions that instantly spring to mind are why has this happened?
and what are the implications of large managerial ownership stake? As one
would expect, the first question can only be partially answered without refer-
ence to the second question. This endogeneity is expected as the implications
of managerial ownership are no doubt one of the main drivers determining
the amount of stock that managers are given.
The primary justification of equity-linked compensation is an agency problem
between the owners and mangers of the firm. In their seminal work on this
subject, Jensen and Meckling (1976) appealed to Adam Smith to explain the
nature of this problem, and since this description’s relevance has endured to
this day, I will repeat it here
The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being managers
rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be
expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance
with which the partners in a private copartnery watch over their own.
Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention
to small matters as not for their master’s honor, and very easily give
themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion,
therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of
such a company
The essence of this and other arguments is that if there is imperfect infor-
mation1 and the manager is not the sole owner of the firm, the manager does
not bear the full cost of any inefficient actions he undertakes (e.g. diverting
resources to themselves or simply shirking). This means that the manager
has different incentives from shareholders and thus his optimal actions dif-
fer from those that will maximize the utility of shareholders. The analysis
1This is essential, because in a world of perfect information shareholders could costlessly
monitor managers. This would allow shareholders to write contracts specifying the action
the manager must take in every state of the world, thus eliminating any agency problem.
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of Jensen and Meckling (1976) predicts that as the information asymmetry
between managers and shareholders becomes more severe it becomes easier
for managers to shirk or consume perks. Therefore a higher proportion of
managerial ownership becomes optimal.
It is an intuitively simple and appealing idea that if managers are given stock,
then they will “think like shareholders”. However, managerial ownership can
also have unintended, perverse consequences.For example, the “no skin the
game” problem described by Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck (2004), the “zero
cost of equity” problem for option grants described by Jensen (2001) and the
reduced incentive for option holding managers to pay out dividends identified
by Lambert, Lanen, and Larcker (1989).
The emphasis on incentive alignment has led many academics to believe
that the important factor for executive compensation is the percentage of
the firm’s outstanding share capital owned by the CEO, as opposed to the
fraction of their wealth or pay that is made up of equity instruments2. When
examining the empirical evidence on the effects of executive compensation,
Abowd and Kaplan (1999) posed the question as to whether the increased
incentives imposed on executives might be doing more harm than good. They
posit that this could happen by making managers overly cautious. They
believe this is supported by the work of Hall and Liebman (1998), who found
that CEOs can face large fluctuations in their wealth which will make risky
projects unappealing even if they are profitable. Another way of putting this
is that by giving managers large equity stakes, we may be unintentionally
making them undiversified.
This thesis is based upon four very simple premises:
1. managers, not shareholders make the investment decisions for the firm;
2. managers do more than just say “yes” or “no” to investments3, they
2For example see Jensen and Murphy (1990a) and Jensen and Murphy (1990b).
3As mentioned in the fourth bullet point below, they can also decide to “wait” when
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can also exert effort that affects the payoff from investment;
3. executive compensation schemes can cause managers to hold more stock
than is optimal for diversification purposes; and
4. many investments can be delayed, involve irreversible capital costs and
have uncertain payoffs.
While these issues have been examined in detail on their own, the interplay of
all four has not. The first two issues have been well documented in the agency
literature on executive compensation4. A general conclusion to come from
this literature is that by giving managers equity exposure we can align their
incentives with those of shareholders. If managers “think like shareholders”
then the fact that they maximise their own utility rather than shareholder
wealth is irrelevant, they will simply maximise the market value of the firm’s
equity. Maximising the market value of equity will maximise shareholder
wealth and thus incentives are aligned.
The third premise is often ignored when arguments are made that giving
managers equity exposure is a good thing. By causing managers to hold
more stock than is optimal, it is likely that they will care about the firm’s
idiosyncratic risk, something that it is assumed shareholders can diversify
away. The result of this is that while shareholders will care about the market
value of the firm, managers will have their own subjective valuation of the
firm which will incorporate the firm’s idiosyncratic risk. That is, there are
two sides to the managerial compensation “coin” - effort and diversification.5
investment can be delayed.
4See Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck (2004) for a thorough review of the executive com-
pensation literature.
5A lack of diversification may also cause managers to engage in “firm level diversifica-
tion”. This hypothesis was first developed by Amihud and Lev (1981), who presented the
diversification argument in the context of managers who have risky firm-specific human
capital which is non-traded. They therefore would wish to engage in diversifying mergers
to reduce this risk. They point out that from a shareholder’s point of view this is subopti-
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The fourth premise is explored in the developing literature on “Real Op-
tions”. This literature has found that when the investment decision is irre-
versible and the payoff is uncertain, there may be “value in waiting”.6
Combining these four premises gives the two central questions this thesis
attempts to answer
1. How does the level of managerial stock-ownership affect the investment
decisions managers make for the firm? and
2. given the answer to (1), how does this affect the shareholder’s decision
to hire a manager?7
Incorporating all four premises into one model is complex and thus a decision
must be made on a framework that is both tractable yet adequately captures
the dynamics at play. The “end goal” as such is to have a model in which
both the manager and the shareholder make a dynamic decision (hiring for
the shareholder and investing/exerting effort for the manager). To reach this
end goal a number of intermediate steps must be taken:
1. the first step is to determine the manager’s valuation of a cash flow he
is constrained to own a fixed proportion of;
2. with this in place we can examine his decision to invest and exert effort
in a now or never setting (i.e. investment cannot be delayed);
3. having established the manager’s static investment/effort decision we
can examine the shareholder’s hiring decision
mal, as they can adequately diversify the firm’s risk themselves. There is strong evidence
showing that this type of diversification destroys value for shareholders, e.g. Berger and
Ofek (1995), Lins and Servaes (1999), Lamont and Polk (2002) and Comment and Jarrell
(1995). Furthermore, May (1995) found that CEOs with more of their wealth invested in
the firm tended to diversify more.
6See Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
7Alternatively, “how does the shareholder compensate the manager?”
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4. having examined the static hiring and investment decisions, we can
then extend the modelling of the manager to incorporate the ability to
delay investment (and thus the decision concerning timing and effort);
5. finally we can examine the shareholder’s decision of whether or not to
hire the manager when investment can be delayed. This can be done in
both the context of a static (now or never) and dynamic (i.e. delayable)
decision of whether or not to hire.
In this thesis I use a continuous time framework to model these steps. As
it turns out, the form of the utility function assumed for the manager has a
huge impact on the tractability of the modelling. The assumption of Constant
Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility as opposed to Constant Absolute Risk
Aversion (CARA) causes the manager’s valuation of the cash flow in the first
step to become wealth dependent. This in itself is an interesting issue, but
it increases the dimensionality of the problem, and introduces some very
interesting numerical issues while also making the later steps of the process
intractable. Because of this we split the substantive analysis of this thesis
into two parts. In the first we assume CARA utility in order to remove
wealth dependence from the valuation and obtain a “clean path” to the end
goal of a dynamic model of hiring and investment. In the second we focus
on CRRA utility thus allowing the manager’s valuation to depend on his
financial wealth. We then explore the resultant numerical issues.
We find that a manager who is constrained to hold a large portion of his
wealth in the firm will value the firm’s projects less than a shareholder be-
cause he is undiversified and thus cares about idiosyncratic risk. The result
of this is that the manager may pass up projects that are NPV > 0 from
shareholders’ perspective. We find this result holds under both the wealth
dependent Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) and wealth independent
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) utility functions. While previous
work has already shown that in this setting the manager’s valuation depends
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upon his risk aversion and the level of idiosyncratic risk8, we show that his
valuation of the entire project depends on the proportion of the firm he owns.
Put simply, the more the manager owns of the firm, the less diversified he
is and thus the lower he values the firm’s cashflow. Another way to think
about this is that the discount rate used by the manager will depend on his
ownership stake in the firm. The additional feature introduced by a CRRA
utility function is that the more wealth the manager has, the less of an is-
sue diversification becomes. In essence, in the static valuation sense a rich
manager thinks more like a shareholder. Intuitively, as the project becomes
a smaller fraction of the manager’s wealth, the less the constraint to hold the
project affects the manager’s diversification.
This is of course only one side of the coin. Managers are given equity9 under
the presumption that they can have some positive effect on the value of
the firm. The fact that too much stock can make the manager undiversified
means that shareholders face a trade off when deciding on the optimal amount
of equity to give the manager. To understand this trade off we extend the
CARA model to allow the manager to exert effort at the time of investment
to reduce the investment cost. This model allows us to examine how the
manager’s optimal level of effort changes in response to changes in various
parameters. Interestingly we find that the manager’s optimal level of effort
is highly non-linear in the proportion of the firm he owns and that this
relationship depends heavily on how risk averse the manager is.
Having modelled the manager’s optimal level of effort in the situation where
he is constrained to own a proportion of the firm he runs, it is now possible to
model the shareholder’s choice of an optimal level of managerial ownership.
In contrast to the standard executive compensation literature, the manager’s
8See Miao and Wang (2007), Munk (2000) and Svensson and Werner (1993).
9Note that by using the term equity we are not limiting the discussion to stock grants.
Managers also obtain equity through stock option grants. The issue we are interested in
is the level of managerial ownership, not the manner in which it is obtained.
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effort is fully reflected in the shareholder’s payoff.10 The shareholder there-
fore trades off incentivising the manager to exert more effort and making him
less diversified. The level of managerial ownership that maximises the payoff
to the shareholder varies significantly across different parameter values. We
therefore conduct comparative statics analysis to see how the optimal level
of managerial ownership varies across different parameters. Interestingly we
find that market and project specific parameters do not have a very large
effect on the optimal level of managerial ownership. By contrast, parameters
that are specific to the manager, such as managerial skill, wealth, risk aver-
sion and dislike of effort, have a very significant effect on the optimal level of
managerial ownership. This is because these are the parameters that have the
largest impact on the shareholder’s payoff. This is interesting as it suggests
that the type of firm the manager works for is relatively unimportant when
determining his compensation; it is the unobservable characteristics of the
manager that matter. Given that managerial characteristics are generally
unobservable this poses a challenging problem for executive compensation
design.
The real options literature has shown that in an environment of uncertainty
there can be significant value in waiting. While the effect of non-tradeability
has been examined in a real options setting11, the issue of partial ownership
by the manager and his ability to exert effort has not been examined in a
dynamic setting where it is possible to delay investment. In this situation the
fact that the manager is maximising his own utility rather than the market
value of the project turns out to be very important. The manager effectively
incurs two costs when investing, a financial cost12 and the utility cost of
10I.e. there is no “noise” in the effort signal as in the standard model pioneered by
Holmstrom (1979).
11See Miao and Wang (2007) for a CARA/Simple Brownian Motion (SBM) model with
consumption and Henderson (2007) for a CRRA/Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM)
model without consumption.
12The manager is a shareholder and thus has to pay his proportion of the dollar invest-
ment cost.
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the effort he exerts. The manager faces a direct trade off between these two
costs in that reducing the financial cost increases the utility cost. Because the
manager has diminishing marginal utility over wealth, the richer he is the less
the financial cost means to him. Therefore for high enough levels of wealth
he will not exert any effort. While the manager wishes to avoid effort because
it is costly, he is also exposed to wealth shocks.13 If the manager invests now
and then subsequently receives a negative wealth shock, he will wish he had
exerted more effort when he invested as money is relatively more important
to him now. This fear of slacking off and then regretting it ex post leads the
manager to delay investing in the region where he would exert little effort if
he invested. That is the manager wants to be very sure that if he slacks off
he will not regret it and so he waits to invest. This is effectively the “bad
news principle” as outlined by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and discussed in
Chapter 2. Given that the shareholder’s objective is to maximize the market
value of the firm, he will simply want the manager to exert “maximum”
effort.14 There is thus a disconnect between the manager’s choice of effort and
what the shareholder desires. More interesting though is that the manager’s
“effort related” desire to wait is decreasing with market volatility, contrary
to the standard real options result that the value of waiting increases with
uncertainty.
The shareholder can make the investment decision but incurs monitoring
costs prior to investment. The shareholder thus waits for a manager with de-
sirable characteristics and/or favorable cash flow outcomes. Unsurprisingly,
the shareholder’s decision of whether or not to hire is heavily influenced by
the likelihood that the manager will exert effort upon investment. In both
the static and dynamic hiring models, the more likely it is the manager will
exert effort upon investment (and thus hiring is ex post optimal), the more
likely it is that a manager will be hired immediately. When the ability to
13This is due to his holdings of risky assets.
14In the context of this thesis, “maximum” means exerting enough effort to reduce the
investment cost to its lower bound.
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delay hiring is introduced, the “bad news principle” can be appealed to in
order to explain the shareholder’s behaviour. In essence, when the manager
has a “choice”15 over his level of effort, the shareholder will delay his hiring
decision in order to avoid outcomes where the manager doesn’t exert effort
upon investing.
While it is important to understand the hiring decision a shareholder would
make when faced with a certain type of manager, it also important to un-
derstand what type of manager a shareholder would prefer to hire given the
choice. To understand what type of manager the shareholder desires we must
examine the payoff to the shareholder for different levels of the relevant man-
agerial parameters. The typical result of this exercise is that the shareholder
will generally prefer a manager who is less risk averse, more skilled and who
requires a lower level of firm ownership. However, when one moves past gen-
eralisations, there are situations where the opposite is true and where the
shareholder is indifferent.
The thesis is in four parts. This is graphically represented in Figure 1.4.
This flow chart is a useful reference while reading this thesis and thus will be
reproduced at the beginning of each chapter with the current chapter colored
in green instead of blue.
In Part I we review the relevant literature (Chapter 2) and set out the general
modelling framework (Chapter 3).
In Part II we set out the “clean path”. As will become clear shortly, the
focal point of Part II is Chapters 7 and 8. The preceding chapters enable the
analysis in those chapters to carried out. Chapter 4 presents the manager’s
valuation of the firm’s cash flow in a “now or never” setting when he has
CARA utility and the cash flow follows Simple Brownian Motion (SBM),
Chapter 5 extends the model of Chapter 4 to allow the manager to exert
15By “choice” we are referring to the area where the manager’s wealth is not so large
that he ever exerts effort and not so small that he always exerts “maximum” effort. The
concept of maximum effort is explained in Chapter 5.
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effort at the time of investment to reduce the financial cost of investing,
Chapter 6 then extends the model of Chapter 5 to examine the shareholder’s
problem of determining the optimal level of managerial ownership, Chap-
ter 7 then extends the model of Chapter 5 to examine the manager’s effort
and investment decisions in a dynamic setting where it is possible to delay
investment and Chapter 8 extends the model of Chapter 7 to examine the
shareholder’s hiring decision.
In Part III we examine the numerical issues and qualitative effects of as-
suming a CRRA utility function while Part IV contains our conclusions and
appendices.
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2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we review the theories of investment, valuation and manage-
rial effort relevant to the problem we wish to model as outlined in Chapter 1.
We begin in Section 2.2 by covering the standard Net Present Value (NPV)
framework for investment and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
which is the de facto valuation model used in standard NPV analysis. Sec-
tion 2.3 reviews Real Options Analysis and contrasts it with the standard
NPV framework. With the standard NPV and ROA theories in place, Sec-
tion 2.4 discusses the work that extends these frameworks to a situation where
the market is incomplete due to an inability to trade the asset (i.e. when a
CEO has restricted stock and options). Finally work related to managerial
effort is discussed in Section 2.5.
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2.2 Standard Theory of Investment
The standard proposition concerning investment to come from financial eco-
nomics is that firms will undertake projects with a Net Present Value (NPV)
greater than zero. NPV is defined as the discounted present value of the
project’s revenues, minus the discounted present value of the project’s costs.1
This approach to valuation is generally referred to as Discounted Cash Flow
(DCF) analysis and is generally accepted as the standard method for valuing
projects. The area where contention generally arises is in the selection of the
discount rate used to discount the project’s risky cashflows. The standard
approach is to use a variant of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
While there are theoretical alternatives to the CAPM2 as well as empirical
questions about the empirical validity of the CAPM,3 it presents a tractable,
intuitively sensible relationship between risk and returns. The CAPM thus
serves as a useful benchmark for the analysis that will be conducted in this
thesis.
At the heart of the CAPM is a simple proposition: investors can diversify
away a portion of an asset’s risk through holding it in a portfolio with other
assets whose movements are not perfectly correlated. This results in a theo-
retically optimal holding of each asset in order to properly diversify away its
“idiosyncratic” risk. Because idiosyncratic risk can be eliminated, investors
do not require a premium for this and thus it is not priced by the market.
The risk that cannot be eliminated through diversification is known as “sys-
1See Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2006) and Copeland, Weston, and Shastri (2005) for
text book expositions.
2Such as the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) of Ross (1976).
3A review of the many studies of the empirical validity of the CAPM is beyond the
scope of this thesis and thus the reader is pointed to Copeland, Weston, and Shastri (2005)
for a good review of the major papers on the subject. It is also worth mentioning that
the many works of Eugene Fama and Kenneth French (see, e.g. Fama & French (1992,
1995, 1996)) while not explicitly testing the CAPM , show that a three factor model better
explains the cross section of expected returns.
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tematic” or market risk. Given that we will be using the CAPM valuation
as the benchmark for this thesis, it is useful to review the CAPM valuation
of the cashflows we will be considering. The two different cashflow processes
we will be considering in this thesis are Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM)
and Simple Brownian Motion (SBM)4. In continuous time, a perpetual cash
flow Yt that follows these processes will evolve according to the following
processes
GBM : dYt = µyYtdt+ σyYtdξ
SBM : dYt = µydt+ σydξ
where µy and σy are the drift and volatility of the respective processes and dξ
is a wiener process.5. Under the assumptions of the CAPM, the continuous
time valuations of the cash flows are
GBM :
Yt
r + ρ σy
σm
(µm − r)− µy
SBM :
Yt
r
+
µy − ρσyΦ
r2
where r is the risk free interest rate, µm and σm are the expected return and
volatility of the market portfolio6 respectively, ρ is the correlation between
the cashflow and the market portfolio and Φ is the Sharpe ratio of the market
portfolio.7 What these two expressions say is that the cash flow is valued
using a discount rate that reflects the “systematic” or market risk of the
cash flow. They key parameter that governs how much systematic risk the
cash flow has is ρ in both cases. This is because the correlation of the cash
4The relative merits of these different processes will be discussed in Chapter 3 when
we discuss the general modelling framework and assumptions we will be making.
5Note that µy and σy have slightly different meanings when we talk about a GBM and
SBM process given that volatility and drift are multiplicative under the assumption GBM
but additive in SBM.
6The market portfolio is assumed to follow GBM.
7Where the Sharpe ratio is a measure of an asset’s risk-return trade off and is defined
as Φ = µm−rσm .
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flow with the market represents how much of the cashflow’s risk is caused by
general market movements and thus cannot be diversified away. To illustrate
this point it is useful to consider the case where ρ = 0 and thus where the
cashflow has no systematic risk. In this case:
GBM :
Yt
r − µy
SBM :
Yt
r
+
µy
r2
From the above equation we can see that when ρ = 0, the CAPM valuation
depends only on the current level of the cashflow (Yt), the riskless interest
rate (r) and the drift term of the cashflow. While the cashflow is risky (i.e
σy > 0), because all of the cashflow’s risk can be diversified away the risk is
not priced.
Bringing everything together, in the simple case where there is a lump sum
cost of investment I8, investment will occur in the standard CAPM/NPV
framework if
GBM :
Yt
r + ρ σy
σm
(µm − r)− µy ≥ I
SBM :
Yt
r
+
µy − ρσyΦ
r2
≥ I
2.3 Real Options Analysis (ROA)
2.3.1 Overview
In recent years a literature has emerged that recognizes and corrects for a
number of assumptions that often do not hold in practice but which are im-
8i.e. The firm pays I and immediately starts receiving Y every period.
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plicitly made when conducting Standard NPV analysis. Copeland, Weston,
and Shastri (2005) note that empirically managers often invest in projects
that have a negative NPV, something that is irrational in the standard frame-
work. They point out this is because standard NPV analysis typically ignores
at least five options that are embedded in many projects:
1. The Expansion Option
If a project turns out to be much more profitable than expected the
manager can expand the scale of the project
2. The Extension Option
Similar to the expansion option, if the project turns out to be particu-
larly profitable the manager can extend the life of the project
3. The Contraction Option
In direct contrast to the expansion option, if the project turns out to
be less profitable than expected the manager can reduce the scale of
the project.
4. The Abandonment Option
If the project turns out to be significantly unprofitable, the manager
can abandon the project to avoid future losses.
5. The Delay Option
If investment is irreversible, the manager may wish to delay investment
in order to receive more information concerning the profitability of the
project.
Incorporating the value of these options into our analysis explains why it is
possible to observe managers investing when the standard NPV is negative.
To see why, we can think of investment in terms of cost benefit analysis.
Cost benefit analysis states that an action should only be undertaken if the
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benefits exceed the costs. The benefits in this situation are the present value
of the project’s revenues plus any options that are created by investing.9 and
the costs are the financial investment cost and any options that are destroyed
by investing10 Thus when options are incorporated the manager should only
invest if
Present Value of Net Revenues + Options Created ≥ I + Options Destroyed
(2.1)
Thus it is entirely possible that the standard NPV rule will be violated (i.e
NPV  0), but investment will occur because the optionality of the project
means that the total benefit of investing exceeds the total cost.
2.3.2 The Option to Delay Investment
Because the real options portion of this thesis is going to focus on the delay
option, it is important to analyze it in some detail. When analyzing the
option to delay investment, real options analysis (ROA) typically makes the
following explicit assumptions11
1. The investor is risk neutral12 or the asset can be perfectly spanned or
the investor is properly diversified.
2. The investment is irreversible.
3. Investment is not a “now or never” proposition and can be deferred.
4. There is uncertainty regarding the payoff or costs of the project.
9Such as the expansion, extension, abandonment and contraction options
10Such as the delay option.
11 There are of course other implicit assumptions that are made which we will discuss
separately.
12A risk neutral investor cares only about the expected payoff and not its distribution.
Risk Neutral investors therefore discount future cash flows using the risk free rate.
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The main effect of the first assumption is that idiosyncratic risk doesn’t
matter as the assumption of risk neutrality or perfect spanning means that
risk neutral pricing can be used,13 while a risk averse investor who is properly
diversified will only care about systematic risk and thus the CAPM applies.14
Given that the primary purpose of this thesis is examining situations where
idiosyncratic risk matters, for our purposes the distinction is not crucial
as both methods share similar general results. For there to be value in
deferring investment, the second assumption is required. This is because if
the investment was completely reversible, a firm could invest now and restore
itself to its pre-investment position if it subsequently receives bad news. In
other words nothing is lost by investing now. The requirement of the third
assumption is obvious: if by deferring the investment decision the firm loses
the ability to invest there is no value in waiting. The final assumption is
required so that something is actually gained from waiting. If there is no
uncertainty regarding the profitability of the project then no information is
gained by waiting and thus waiting is pointless.15
The main conclusion from the literature concerning the option to wait is that
when there is uncertainty there can be value in waiting. The result of this
is that the firm will invest only when the present value of the project’s net
revenues exceeds the investment cost by a strictly positive amount.16 An
important implication of this is that the hurdle rate used by the firm will
be higher than its Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) to reflect the
fact that the investor needs to be compensated for the delay option that is
13See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for an overview.
14 McDonald and Siegel (1986) present the first treatment on valuing the option to wait
when the investor is properly diversified.
15There is a present value related reason to wait when there is no uncertainty which is
discussed in Section 5.1.A of Dixit and Pindyck (1994). This is however simply a matter
of timing the investment to maximise the present value, rather than waiting to gain new
information.
16For textbook expositions of this see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Trigeorgis (1996).
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destroyed once investment occurs.17 More importantly though, is the fact
that the value of the option to wait, and thus the investment threshold and
hurdle rate used, is increasing in the volatility of the project’s cashflow. This
is significant as the standard CAPM valuation of the cashflow, and thus the
investment threshold, does not depend on the volatility of the cash flow.
2.3.3 Criticisms: Is There Really Value in Waiting?
The basic proposition that there is value in waiting has lead to a prolifera-
tion of academic work18 as well as growing acceptance among practitioners
of the importance of using ROA when making investment decisions. This
has of course led to closer scrutiny of the implicit assumptions made when
conducting standard ROA. As Triantis (2005) points out, ROA often reflects
“perfection” rather than economic reality. Many of the criticisms raised do
in fact reduce the value of waiting, but as we will discuss, once the model’s
assumptions are relaxed to more closely reflect economic reality, there is still
value in waiting, it is just not as large as the standard model suggests. In
what follows we examine the main objections that are raised against ROA.
Competition Destroys the Value of Waiting
The intuition behind this argument is very simple: by waiting, a firm pro-
vides competitors with the ability to invest first and obtain any available
first-mover profits.19 However, it is easy to over-state this argument as it re-
quires some quite restrictive assumptions. In particular, it assumes that all
17Empirical evidence that managers do often use a hurdle rate that is higher than
the WACC is presented by Poterba and Summers (1995), Meier and Tarhain (2007) and
Chirinko and Schaller (2009).
18See Schwartz and Trigeorgis (2004) for a collection of some of the most important
contributions to the Real Options literature.
19Bulan, Mayer, and Sommerville (2009) provide empirical evidence supporting this
using real estate markets.
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investments can be characterised as an “early bird gets the worm” situation.
While there may indeed be advantages to investing before ones competitors
in some cases, there are other situations where it is beneficial to let these
competitors go first. For example, suppose the proposed investment is in a
new and highly uncertain market or technology: by letting a competitor go
first and observing its fortunes, much of the firm’s investment risk can be
eliminated. When such second mover advantages are present, competition
actually reinforces the value of waiting.20
Many investments are likely to contain elements of both first and second
mover advantages, so the total effect of competition on the value of waiting
depends on which effect dominates. Only when pre-emption is essential (i.e.
the first mover effect dominates) will the strategic importance of waiting
become negligible. Recent empirical work shows that the benefits from pre-
emption are dependent on industry structure, but the relationship is not a
one way street. In fact, it has been found that while competitive industries do
indeed invest faster than monopolistically competitive firms, firms in the least
competitive industries actually invest the fastest.21 This suggests that pre-
emption is much more important in less competitive industries, which makes
sense given that in a less competitive industry the “prize” from winning the
investment “race” will often be greater since there are fewer agents to share
it with.
In a slightly different context (i.e. looking beyond first and second mover
advantages), Novy-Marx (2007) shows that options still have value in com-
petitive settings when there is cross-sectional variation in firm size and in-
vestment is lumpy and Guthrie (2010) shows that there is option value when
firms have different cost structures in competitive settings.
20The key paper to present this result is Childs, Ott, and Riddiough (2002) who show
that competition does not destroy the value of waiting when the first firm to invest reveals
information about the true state of demand. More generally, see Boyer, Gravel, and
Lasserre (2004) for a survey of real options models involving strategic competition.
21See Akdogˇu and MacKay (2008).
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Credit Constraints
Investment must be paid for, whether out of internal funds (retained prof-
its) or external funds (sale of new securities). Clearly, the ability to invest
depends heavily on the availability of such financing, and on its price and
its terms. Firms that must pay a high price to obtain new external finance
(perhaps because they are deemed to be high risk or there are information
asymmetries) will rely on internal funds, and therefore on the profitability of
existing assets.
NPV and most real options models ignore the financing problem, instead
simply assuming that investment will be paid for somehow. But firms that
rely on internal financing run the risk that this funding may not be available
in the future: for example, an adverse shock to profits may deplete internal
funds to the extent that investment becomes impossible. In this situation,
waiting is less valuable because of the risk that the investment opportunity
may in effect disappear.
Although the possibility of financial constraints weakens the advantages of
waiting to invest, these advantages do not disappear entirely. Even a severely
cash constrained firm benefits from acquiring new information - the optimal
waiting time is simply shorter than if it were unconstrained.22
Investments take “Time to Build”
In the standard real options world, investment occurs instantaneously at the
commencement of the project; subsequent investment is not required. In
practice most projects take “time to build” - that is, they require implemen-
tation and construction over a period of time. As a result, typical investment
expenditure is ongoing rather than a one-off lump sum.
Investments that begin, and then take time to complete, can of course be
22See Boyle and Guthrie (2003) and Boyle and Guthrie (2006).
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abandoned before completion if new information suggests that this would be
the optimal strategy. Such projects are, in effect, more reversible than simple
lump-sum projects, since the remaining investment cost can be avoided by
abandoning the project. But the more reversible the project, the lower the
incentive to delay its launching in order to acquire more information about
its prospects. A longer implementation period thus decreases the value of
waiting to invest.23
This phenomenon is exacerbated if the risks surrounding the project’s ul-
timate cost are primarily of the ‘technical’ variety (uncertainty about the
time needed for completion and the quantity of inputs required).24 These
kinds of risks are generally only resolved by having construction commence,
so that delaying investment provides no potential for additional information
and hence is not valuable. By contrast, input price risk (uncertainty about
the price of inputs) remains, whether or not construction is currently ac-
tive. So there is value in waiting to gain new information about this even for
projects that take time to build.
In the case of major infrastructure projects (for example the building of
transmission investment or a new stadium for a sports event), a certain level
of capacity must be in place at a known date in the future.25 When a project
has a long or uncertain construction period, the value of waiting is reduced
because waiting may leave insufficient time for completion by the required
date.
Mean Reversion
Real options models typically assume that shocks to the value of the project
value follow a “random walk” process and that these shocks are permanent.
Thus the value of a project can be subject to repeated adverse shocks, and the
23See Milne and Whalley (2000).
24See Pindyck (1993).
25See Boyle, Guthrie, and Meade (2006).
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incentive to delay investment arises from a desire to minimise the probability
of such an outcome.
However, some projects are more accurately thought of as mean-reverting:
when their value lies above or below a long-run mean, it tends to revert back
towards that mean.26 As a result, negative shocks tend to be followed by
positive shocks, which lowers the potential magnitude of adverse outcomes
and thus would seem to lessen the value of waiting.
But this is not the whole story. If mean project value exceeds the investment
cost, then even if the project value is currently low, the project is likely to
eventually be worth more than it costs. In such a case, the value of waiting
can be even greater than in the standard situation.27
Costly Information
The decision on whether to invest or delay requires calculation of a project’s
profitability. But unlike the holders of financial derivatives (on which real op-
tions theory is based), investment managers cannot continuously re-evaluate
project profitability. The complexity of most real world projects means that
such calculations are time consuming and costly.
Costly evaluations lower the value of waiting in two ways.28 First, evaluation
costs directly increase the project’s cash outflows and thus lower its value.
When the acquisition of further information about the project is costly, the
opportunity cost of delaying investment to acquire this information is greater
and hence the incentive to wait is lower. Second, and more subtly, higher
evaluation costs lead to less frequent evaluations (since doing so continuously
would be prohibitively expensive), and therefore to a lower probability of
26This is particularly true for projects whose value depends on commodity prices.
27Dixit and Pindyck (1994) value the option to wait when the project’s value follows a
mean reverting stochastic process.
28See Guthrie (2007).
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choosing the best time to invest. Since much of the value of waiting stems
from having the flexibility to invest on exactly the right date, this effect
reduces the incentive to wait in the first place. This is particularly important
when project value is mean-reverting, as the temporary nature of value shocks
means that getting the timing of investment exactly right is crucial.
Summary
Although these real-world factors drive a wedge between the true value of
waiting and that predicted by simple theoretical models, the size and sign of
this wedge is frequently unclear. Even when the waiting value is unambigu-
ously smaller than its theoretical counterpart, it is extremely unlikely to be
zero.
2.4 Non-Traded Assets and Idiosyncratic Risk
The central idea behind this thesis is that the managers of firms are forced
to hold too much stock in the companies they work for and thus are unable
to eliminate idiosyncratic risk. If managers are able to trade their stock
then this is not a problem as they could simply sell down their stake to the
level that is optimal for diversification purposes. While a fair amount of
work has examined the valuation of non-traded stocks and derivatives in in-
complete markets, non-traded stochastic cashflows have received comparably
less attention. The purpose of this section is thus to review the literature
concerning the valuation of non-traded cash flows in both a static and real
options context.
We begin in Section 2.4.1 by briefly reviewing some of the general literature
on the valuation of non-traded stocks and options.
We therefore begin by reviewing the literature regarding the valuation of
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a non-traded stochastic cashflow, before proceeding to discuss the recent
literature concerning the valuation of the delay option when the underlying
asset is non-traded. This is sensible because it is difficult to understand how
an option on a non-traded asset is valued without first discussing how the
non-traded asset itself is valued. The key insight that we shall find is that
because idiosyncratic risk cannot be eliminated, the valuation is no longer
preference free. Therefore factors such as the manager’s level of risk aversion
and personal financial wealth can have significant impacts on the decisions
made.
2.4.1 General literature on non-traded options/stocks
The majority of the work concerning the valuation of non-traded assets has
focused upon how the presence of a non-traded asset affects an agent’s op-
timal consumption and investment in risky assets. In terms of consump-
tion/savings decisions, the general result of this literature is that the classical
two-fund separation result no longer holds.29 This is because an investor’s
demand for risky assets no longer depends solely on its mean and variance,
but also on its ability to hedge the risks associated with their non-traded
income.30 From a valuation perspective, since the demand for risky assets
depends on the ability to hedge non-traded income, many standard asset
pricing models will not hold.31 The presence of unhedgeable risks is likely to
29The two-fund separation result originates from the work of Tobin (1958) and states
that the decision concerning choice of the optimal mix of risky assets can be separated
from the choice of how much money to invest in the portfolio of risky assets. Thus the
decision for the investor is simply how much money to allocate to the risky fund of assets
and how much to allocate to the risk free asset.
30See Campbell and Viceira (2002) for discrete time models of consumption/saving
decisions in the presence of non-traded income.
31For example He and Pages (1992) show that Merton’s Intertemporal Capital Asset
Pricing Model (ICAPM) doesn’t hold in the presence of non-traded income, but a version
of Breedon’s Consumption CAPM with modified Euler equations does hold.
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reduce the valuation an agent places on an asset relative to the case where
the asset is freely traded. For example, Kahl, Liu, and Longstaff (2003) have
shown that an agent’s valuation of restricted stock is much less than the
value he would place on it were it tradeable, and Ingersoll (2006), Meulbroek
(2001) and Hall and Murphy (2002) have developed models showing that the
value of an employee stock option can be anywhere between 50-70% of its
Black-Scholes value.
2.4.2 Valuation of non-traded cashflows
The starting point for the valuation of a non-traded cashflow in continuous
time is the simple model of Merton (1969). In this model the investor has
either CARA or CRRA, can freely trade in risky assets as well as the risk
free asset and does not have a non-traded source of income. This model has
since been extended in a number of ways to examine the role of idiosyncratic
risk and non-tradability.
Merton (1971) extended the classic no-income model of Merton (1969) by ex-
amining the situation where a CARA investor receives an income stream that
follows a Poisson process. He finds that investors treat the certainty equiv-
alent value of their lifetime income as an addition to their current wealth.
Thus investors consume a constant fraction of their “total wealth” and in-
vest a constant fraction of their financial wealth into risky assets based upon
their mean and variance. In this situation two-fund separation still holds as
a Poisson process means that shocks to income are entirely idiosyncratic.
He and Pages (1992) isolated the effect of non-tradability by examining the
case where an investor has a perfectly-spanned income stream that he can-
not trade or borrow against. They found that in this case the liquidity
constraints alter the effective planning horizon of the investor, causing the
investor to smooth consumption over time more than they would in the ab-
sence of liquidity constraints. He and Pages also show that as wealth goes to
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infinity, the optimal consumption and savings policies converge to the poli-
cies that would be chosen without the constraints. Intuitively this means
that as income becomes a smaller part of total wealth, the constraints on in-
come become irrelevant. Under the same general assumptions, El Karoui and
Jeanblanc-Picque´ (1998) derived a closed form solution for consumption as a
function of wealth and income. They used this to show that at zero wealth,
a smaller fraction of income is consumed relative to the unconstrained case.
This result is broadly consistent with the consumption-smoothing result of
He and Pages (1992).
Duffie, Fleming, Soner, and Zariphopoulou (1997) relaxed the assumption of
complete markets, and showed that when the investor has CRRA utility and
the income process follows GBM, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equa-
tion is a second order non-linear partial differential equation. Crucially, the
assumption of CRRA utility means that the valuation of the cash flow now
depends on the agent’s financial wealth. The key contribution of this paper
was to show that the dimensionality of the HJB equation can be reduced by
transforming the model into a function of one variable (the ratio of wealth to
income Z ≡ W
Y
). Using this transformed model they were able to prove that
the value function is a constrained-viscosity solution to the HJB equation.
While they were unable to find analytical solutions they proved that as the
ratio of wealth to income reached infinity, the investor would behave as if
he was in a Merton(1969, 1971) world with no income.32 This result is very
similar to the limiting result of He and Pages (1992). The implication is
that an investor (or manager) who has sufficiently large financial wealth is
indifferent to the parameters of the cashflow.
Making the same assumptions about the investor’s opportunity set as Duffie,
Fleming, Soner, and Zariphopoulou (1997), Koo (1998) derives the implicit
value the agent places on the income stream and uses this to characterize
32This stems from the fact that the model of Duffie, Fleming, Soner, and Zariphopoulou
(1997) differs from the framework of Merton (1969,1971) only through the addition of
non-traded income.
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the optimal policies.33 This implicit value is defined as the marginal rate
of substitution between income and wealth. Koo shows that the implicit
value of the income stream is, in general, less than the complete markets
valuation, consistent with the stock and option pricing models mentioned
previously. As with Duffie, Fleming, Soner, and Zariphopoulou (1997), Koo
was unable to analytically solve the model. However, he did prove that the
value function, optimal polices and implicit valuation of income converge to
their complete market counterparts as the ratio of wealth to income goes to
infinity.
Building upon the work of Duffie, Fleming, Soner, and Zariphopoulou (1997)
and Koo (1998), Munk (2000) makes two major contributions. The first is
to recognize that the implicit valuation derived by Koo is not an entirely
satisfactory measure of value. This is because the implicit value is by defini-
tion a marginal value and thus does not offer an entirely satisfactory account
of the value of the entire stream to the investor.34 Munk therefore derives
the utility indifference value of the income stream.35 While the implicit and
utility indifference valuations differ initially, Munk proves that they converge
as the ratio of wealth to income goes to infinity. Munk’s second contribution
is to show how a simple converging numerical method can be used to solve
the HJB equation numerically. He uses the Markov chain approximation
method and confirms that the valuation of the income stream is much lower
than the complete markets valuation. Using the numerical solution to the
HJB equation he is also able to compute the agent’s optimal consumption
and investment in the risky asset. He confirms the analytical results of Duffie,
Fleming, Soner, and Zariphopoulou (1997) by showing that when the ratio
of wealth to income is very large, optimal consumption and investment are
constant across different levels of the income stream. More interesting is the
33These policies refer to the consumption and portfolio decisions of the agent.
34The valuation of the entire stream is what is relevant to this thesis since we are
analysing investment decisions.
35See Henderson (2009) for an overview of the utility indifference pricing method.
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behavior of optimal consumption and investment when wealth is relatively
low. Munk finds that both consumption and investment increase rapidly with
income initially, and then become proportional to income as income becomes
relatively large.
Miao and Wang (2007) take a slightly different approach by making assump-
tions that simplify the analysis considerably compared to the Duffie, Fleming,
Soner, and Zariphopoulou (1997) framework. By assuming CARA utility and
thus eliminating wealth effects they are able to derive the following closed
form solution for the investor’s valuation of a non-traded SBM cashflow
G[Y ] =
(
Y
r
+
µ− ρσyΦ
r2
)
− γφ
2
2r2
(2.2)
which is simply the CAPM valuation of an SBM cashflow presented in Sec-
tion 2.2, with an additional term that decreases the valuation of the cashflow
depending on the manager’s risk aversion (γ) and the level of idiosyncratic
risk (φ).
2.4.3 Real Options
The major papers concerning the valuation of the option to wait when the un-
derlying asset is non-traded take two different approaches. Henderson (2007)
assumes that the project value is stochastic and thus the investor receives a
lump sum upon investment. This is quite different from assuming that upon
investment the investor begins to receive a risky cashflow. The result of this
is that investing actually eliminates the investor’s exposure to the project’s
risk. While this type of situation does describe many investments,36 it is not
the primary concern of this thesis.
36The primary example is that of an apartment development which is then sold off upon
completion as opposed to being managed by the developers. In this situation the developer
is bearing the risk prior to completion, but once the project is completed the investors
who purchased units then bear all the risk.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 35
The analysis of Miao and Wang (2007) is more complete than that of Hender-
son (2007) in that the authors analyse both the case where the payoff from
investment is a lump sum and where it is a stochastic cashflow, allowing a
comparison between the two. Given that our primary interest is the analysis
of cashflows, the majority of this section will focus on this paper. However,
as will be seen shortly, the approach of Henderson (2007) is unique and thus
it is important to analyse the difference in methodology between the two
papers. A third paper by Hugonnier and Morellec (2007b) also analyzes the
value of the option to wait when the underlying asset is non traded, but as
we shall see their analysis is incomplete.
Henderson (2007)
Henderson (2007) models the problem of an entrepreneur who has an infi-
nite horizon CARA utility function defined over financial wealth (x in her
notation)
U(x) = −1
γ
e−γx, γ > 0 (2.3)
By defining utility over wealth, consumption has been eliminated from the
model, thus simplifying the analysis. The entrepreneur is the sole owner of
a firm whose only asset is the right to invest in a project that will pay the
lump sum Vt at the time investment of the lump sum cost I is paid. The
entrepreneur also has access to a risky asset (whose price is denoted Pt) which
partially spans movements in Vt. Because the firm’s asset is non-tradable and
Pt only partially spans the risk associated with Vt, we are in an incomplete
market and thus idiosyncratic risk matters. Vt and Pt are assumed to evolve
according to the following GBM
dV
V
= η(ξdt+ dW ) + rdt
dP
P
= σ(λdt+ dB) + rdt
where ξ ≡ υ−r
η
and λ ≡ µ−r
σ
are the Sharpe ratios of the two assets. dW
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and dB are the two Weiner processes whose correlation is denoted by −1 ≤
ρ ≤ 1. The novelty of Henderson’s approach is the derivation of what the
author refers to as a “time consistent utility function”. This approach is
taken because of the issues that arise when trying to value cash flows at
intermediate times when the investor has no consumption. The author shows
that the time consistent utility function that is maximised at the time of
investment is
Uτ (x) = −1
γ
e−γrτxe
1
2
λ2τ
where τ is the time that investment occurs. This differs from the standard
utility function in two ways: the −rτ term converts the investment payoff
into today’s money and the e
1
2
λ2τ makes an adjustment for the fact that
the investor’s wealth has been optimally invested in the risky asset. CARA
utility’s lack of a wealth effect in valuation combined with the use of time
consistent utility allows Henderson to obtain a closed form solution for the in-
vestor’s value function which is then used to determine a certainty equivalent
valuation of the option.
Her results are very interesting when compared to the standard results from
the real options literature. The primary findings are the following
1. In general if |ρ| < 1 and γ > 0 then the value of the option and thus
the investment threshold is less then the McDonald and Siegel (1986)
and risk neutral values.
2. The value of the option to wait and thus the investment threshold is
increasing in |ρ|.
3. The value of the option to wait, and thus the investment threshold, is
decreasing in γ.
4. It is possible for the value of the option to decrease with uncertainty.
5. The risk neutral valuation and the model of McDonald and Siegel
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(1986) are contained as special cases of the model when γ → 0 (Mc-
Donald and Siegel (1986)) and ρ→ 1 (risk neutral).
The intuition behind the first three results is fairly straightforward. In gen-
eral when an agent is forced to bear idiosyncratic risk he values the project
less than the situation where he is not exposed to that risk. Thus it makes
sense that he values the option less in this situation than he would if he
were not exposed to this risk. As |ρ| → 1, we are approaching a situation
where the risky asset perfectly spans Vt and thus the project no longer has
any idiosyncratic risk. Therefore it is sensible that the agent’s valuation of
the option increases. The manager’s dislike of idiosyncratic risk is dependent
on his risk aversion and thus it is unsurprising that as his risk aversion in-
creases (and thus his dislike of idiosyncratic risk increases) his valuation of
the option decreases. The fourth result is slightly more complex. Because
the agent dislikes idiosyncratic risk, an increase in volatility has two effects:
idiosyncratic volatility increases and the convexity of the payoff increases37.
The first effect reduces the value of the option while the second increases
the option value via the standard channel. Depending on parameter values
either effect can dominate.
Based upon this the author argues that the use of either the McDonald and
Siegel (1986) or risk neutral investment rules can lead to sub-optimal under-
investment, as this model predicts that investment can occur much earlier
than the standard models suggest. This conclusion relies upon the manager
being the sole owner of the firm. If the manager is a minority shareholder
and the other investors have different risk preferences to the manager or are
properly diversified while the manager is not, the conclusion is likely to be
quite different. If the manager makes a decision based upon the incomplete
model, then from a shareholder’s perspective he may be investing too early
which would result in over investment as far as shareholders are concerned.
Acknowledging the difference between managers and shareholders will be the
37That is, the downside that is avoided by not investing increases.
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primary concern of this thesis.
One thing that Henderson does not consider is the distinction between a lump
sum payoff and a stochastic cashflow upon investment. When a lump sum
is assumed, the payoff from investment is independent of risk preferences.
In this situation risk aversion decreases the value of the option and not the
payoff. Thus it is perhaps unsurprising that investment is sped up. As we
shall see shortly from the analysis of Miao and Wang (2007), if the payoff is
instead a stochastic cashflow, then risk aversion will also affect the manager’s
valuation of the payoff. Therefore the net effect on investment timing depends
on whether the effect of risk aversion is greater on the option or the payoff.
Miao and Wang (2007)
Similarly to Henderson (2007), Miao and Wang assume that the investor
has CARA utility and thus there is now wealth dependence in the problem.
However they assume that utility is defined over consumption (Ct) and thus
takes the following form
U(Ct) = −1
γ
e−γCt , γ > 0
By defining utility over consumption, wealth serves a purpose at intermediate
points in time and thus a time consistent utility function does not need to be
derived as it was in Henderson (2007). However, the inclusion of consumption
does result in the investor’s HJB equation becoming a second order non-
linear differential equation which has no analytical solution. Therefore the
HJB is solved numerically using the projection method implemented with
collocation.38 The authors examine both the case where the payoff from
investment is a lump sum and the case where the payoff is a stochastic
cashflow. They examine both of these for the cases of “self insurance” (the
investor only has access to the risk free asset) and when there is a risky asset
38See Judd (1998) for an overview of this method.
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that can be used to partially hedge the project. Given that the focus of this
thesis is not on self-insurance, we focus solely on the partial spanning case.
In contrast to Henderson (2007), Miao and Wang assume that the investment
state variable (which represents either a lump sum received at the time of in-
vestment or a cash flow) follows SBM (as opposed to Henderson’s assumption
of GBM). To capture the difference between systematic and idiosyncratic risk
they assume that the state variable evolves as follows
dXt = αxdt+ ρσxdBt + xdB˜t
where B and B˜ are independent wiener processes and x is the project’s
idiosyncratic volatility, which can be defined as
x =
√
1− ρ2σx
For the lump sum case the results of Miao and Wang are consistent with
those of Henderson (2007) in that they find the value of the option to wait is
lower than the risk neutral valuation and is decreasing in both risk aversion
(γ) and the level of idiosyncratic volatility (2x).
If the investment payoff is instead a flow, then there are two competing ef-
fects on investment timing. The first effect is the same as for the lump sum
case in that risk aversion and idiosyncratic risk decrease the value of the op-
tion, something that encourages investment. The second effect is that after
investment the manager is receiving a stochastic cashflow. The fact that he
cannot fully eliminate the cashflow’s idiosyncratic risk means that risk aver-
sion and idiosyncratic risk decrease the manager’s valuation of the cash flow,
something that discourages investment. The net effect on investment timing
thus depends on which effect dominates. The authors then go on to show
that the project value effect dominates the option effect and thus idiosyn-
cratic risk and risk aversion delay investment when we have flow payoffs. The
main implication of this result is that statements cannot be made about the
effect of idiosyncratic risk on investment timing without first considering the
nature of the investment payoff.
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Hugonnier and Morellec (2007)
The paper of Hugonnier and Morellec (2007b) shares elements of both the
self insurance model of Miao and Wang (2007) and the model of Henderson
(2007). They consider an agent with CRRA utility defined over wealth who
is the owner of a firm that has the option to invest in a project that will
deliver a GBM cashflow upon completion. The manager has no consumption
and does not have access to a risky asset to partially hedge the project’s
cashflow. Interestingly they do not employ the time-consistent utility ap-
proach of Henderson despite the fact that there is no consumption in the
model. The agent has access to the risk free asset and is assumed to have
the cost of investment (I) invested in the riskfree asset at all times prior to
investment, thus generating an income stream of rI at every point in time
prior to investment. They find that risk aversion causes the manager to de-
lay investment relative to the McDonald and Siegel (1986) case. They posit
that this is because by investing the agent is exchanging a risk free cash-
flow (rI) for a risky cash flow and thus the agent wishes to delay exposing
himself to idiosyncratic risk. This is the same result as found by Miao and
Wang (2007) when the payoff from investment is a cashflow. However, in
this case the result is a direct result of the setup of their model. Hugonnier
and Morellec (2007b) have modelled the problem essentially ignoring the fact
that the agent is holding an option prior to investment and thus is exposed
to idiosyncratic risk through that option. Thus rather than investment being
delayed because the effect of idiosyncratic risk is greater on the project value
than on the option value, it is delayed to put off transitioning from a risk
free state to a state where they are exposed to risk.
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2.4.4 Implications for Well Diversified and Risk Neu-
tral Shareholders
The general conclusion to come from the models concerning non-tradability,
risk aversion and idiosyncratic risk is that exposing an agent to an asset’s
idiosyncratic risk will lower his valuation of that asset. In a “now or never”
investment setting this means that managers are likely to value the firm’s
projects less than shareholders and thus could pass up projects that have a
positive NPV from a properly diversified/risk neutral shareholder’s perspec-
tive.
When the analysis is expanded to projects where delay is possible, we can
have either over or under investment from a well diversified/risk neutral
shareholder’s perspective. If the project’s payoff is of a lump sum nature,
then it is likely that managers will invest sooner than would be optimal from
a shareholder’s perspective. Conversely, if the project is a flow then it is
likely that the manager will invest later than is optimal from a shareholder’s
perspective. Thus constraining managers to hold large amounts of their
company’s stock can actually have adverse impacts on shareholder wealth.
That is, giving managers stock has the potential to make them think less
like shareholders.
2.5 Effort
Managers are generally given stock because they are believed to have the
ability to positively influence the value of the firm. Work relating to the
optimal incentive level that shareholders should give managers to motivate
them to exert effort has shown that the optimal incentive level decreases with
firm risk.39 These models generally focus on a manager who can directly
affect the stock price of the firm he works for by exerting effort, but the
39See Murphy (1999) for a survey of this literature.
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stock price is subject to significant noise. As the level of noise increases,
the manager’s optimal level of effort decreases because the firm’s stock price
performance depends less on his level of effort. It is therefore not surprising
that as the level of noise increases, the optimal incentive decreases in this
context. As will become clear later, a key distinction between my thesis and
this work is that there is no “noise” in my model. That is, the manager’s
effort is fully reflected in the shareholder’s payoff.
The majority of this work however does not make any attempt to separate
the impact of the firm’s systematic and idiosyncratic risk on the optimal in-
centive level. The exception to this is a paper by Jin (2002), who examines
the optimal incentive given to the manager when he cannot trade the stock
of his own firm but can trade the market portfolio. He finds that idiosyn-
cratic risk decreases the optimal incentive for the same reasons as in the
standard model, while systematic risk has no effect on the optimal incentive
level. The reason that systematic risk has no effect is that the manager can
simply adjust his holding of the market portfolio to eliminate any changes in
the systematic component of the firm’s risk. This analysis however doesn’t
take into account how changes in the level of both systematic and idiosyn-
cratic risk can affect the manager’s valuation of the firm. This is likely to
affect the manager’s optimal level of effort, and thus the contract provided
to the manager. In this thesis I will model a slightly different problem that
incorporates the manager’s valuation problem as well as his effort decision.
I do this by allowing effort to affect the investment cost of the firm’s project.
Once the manager’s optimal level of effort is determined, we can then model
the shareholder’s problem of how much stock to give the manager.
A related problem that has not been discussed is what impact effort has
in a real options setting. The real options papers that have examined the
difference between shareholders and managers and how to contract to correct
for these differences have generally focused on inducing optimal timing from
a manager who has private information. Wonder (2006) presents a model
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of private information where the manager can divert the firm’s assets to his
own use and shows that the optimal contract is a call option on the project
payoff. Grenadier and Wang (2005) take a different approach and allow the
manager to exert effort to alter the probability distribution of the private
portion of the payoff. In their model effort alters the chance of getting a
“good” project instead of a “bad” project. In this setting, since the manager
also receives private information by waiting, his option is more valuable than
the shareholders’ and thus the manager will delay investment more than a
shareholder would. Finally, Hugonnier and Morellec (2007a) present a model
where the manager is undiversified and thus values the project differently
to the shareholders but faces the possibility of a control challenge if his
behaviour deviates too far from value maximising behaviour. They find that
risk aversion and idiosyncratic risk significantly speed up investment, but this
is mitigated by the threat of a control challenge. This model however has a
very ad-hoc link between the manager’s wealth and the project in that his
wealth is simply scaled up or down by a constant at the time of investment.
This constant depends on whether he is replaced and if the project has a
negative NPV.
Chapter3
General Setup
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the modelling framework we will be
using in the rest of this thesis. This serves the purpose of consolidating any
common assumptions in a single point of reference. We begin this chapter in
Section 3.3 by setting out the principal agent problem between the manager
and shareholder. Following this we describe the specific assumptions made
concerning the shareholder’s problem in Section 3.3 and the manager’s prob-
lem (including possible utility functions) in Section 3.4. We next set out the
assumed stochastic structures for the market asset and the firm’s cashflow in
Section 3.5. The final part of the framework we need to lay out is the man-
ager’s inter-temporal wealth equations, which we do in Section 3.6. These
equations set out the dynamics of the manager’s financial wealth before and
after investment.
The next step is to combine these different assumptions to derive the man-
ager’s general Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. This is done in Sec-
tion 3.7 and serves as the basis for the various models we will solve throughout
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out this thesis.
The final section of this chapter (Section 3.8) sets out a special case of the
general model, corresponding to the manager’s value function when there is
no project/cashflow. This is the well known model from Merton (1969). The
solution to this model is important as it represents the manager’s outside
option, i.e. the payoff he gets from investing/not accepting the job.1
3.2 The Principal-Agent framework
The principal in this thesis is the representative shareholder.2 The share-
holder owns the right to a project which delivers a stochastic revenue stream
Yt upon paying the investment cost I.
3 The shareholder can either manage
the project himself or delegate the decision on whether or not/when to invest
to a manager (the agent). If the shareholder chooses to hire a manager, the
manager receives a proportion α of the project which he cannot trade. The
cost of this project is funded by the firm’s shareholders in proportion to their
ownership stake4 and thus the manager must pay a cost of αI as soon as the
firm invests.
The potential for agency problems in this thesis arises by making the follow-
ing key assumptions:
• The manager can exert effort to reduce the investment cost I, but the
shareholder cannot;
1Managers of course have the option to accept another job. For the purposes of
tractability we assume the manager has no outside employment opportunity.
2As set out in Section 3.3, for simplicity we assume that there is one representative
shareholder. That is, shareholder unanimity holds.
3It is assumed that upon investment the project is completed immediately, i.e there is
no “Time to Build”.
4That is, the firm is entirely equity financed.
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• The shareholder incurs a monitoring cost κ while waiting to invest but
the manager does not; and
• The shareholder values the firm’s cash flows using the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM) whilst the manager does not since he is not
properly diversified.
No skill and proper diversification provide a simple point of reference for the
manager’s position relative to shareholders. We could have allowed share-
holders to have some skill and be relatively un-diversified, but this would
increase the complexity of the analysis for no discernible benefit.
Similarly, we assume that the shareholder incurs a positive monitoring cost
while the manager’s monitoring cost is normalised to zero. The manager
could have been given a positive monitoring cost that is less than the share-
holder’s, but the same analysis of relative monitoring costs can be achieved
by simply normalizing the manager’s monitoring cost to zero.
To focus on the agency issues caused by differences in diversification, ability
to exert effort and monitoring costs, we assume that there is no asymmetric
information. Our analysis thus differs from the traditional principal agent
literature in that the manager does not have any private information. This
means that the shareholder is able to observe (amongst other things) the
manager’s effort, skill and financial wealth.5
3.3 The Shareholder’s problem
In this thesis, we model the shareholder’s problem in two different general
ways, based upon the complexity of the manager’s problem that underlies the
shareholder’s decision. In Chapter 6 we consider the shareholder’s decision
5In a way this is a weakness of the framework, but on the same note it allows the
intertemporal issues we are interested in to be isolated.
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when the manager makes a now-or-never investment decision. In this setting
there is a closed form solution for the manager’s problem and thus we can
allow the shareholder to choose how much of the firm’s stock to give the
manager. Specifically, the shareholder chooses the level of the variable α
which is the percentage of the firm’s stock that is given to the manager. In
this setting, choosing α = 0 corresponds to not hiring a manager and the
shareholder managing the project.
In the model of Chapter 8 things are more complicated. The manager makes
a decision in a dynamic setting where investment can be delayed and this
problem must be solved numerically.6 This means that the proportion of
the firm that the manager owns must be treated as exogenous from the
shareholder’s perspective. Therefore in Chapter 8 the shareholder’s decision
is a one-off decision of whether or not to hire, given an exogenous “cost” of
hiring the manager, where the cost is the exogenous portion of the firm that
is given to the manager if hired. In addition, we also allow the shareholder
to delay his decision of whether or not to hire a manager/invest. Thus the
shareholder can wait for a manager with desirable characteristics.
3.4 The Manager’s problem
3.4.1 General setup
The manager’s objective is to maximize expected utility of lifetime consump-
tion, defined as
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−βdtU(Ct)dt
]
where β is the manager’s time preference. The manager owns a non-traded
exogenous fraction α of a firm whose investment decisions he controls.7 The
6This analysis is carried out in Chapter 7.
7In reality, managers would generally also have a fixed component to their income.
However, we are focused on the incentive effect of ownership and thus have normalised
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manager also has an exogenous initial endowment of wealth Wt and can in-
vest in risk free bonds and a risky market asset. Because the manager cannot
trade his shares in the firm he cannot trade away the firm’s idiosyncratic risk.
Therefore we are in a situation of incomplete markets. Prior to investment the
manager thus makes the following decisions at every point in time: the dollar
value of investment in the risky asset (pit), consumption (Ct), investment in
the risk free bonds (Wt − pit), how much effort (e) to exert if investment
occurs and whether or not the firm will invest in the project. Because the in-
vestment decision is assumed to be irreversible, the manager’s only decisions
post investment are the asset allocation and consumption/savings decisions.
Given the above structure, we can think of the manager as being in one of
two states at any point in time: in State 2 the firm has invested and he
is receiving his share of the income stream and in State 1 the firm is yet
to invest. State 1 can be characterised as either a dynamic setting where
investment can be deferred or a static setting where the manager must make
a now or never investment decision.
3.4.2 The Manager’s Utility Function
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA)
U(C) = −1
γ
e−γC (3.1)
The CARA utility function (3.1) is characterized by increasing relative risk
aversion. This suggests that people become more averse to risks involving a
proportion of their wealth as their wealth increases. Evidence presented by
Campbell and Viceira (2002), suggests that this may not be the case. They
argue that the long run behavior of the economy suggests that there is no
persuasive link between relative risk aversion and wealth. This is based upon
the fact that risk premia and interest rates (which are essentially the prices
this to zero.
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of relative risk) have remained relatively constant over the last two centuries
despite massive increases in per-capita consumption and wealth.
Despite the aforementioned intuitive shortcomings, this utility function does
have some empirical support. Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) have shown
that observed option prices and forecasts show support for investors having
a CARA utility function. From a modelling perspective this utility function
seems to be the most tractable based upon previous work.8 This stems
from the fact that CARA utility eliminates wealth effects, which reduces the
dimensionality of problems, making them easier to solve.
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA)
U(C) = Cγ (3.2)
As previously pointed out, the arguments of Campbell and Viceira (2002)
support a utility function with constant relative risk aversion and thus this
utility function is appealing in that respect. However, using a constant rel-
ative risk aversion utility function allows for wealth effects. This has an
intuitive appeal as it is possible that an agent’s wealth level will have an
impact on his investment decisions. However, the added dimensionality of
the problem may make the analysis intractable.
CARA utility also exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion which is an
intuitively plausible description of behavior. Therefore in selecting a util-
ity function we face a trade off between tractability (CARA) and economic
plausibility (CRRA).
8Closed form solutions to incomplete markets based investment timing problems have
been found by Miao and Wang (2007) and Henderson (2007).
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3.5 Stochastic Structure
The following assumptions are made concerning the stochastic structure of
the investment opportunity set.
3.5.1 Market Asset
The value of the market asset, Mt, evolves according to the following Geo-
metric Brownian Motion (GBM)
dMt = µmMtdt+ σmMtdξt (3.3)
GBM is the generally preferred specification for stock prices since it doesn’t
permit negative values and thus captures the limited liability nature of traded
companies. It is also more tractable than other potentially more realistic
models such as those that assume volatility is stochastic.
3.5.2 Investment State Variable
Because the assumption regarding the evolution of the investment state vari-
able has a significant effect on the complexity of the problem, we will consider
the following processes for Yt (i.e. the project’s cashflow).
Simple Brownian Motion (SBM)
dYt = µydt+ ρσydξt + φdηt (3.4)
Note that dηt is an additional Brownian motion. Here the state variable
can become negative, which in the case of a stochastic income stream is
interpreted as the project making a loss. While this specification simplifies
the analysis substantially, the state variable can become arbitraily large and
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negative so that we need to assume that the manager will continue the project
even if it is incurring substantial losses.9
Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM)
dYt = µyYtdt+ ρσyYtdξt + φYtdηt (3.5)
The assumption of GBM means that the state variable cannot become nega-
tive. Furthermore, since changes to the state variable are multiplicative, once
the state variable reaches zero it stays there forever. This implies that once
the cashflow or project value reaches zero the project rights will be worthless.
Variables related to idiosyncratic risk
Given that we are interested in separating the effects of systematic and non
systematic risk, the following variables are defined for both the GBM and
SBM cases:
• −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1: the correlation of the firm’s cash flow with the market
portfolio
• φ = √1− ρ2σy: the idiosyncratic component of the project’s volatility
• dηt: the Wiener process governing the idiosyncratic component of the
project cash flow.
• dξt: the Wiener process governing the systematic component of the
project cash flow.
• (dξt)(dηt) = 0
9This problem could be solved by introducing an abandonment option. This however
would significantly complicate the analysis.
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3.6 Inter-temporal Wealth Equations
Given the characterization of the manager’s problem and the stochastic struc-
ture in which the problem is framed, we can express the manager’s pre and
post-investment intertemporal wealth equations as follows.
3.6.1 Stage 2 : Post Investment
In this state the manager has already incurred the investment cost αI and is
currently receiving his share of the stochastic income stream αYt each period.
The budget constraint is therefore
dWt = ((rWt + pi(µm − r))− Ct + αYt)dt+ piσmdξt (3.6)
Intuitively, the manager’s wealth increases each date due to his investments
in the risk free asset, risky asset and the project. Each date it also decreases
because he spends Ct on consumption.
3.6.2 Stage 1 : Pre Investment
To allow for the situation where the manager may wish to invest in the
project but does not have the money to do so, we do not constrain the
manager to hold his share of the investment cost at every point in time prior
to investment.10 Therefore the pre-investment intertemporal wealth equation
is simply the post-investment equation without the stochastic cashflow
dWt = ((rWt + pi(µm − r))− Ct)dt+ piσmdξt (3.7)
10Put another way, the manager is not liquidity constrained. If we did constrain the
manager to hold αI at every point in time prior to investment, this would be accomplished
by constraining the manager to hold αI in the risk free asset at every point in time prior
to investment.
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3.7 The General Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equa-
tion
While the specific form of the manager’s value function depends on the as-
sumptions concerning the investment state variable, the form of the invest-
ment payoff, the manager’s utility function and whether or not investment
has occurred, in order to avoid repetition it is useful to derive the general
form of the manager’s value function. Given that the manager maximizes
the expected lifetime utility of consumption over an infinite horizon, we can
use dynamic programming to express the manager’s value function as follows
J(W,Y, t) = max
C,pi
[
U(Ct)dt+ e
−βdtE[J(W (t+ dt), Y (t+ dt), t+ dt]
]
(3.8)
Using standard methods it is straightforward to show that the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) for the manager’s problem is
βJ(W,Y ) = max
C,pi
[
U(C) + E[Jt + JwdW + JydY +
1
2
JwwdW
2 +
1
2
JyydY
2 + JwydY dW ]
]
(3.9)
Note that the exact form this equation takes depends on whether dW takes
the form specified in Equation (3.7) or Equation (3.6).
3.8 Special Case: The Model with No Project
(Merton (1969))
In the case where the manager does not own any of the firm or if the project
rights have expired, then lifetime utility no longer depends on the investment
state variable. Therefore the problem reduces to the classic case studied by
Merton (1969)
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3.8.1 The Manager’s Problem
In this situation the manager’s intertemporal budget constraint is given by
(3.7). Using M superscripts to denote that this is the Merton (1969) value
function, we can simplify (3.9) down to:
βJM(W ) = max
C,x
[U(C) + JMw (rW + x (µm − r)− C)
+
1
2
JMww(xσmW )
2]
FOCC : U
′[C] = JMw
FOCpi : pi
∗ = −J
M
w (µm − r)
JMw σ
2
m
(3.10)
This is the standard system from Merton (1969). The consumption first order
condition is the familiar envelope condition which states that in equilibrium
the marginal utility of consumption must be equal to the marginal utility
of deferring a unit of wealth. The portfolio first order condition is simply a
continuous time analogue to standard mean variance portfolio theory in that
the dollar amount invested into the risky asset is positively related to the
risk premium of the asset (µm − r) and negatively related to the variance of
the asset (σ2m)
3.8.2 Solutions
Because the solution for the manager’s intertemporal value function is depen-
dent on the form of his utility function, we will present the solutions for both
CRRA and CARA utility. However, as the solution method for this problem
is well known from previous work, the derivations will not be repeated here.
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CARA Utility
When utility is assumed to have the functional form given in (3.1), Merton
(1969) has shown that the solution to (3.10) is
JM(W ) = − 1
γr
e
−γr(W+ Φ2
2γr2
)
where Φ is the Sharpe ratio of the market asset.11 Thus optimal consumption
and investment can be expressed as
C∗ = r
(
W +
Φ2
2r2γ
)
pi∗ =
µm − r
rγσ2m
CRRA Utility
When utility is to assumed to have the functional form given in (3.2), Merton
(1969) has shown that the solution to (3.10) is
JM(W ) = Aγ−1W γ
where
A ≡ γ
1− γ
[
β
γ
− r − 1
2
(
µm − r
σm
)2
1
1− γ
]
Therefore optimal consumption and investment in the risky asset can be
expressed as
C∗ = AW
pi∗ =
µm − r
(1− γ)σ2m
W
11Thus Φ = µm−rσm
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Chapter4
CARA Utility with SBM Cash flow
4.1 Introduction
As outlined in Chapter 1, there are a number of steps that must be completed
before we answer the primary questions this thesis seeks to answer. In this
chapter we will complete the first step. The question this chapter examines is
“how does a manager value a cash flow he is constrained to own a proportion
of?”. Having established the manager’s valuation of his share of the cashflow,
we also briefly examine the manager’s static (“now-or-never”) investment
decision.
Previous work has shown that the assumption of CARA utility causes the
manager’s valuation of the income stream to be independent of his level of
wealth,1 this simplifies the analysis considerably and thus CARA utility will
be the starting point for our analysis. Given that Miao and Wang (2007) have
obtained a closed form solution for a CARA investor that owns a SBM cash-
flow, we will use their solution procedure for the case of partial ownership.
This dual assumption of CARA/SBM will continue through to Chapter 8
1See Miao and Wang (2007)
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and is the basis of the “clean path”.
The layout of this chapter is as follows: Section 4.2 sets out the solution
(4.2.1) and comparative statics (4.2.2) for the manager’s utility valuation of
the cash flow, Section 4.3 sets out the manager’s now-or-never investment
decision and Section 4.4 summarises the findings of this chapter.
4.2 Utility Valuation of the Cashflow
4.2.1 Solution
In this state the manager is already receiving an income stream that evolves
according to Simple Brownian Motion and faces the Stage 2 intertemporal
budget constraint. Using (3.4), (3.1) and (3.6) we can simplify the general
HJB equation (3.9) down to the following
βJ2(W,Y ) = max
C,pi
[−1
γ
e−γC + J2w (rW + pi (µm − r)− C + αY ) + J2yµy
+
1
2
J2ww(piσm)
2 +
1
2
J2yy
(
φ2 + ρ2σ2y
)
+ J2wy(piρσyσm))]
Taking the first order conditions for consumption and investment in the risky
asset yields
FOCC : C
∗ = − ln(J
2
w)
γ
FOCpi : pi
∗ = −J
2
w (µm − r)
J2wwσ
2
m
− ρJ
2
wyσy
J2wwσm
Following Miao and Wang (2007) we assume2 that β = r and guess a solution
for the value function of the following form
J2(W,Y ) = − 1
γr
e
−γr(W+αG[Y ]+ Φ2
2γr2
)
(4.1)
2Miao and Wang (2007) note that this assumption is necessary to obtain a closed form
solution.
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which is simply the Merton (1969) no income value function plus the un-
known function αG[Y ]. By setting up the problem in this way, αG[Y ] is the
implicit valuation of the manager’s stake in the firm. Conversely, G[Y ] can
be interpreted as the manager’s implicit valuation of the entire firm given
that he is constrained to own a proportion α of the firm. Using this guess
and substituting in the first order conditions allows the HJB equation to be
simplified down to
Y−rG(Y )+1
2
rαγ
(
ρ2 − 1)G′(Y )2σ2y+(µy + ρ (r − µm)σyσm
)
G′(Y )+
1
2
G′′(Y )σ2y = 0
Following Miao and Wang, we make an initial guess for G[Y ] of
G[Y ] =
(
Y
r
+ A
µy − ρσyΦ
r2
)
− Aγφ
2
2r2
where A is a constant to be solved for. If we substitute this guess into the
differential equation and solve for A we get the following
A =
2ρ (r − µm)σy + σm
(
αγ (ρ2 − 1)σ2y + 2µy
)
2ρ (r − µm)σy + σm
(
γ (ρ2 − 1)σ2y + 2µy
)
Substituting this back into our initial guess for G[Y ] yields the following
solution
G[Y ] =
(
Y
r
+
µy − ρσyΦ
r2
)
− αγφ
2
2r2
(4.2)
This is identical to the solution obtained by Miao and Wang (2007) except
that the third term is now scaled by α. Given that the third term deals with
the idiosyncratic risk of the project and all the variables in that term are
positive constants we can see that the manager’s subjective valuation of the
entire project is decreasing in α. The intuition behind this is that the more of
the firm the manager is constrained to hold, the more idiosyncratic risk he is
forced to bear as he is less diversified. Therefore the manager will effectively
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value the cash flow using a higher discount rate. From Equation (4.2) we
can also make the observation that as α → 0 the valuation of the project
approaches the CAPM valuation and thus does not depend on risk aversion
(γ) or idiosyncratic risk (φ).
4.2.2 Comparative statics
We now conduct comparative statics to determine how the manager’s valua-
tion of cashflow varies with particular parameters. The main purpose of this
is to see whether the effect of certain parameters differs from the standard
effects predicted by the CAPM.3 The base case parameters we will use are
as follows:
Table 4.1: Base case parameters for Chapter 4
γ = 1 r = 0.1 µm = 0.15
β = r σm = 0.3 µy = 0.1
σy = 0.3 ρ = 0.0 I = 100
These parameters differ slightly from those used by Miao and Wang (2007).
Where the parameters are different, this has been done to maintain some
level of consistency with the parameters used in the numerical analysis of
Chapter 9.4
Given that the volatility of the project (σy) and the correlation of the project
(ρ) appear in both the second and third terms5 of Equation 4.2, their effect
3As discussed in Chapter 3, the CAPM is the benchmark valuation we use for the
shareholder.
4Loosely speaking, the market parameters from Chapter 9 (which are taken from Munk
(2000)), are used in conjunction with the manager-specific parameters from Miao and
Wang (2007). Because different processes are used for the cashflow (GBM and SBM) we
cannot have perfectly consistent parameters between Chapter 9 and the rest of the thesis.
5Recall that φ ≡
√
1− ρ2σy
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on the value of the project will depend crucially on the level of α. To help
understand this, Figure 4.1 plots the manager’s subjective value of the project
as a function of both α and ρ.
Figure 4.1: Subjective Value as a function of α and ρ
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Calculated using the base case parameters
From Figure 4.1 we can see that the effect of ρ on G[Y ] depends on whether α
is high or low. When α is low, G[Y ] decreases linearly in ρ whereas when α is
large G[Y ] initially decreases in ρ but then begins to increase. The intuition
here is that when α is small the manger’s valuation of the project approaches
the CAPM valuation. Therefore the value of the project decreases linearly
with ρ since this increases the project’s “beta”.6 On the other hand, when α
is large the manager is very exposed to the firm and thus cares more about
the firm’s idiosyncratic risk. To understand why the valuation is non-linear
in ρ when α is large, recall that φ =
√
1− ρ2σy. Therefore ρ appears in the
third term of equation (4.2) in a nonlinear fashion. It is easy to show that
the third term of this equation is increasing in ρ until ρ = 0 after which this
6In the CAPM, beta is the measure of systematic risk. This should not be confused
with the parameter β in our model representing the agent’s time preference.
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term is decreasing in ρ. It is also interesting to note that the value of the
project decreases with respect to α except when | ρ |= 1. This is because
in this situation we are in a complete market and thus the project has no
idiosyncratic risk.
Similarly, to understand how the effect of σy on the subjective valuation de-
pends on α, Figure 4.2 plots the manager’s subjective valuation as a function
of σy and α when ρ = 0.5. From Figure 4.2 we can see that the effect of σy
also depends strongly on how much of the firm the manager owns. We can
see that when α is small, σy has an insignificant effect on G[Y ]. However
when α is large the effect of σy is large and non-linear.
7 This is because
when α is small the manager does not care about the project’s idiosyncratic
risk and thus the only effect of σy on the manager’s valuation of the project
is through its effect on the project’s beta. When α is large the manager
also cares about the project’s idiosyncratic risk and thus σy has a significant
effect on the manager’s subjective valuation. As shown by the third term in
Equation (4.2), idiosyncratic risk has a non-linear effect on project value.
Figure 4.3 plots the subjective valuation as a function of α and γ. The
intuition behind the effect of γ as α is varied is similar to that for σy and ρ.
Figure 4.3 shows that when α is very small the manager’s valuation of the
project approaches the CAPM valuation. Given that the CAPM valuation
is independent of preferences it is unsurprising that γ has little effect when
α is low. The larger α is, the more idiosyncratic risk the manager is exposed
to. Given that the higher risk aversion is, the more a manager cares about
idiosyncratic risk, it is expected that the value of the project decreases with
γ. It is also unsurprising that this relationship is stronger when α is higher
since idiosyncratic risk is larger.
In the CAPM, the only effect that total project volatility has is through its
7Note that this graph is drawn with ρ = 0.5 and thus σy has a negative effect on G[Y ].
If a value of ρ close to −1 was chosen the same analysis would apply except σy would have
a positive effect.
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Figure 4.2: Subjective Value as a function of α and σy
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Figure 4.3: Subjective Value as a function of α and γ
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effect on the beta of the project. To understand the distinction between
systematic risk (beta in the CAPM) and idiosyncratic risk (φ) in the current
model, Figure 4.4 plots the manager’s subjective valuation of the project as
function of ρ and σy.
Figure 4.4: Subjective Value as a function of ρ and σy
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Because investors only care about systematic risk in the CAPM, when ρ = 0,
σy will have no effect on the value of the project since this risk is entirely
idiosyncratic. Figure 4.4 illustrates that in the current model idiosyncratic
risk matters. When ρ = 0, σy has a negative effect on the subjective valu-
ation of the project. In Figure 4.4 as ρ → 1 there is a significant negative
relationship between the subjective value and total volatility, whereas when
ρ → −1 the relationship is positive. This is the standard result from the
CAPM (the “CAPM effect”). However in the current setting the manager
requires compensation for both systematic and idiosyncratic risk. Therefore
the net effect of σy on the subjective valuation of the project will depend on
the relative split between idiosyncratic and systematic risk.
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The idiosyncratic risk of a project is by definition independent of movements
in the market asset and thus the effect of idiosyncratic risk on the valuation
of the project is independent of ρ and thus always negative. However, in our
modelling framework the level of idiosyncratic risk depends on ρ, because
ρ determines how much of the project’s risk can be hedged using the risky
asset. As ρ→ |1|, the project has no idiosyncratic risk and thus the CAPM
effect of σy dominates the idiosyncratic effect, whereas as ρ→ 0 the project’s
risk is entirely idiosyncratic and the idiosyncratic effect dominates.
4.3 The Static Investment Problem
If investment in the project can be characterized as a now or never decision,
then we can think of the manager as choosing between not investing (i.e.
receiving the Merton (1969) value function) or paying αI and receiving the
Stage 2 value function. The manager’s value function can thus be expressed
as
V (W,Y ) = max[J2(W − αI, Y ), JM(W )]
= max[− 1
γr
e
−γr(W+α(G[Y ]−I)+ Φ2
2γr2
)
,− 1
γr
e
−γr(W+ Φ2
2γr2
)
] (4.3)
We use this function to characterize the situations when a manager does and
does not invest for a range of parameter values. Given that we have already
examined the valuation the manager places on the cashflow, we know the
effect that certain parameters will have on the manager’s decision of whether
or not to invest. Anything that reduces the value of the project makes invest-
ment less attractive and vice versa. However, whether or not these effects are
significant to the investment decision is the more important question. The
main variables of interest are those which are manage- specific and thus we
will examine the significance of wealth, ownership and risk aversion on the
investment threshold.
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Figure 4.5: Investment Threshold (Y ∗) as Function of α
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To understand the manager’s investment decision, Figure 4.5 plots the man-
ager’s investment “threshold” Y ∗ as a function of α for various levels of γ.
The threshold Y ∗ is the level of the cashflow where the manager invests once
Y > Y ∗. From Figure 4.5 we can see that the effect of α on the investment
threshold depends heavily on the manager’s risk aversion. For context, the
CAPM investment threshold for the base case parameters is 9. When risk
aversion is very low we find that the investment threshold is almost flat (and
approaches the CAPM threshold) whereas when risk aversion is large the in-
vestment threshold increases significantly in α. This happens because when
γ is small the manager approaches risk neutrality and thus does not care
about idiosyncratic risk.
Figure 4.6 plots the manager’s investment threshold as a function of W and
Y for various levels of γ. When we examine the effect of wealth on the
investment threshold we unsurprisingly find that the investment decision is
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Figure 4.6: Investment Threshold (Y ∗) as Function of W
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Calculated using the base case parameters and γ = 10, 5, 2, 1, 0.5. In this graph the y-axis represents Y and the x-axis
represents W . The top line plots the threshold for γ = 10 while the bottom line plots the threshold for γ = 0.5
independent of the manager’s wealth level. This stems from the fact that the
manager’s valuation of the cash flow is wealth independent.8 The interesting
feature of Figure 4.6 is that as risk aversion increases, the gap between the
investment threshold selected by the manager and that predicted by the
CAPM (9 in Figure 4.6) gets larger.
8It is also of course dependent on the assumption that the manager faces no liquidity
constraints.
CHAPTER 4. CARA UTILITY WITH SBM CASH FLOW 70
4.4 Summary
This chapter has focused on answering the question “how does a manager
value a cash flow he is constrained to own a proportion of?”.
We have seen that the constrained valuation is often non-linear and the
effects of certain parameters differ markedly from those predicted by the
CAPM. The main result to come from this chapter is that as α increases,
the manager’s subjective valuation of the project decreases since this exposes
him to more idiosyncratic risk. As shown in Figure 4.5, this means that the
higher α is, the less likely it is that the manager will invest.
Chapter5
Managerial Effort
5.1 Introduction
In the model of Chapter 4 the only effect the manager has on the firm is
choosing whether or not investment takes place. In reality managers are
generally only hired because they have the ability to positively1 affect the
value of the firm in some way.
Given that the previous model only captures the negative effects associated
with managerial ownership, we now extend the model of Chapter 4 to the
case where the manager can exert effort to reduce the cost of investment,
thereby increasing the firm’s investment payoff.
We will thus complete the next step in our progression by understanding
what factors influence the manager’s decision of how much effort to exert.
The impact of the manager’s effort decision on his investment decision are
then examined in a “now-or-never” setting.
This chapter is set out as follows: Section 5.2 outlines the framework and
1Managers can of course also negatively affect the value of the firm. Our focus however
will be on positive impact the manager can have on the firm.
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assumptions used to introduce effort into the model of Chapter 4, Section 5.3
examines the solution for the manager’s optimal level of effort, Section 5.4
examines the manager’s investment decision in a now-or-never setting given
that he can exert cost reducing effort at the time of investment and Sec-
tion 5.5 summarises the results of this chapter.
5.2 Setup
We assume that the manager can affect the investment cost in the following
way
I[e] = exp(−λe)A+ (1− exp(−λe))B e ≥ 0 (5.1)
By defining the investment cost function in this way, the manager’s effort
is fully reflected in the investment cost and therefore the eventual payoff to
the shareholder. In other words there is no “noise” in the Holmstrom (1979)
sense.2
While we could have allowed for e to become negative (thus allowing the
manager to shirk)3, we will restrict ourselves to the case of strictly positive
effort in order to focus on the issues of managerial effort and idiosyncratic
risk.
By defining the cost of investment in this way we can think of A as the base
cost of investment if no effort is exerted. The parameters B and λ govern two
different aspects of managerial skill. B governs the absolute amount by which
the investment cost can be reduced by the manager exerting effort.4 We can
thus think of B as characterizing both the manager’s ability to reduce the
investment cost and the natural scope for cost reduction in the project being
considered. The aspect of managerial skill that λ represents is subtly different
2To introduce noise into this setup one would include a random error term in the
investment cost function.
3Although arguably e = 0 could be characterised as shirking.
4Thus if A = $100m and B = $80m then there is the potential for $20m of cost savings.
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from B. While B determines how much the investment cost can be reduced
through effort, λ tells us how much effort is required to reach an arbitrary
level of cost reduction. Thus all other things being equal a higher λ means
that effort is more effective at reducing the cost of investment. Figure 5.1
illustrates the impact of λ on the effectiveness of effort. We can see that
when λ is very large it takes almost no effort to reduce the investment cost
to B, where as when λ is quite small it takes a significant amount of effort
to reach B.
Figure 5.1: Investment Cost vs Effort for various levels of λ
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Calculated using λ =0.01, 0.1, 0.5, 1, 2, 3, where the top line represents λ = 0.01 and the bottom curve
is λ = 3
It is important to note that there are two extreme cases when effort has no
effect on the investment cost. When A ≈ B, either the manager doesn’t have
the skill or there is physically no scope for cost savings. Therefore effort has
no effect on the investment cost. Similarly if λ = 0, even if there is significant
scope for cost savings,5 the manager lacks the skill to reduce the investment
cost.
The exponential nature of the cost function also imposes two intuitively
5That is, B is quite low relative to A.
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appealing atributes. Firstly, the manager will experience diminishing returns
to effort meaning that the initial units of effort he exerts will have a large
effect on the investment cost whereas later units will have a smaller effect.
Secondly, so long as B ≥ 0 we avoid the unrealistic situation of a negative
investment cost.
Like the previous models, we solve this problem backwards by first solving the
manager’s problem given that he has decided to invest and then determining
whether or not investing is the utility maximizing strategy for the manager.
We already know that if the manager invests he receives the payoff J2(W −
αI, Y ). We assume that at the time of investment the manager can exert
effort which has a benefit defined by Equation (5.1) and imposes a lump
sum cost on the manager. We can thus express the manager’s payoff from
investing as
Je(W,Y ) = J2(W − αI[e], Y )− θe (5.2)
where θ can be thought of as the manager’s dislike of effort. By setting
up the payoff this way we are implicitly assuming that the cost of effort is
independent of wealth and thus is physical dislike of effort as opposed to a
financial representation of the cost of effort.6
5.3 The Manager’s Optimal Level of Effort
Using Equations (5.2) and (4.1) we can simplify the payoff function to the
following for the SBM/CARA case
Je(W,Y ) = − 1
γr
e
−γr(W+α(G[Y ]−I[e])+ Φ2
2γr2
) − θe (5.3)
6This implies that Bill Gates dislikes exerting effort just as much as we do if we have
the same θ. However, as Equation (5.4) shows, his optimal level of effort will still be
different from mine due to the differences in our wealth.
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Substituting in the solution for G[Y ] and taking the first order condition for
effort allows us to solve for the manager’s optimal level of effort
eˆ =
Ω− 2r log
(
θ
(A−B)αλ
)
+ 2rW
λ
(
e
η2
2r
−αγρσyη
r
−α
2γ2σ2y
2r
+
α2γ2ρ2σ2y
2r
+rWγ−Brαγ+Y αγ+αγµ
r rγθ
)
2rλ
(5.4)
where
Ω ≡ 2(Bα−W )γr2 − η2 + 2αγ(δηρ− µ− rY ) + α2γ2δ2 (1− ρ2)
Given the complexity of this expression, we will conduct graphical analysis
to determinine the effect of the firm and manager-specific parameters on the
level of effort exerted by the manager. We use the same base case parameters
as outlined in Section 4.2.2, with the addition of “effort” specific parameters
as outlined in Table 5.1
Table 5.1: Base case parameters for Chapter 5
γ = 1 r = 0.1 µm = 0.15 µy = 0.1 A = 100 λ = 1 W = 1
β = r σm = 0.3 σy = 0.3 ρ = 0.0 B = 80 θ = 0.1 Y = 10
The first parameters we examine are the manager’s wealth (W ) and the level
of the cash flow (Y ). Figure 5.2 plots the manager’s optimal level of effort as
a function of W and Y . It shows optimal offort (eˆ) is a decreasing function
of both the manager’s outside wealth and the level of the cash flow. This is
easily understood intuitively given that CARA utility exhibits diminishing
marginal utility from wealth. Because increasing effort increases the payoff
from investment, the utility gain from that payoff is large when W is small
and small when W is large. Therefore we observe that effort decreases with
W . Similarily when Y is very large, the utility benefit from exerting effort is
small and thus we also see that effort decreases with Y .
The next parameter we wish to examine is α. As it turns out, the effect of
α depends heavily on the manager’s level of risk aversion (γ). Figure 5.3
therefore plots optimal effort as a function of α and γ.
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Figure 5.2: The effect of W and Y on optimal effort
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Calculated using the base case parameters
Figure 5.3 shows that the effect of α on optimal effort is highly non-linear
and depends very strongly on the manager’s risk aversion (γ). To understand
the effect of α on optimal effort we need to recognize that increasing α has
three conflicting effects on optimal effort:
• The manager obtains a greater direct benefit from effort since he owns
more of the firm and thus exerts more effort;
• The manager is “richer” and thus exerts less effort; and
• The manager is less diversified and thus exerts more effort to offset his
lower valuation of the cashflow.
Starting from the observation that the manager bears the full cost of any
effort he exerts, but has to share the benefit of his effort with shareholders,
we can see that increasing α increases the benefit the manager receives from
exerting effort. Therefore α has a positive effect on effort. On the other hand,
CHAPTER 5. MANAGERIAL EFFORT 78
Figure 5.3: The effect of α and γ on optimal effort
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Calculated using the base case parameters
increasing α also scales up the manager’s exposure to Y . We have already
demonstrated that effort decreases with Y and thus it is unsurprising that
scaling up the manager’s exposure to Y decreases effort. In a sense the
more of the firm the manager owns, the “richer” he is and thus his marginal
utility of an increase in Y exposure is lower. The third effect relates to how
diversified the manager is and is highly dependent on how risk averse the
manager is. As discussed in Chapter 4, a higher value for α decreases the
manager’s valuation of the cashflow. To offset this decrease in value the
manager exerts more effort.
We can see from Figure 5.3 that when γ is small the first two effects dom-
inate; effort initially increases due to the first effect but as α gets large the
marginal utility effect starts to kick in and thus effort tapers off and eventu-
ally decreases. However when γ is quite large we find that the diversification
effect begins to dominate the first two and effort will actually start to in-
crease in α after initially increasing then decreasing. This is interesting as
the relationship between optimal effort and α is highly non-linear and heavily
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influenced by the manager’s risk aversion.
Another interesting aspect of Figure 5.3 is the effect of risk aversion on effort.
For low levels of α effort decreases with γ. It is easy to show in the standard
Merton (1969) model that the marginal utility of wealth is decreasing in
γ. Thus an increase in γ decreases the utility payoff from effort and thus
decreases optimal effort. However as mentioned previously, risk aversion is a
significant determinant of whether under-diversification affects the manager’s
valuation of the cashflow. Thus we can see that when α is large and the
manager is undiversified, optimal effort starts to increase because an increase
in γ starts to significantly reduce the manager’s valuation of the project.
To confirm our intuition that it is a lack of diversification driving the be-
haviour in the region where γ is high, we consider the case where ρ = 1. In
this situation the project has no idiosyncratic risk and thus diversification
is not a factor. If idiosyncratic risk is the cause of the change in behaviour
in the region where γ is large, then when there is no idiosyncratic risk the
diminishing marginal utility effect should dominate. That is, when γ is large
effort should be decreasing in γ and α. We can see from Figure 5.4 that this
is the case.
While θ and λ can respectively be thought of as the cost and benefit of effort,
Figure 5.5 shows they do not have the opposite effects on effort as one might
expect. As would be expected, optimal effort decreases as the cost of effort
(θ) rises. As λ approaches zero optimal effort is zero as effort has no effect on
the investment cost. For very small levels of λ we do find that optimal effort
increases with λ, but this is only for a very small range. Outside of this range
optimal effort actually decreases with λ. The intuition for this is that when
λ is very small, an increase in λ means that effort actually has an effect on
the investment cost. This means that effort is worthwhile and thus optimal
effort increases. However, once λ becomes large enough, optimal effort starts
to decrease in λ. This is because we are in a state where only a small amount
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Figure 5.4: The effect of α and γ on optimal effort when ρ = 1
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Calculated using the base case parameters
of effort is required to drive the investment cost close to B.7 Once we are in
this state, the cost of driving the investment cost down to B is small enough
that the manager will always exert enough effort to do so. Therefore once
we are in this state optimal effort is decreasing in λ because an increase in λ
decreases the effort required to drive the investment cost down to B.
If we now turn to the parameters concerning the investment cost, it is unsur-
prising to find that the upper (A) and lower boundaries (B) have opposite
effects on optimal effort. Figure 5.6 shows that as A increases, the benefit
from exerting effort increases and thus optimal effort increases. This effect
begins to diminish as A becomes large due to the fact that the amount of
effort required to reduce the cost to B does not change a great deal as A
increases. The opposite logic applies to B where we find that when B is very
small optimal effort is relatively insensitive to changes in B, but begins to
rapidly decrease as B approaches A. In the case where A ≈ B, optimal effort
is driven towards zero as would be expected given effort has no effect on the
7Note that due to the exponential nature of the cost function, only with e = ∞ will
I[e] = B.
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Figure 5.5: The effect of θ and λ on optimal effort
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Calculated using the base case parameters
investment cost.
Figure 5.6: The effect of A and B on optimal effort
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Calculated using the base case parameters
Given the discussion in Section 4.2, it is unsurprising that in Figure 5.7 the
effect of σy on optimal effort depends on the sign of ρ. When ρ is positive, σy
has a negative effect on the manager’s subjective valuation. Because σy has
a negative effect on the manager’s valuation the manager exerts more effort.
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The opposite occurs when ρ is negative since σy increases the manager’s
valuation in this situation. We also see that as ρ increases optimal effort
increases because the manager’s valuation decreases as ρ increases.
Figure 5.7: The effect of σy and ρ on optimal effort
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Calculated using the base case parameters
The final parameter we consider is the volatility of the market asset (σm).
Figure 5.8 plots the manager’s optimal level of effort against σm. Figure 5.8
shows that as σm increases so does the manager’s optimal level of effort. This
is interesting because the base case assumption of ρ = 0 means that σm has
no effect on the manager’s valuation of the project. Indeed, it is easy to show
that regardless of the assumption concerning ρ, there is a positive relation-
ship between optimal effort and σm. This occurs because a ceteris parabis
change in σm reduces the market asset’s Sharpe ratio. In other words the
attractiveness of the manager’s portfolio investments has reduced. This has
the effect of reducing the manager’s utility which all other things equal causes
the marginal utility of wealth to increase. This increase in the marginal util-
ity of wealth means that the utility benefit of effort has increased. Therefore
we witness the optimal level of effort increasing as σm increases.
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Figure 5.8: The effect of σm on optimal effort
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5.4 The Static Investment/Effort Decision
Having analysed the manager’s optimal effort decision, we are now in a posi-
tion to examine the “now or never” investment decision the manager makes
in a static setting. If the manager decides to invest, we have already solved
for his optimal level of effort, and thus know that the payoff from investing
is simply Equation (5.3) with the expression for the optimal level of effort
(Equation (5.4)) substituted in. Conversely if the manager decides not to
invest then he is simply in the Merton (1969) world where he is not receiving
the cash flow nor does he have the option to invest. Given this characteriza-
tion, the manager’s investment problem can be expressed as
V e(W,Y ) = max[J2(W − αI[eˆ], Y )− θeˆ, JM(W )] (5.5)
Because α and W both affect the manager’s optimal level of effort (eˆ), their
effects on the investment threshold are considerably different compared to
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the no effort case where their effects were linear.
Figure 5.9: Investment Threshold (Y ∗) as a Function of α and γ
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Calculated using γ = 5, 2, 1, 0.5. In this graph the y-axis represents Y and the x-axis represents α. The
top line plots the threshold for γ = 10 while the bottom line plots the threshold for γ = 0.5.
Figure 5.9 shows that for low levels of risk aversion the investment threshold
decreases in α for the majority of the range and then gradually increases.
If we recall Figure 5.3, for small levels of γ, effort is generally increasing in
α because the manager benefits more from exerting effort. The fact that
effort increases with α results in an investment threshold that declines as
α increases. On the other hand, when γ is quite large, diversification is
much more important to the manager. Therefore, for high values of γ, as α
gets large the manager’s valuation of the project decreases. This causes the
investment threshold to increase, after initially decreasing due to the effect
mentioned previously.
Figure 5.10 plots the manager’s investment threshold as a function of W
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Figure 5.10: Investment Threshold (Y ∗) as a Function of and Wand γ
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Calculated using γ = 5, 2, 1, 0.5. In this graph the y-axis represents Y and the x-axis represents W . The
top line plots the threshold for γ = 10 while the bottom line plots the threshold for γ = 0.5.
and Y for various levels of risk aversion. In this graph we can see that for
each level of risk aversion there is effectively a “high” threshold and “low”
threshold which correspond to high wealth and low wealth. This is a direct
result of using an investment cost function which has an upper (A) and
lower (B) bound and the fact that effort decreases in W . I.e. the low wealth
threshold roughly corresponds to the I[e] ≈ B and the high wealth threshold
corresponds to I[e] = A.
If we focus on the right hand side of the graph (high W ) where no effort is
exerted, we observe the same general pattern as in the no effort model (e.g.
Figure 4.6). That is, for higher values of γ the investment threshold is higher
since the manager values the project less.
The most interesting feature of Figure 5.10 is the shape of the transition be-
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tween the “high” and “low” thresholds for different levels of γ. The general
pattern we observe as that for higher values of γ, the transition is steeper.
Put another way, a smaller change in W is required to move from the low
threshold (high effort) to the high threshold (low effort). This relationship
occurs because the CARA utility function is strictly negative and thus faces
an asymptote at zero. Given that an increase in γ increases the concav-
ity of the utility function, as γ increases the level of utility approaches the
asymptote much quicker (i.e. the function becomes flatter). The result of
this is that for large values of γ the marginal utility of wealth and thus the
utility benefit of effort get driven close to zero quite quickly. This is why in
Figure 5.10 we see that for high levels of γ the change from a low investment
threshold (i.e high effort) to a high investment threshold (i.e low effort) oc-
curs quite suddenly. This is in stark contrast to the case of low risk aversion
where effort is exerted over a much broader range of W .
5.5 Summary
In this chapter we examined the constrained manager’s decision of how much
effort to exert at the time of investment. The manager’s optimal level effort
is highly non-linear in the proportion of the firm he owns and depends on
how risk averse he is. In other words, more is not neccesarily better when
it comes to motivating the manager to exert effort. Importantly, manager-
specific parameters really matter.
Perhaps the more interesting feature of this chapter is the manager’s invest-
ment decision. In the model of Chapter 4, the manager’s financial wealth
(W ) did not affect his investment decision because under CARA utility the
valuation of the cash flow is not wealth dependant. However, once effort is
introduced into the model the manager’s investment decision depends on his
wealth. This is because the manager’s effort decision depends on his wealth
and thus so does the investment cost. Therefore, despite wealth having no
CHAPTER 5. MANAGERIAL EFFORT 87
direct impact on the manager’s valuation, his actions depend on his wealth
and therefore the manager’s wealth indirectly impacts the value of the firm.
Chapter6
The Shareholder’s Static Hiring
Problem
6.1 Introduction
This chapter represents an intermediate point of analysis in this thesis. The
model of Chapter 5 is not dynamic, but it does allow us to model the trade off
a shareholder faces between making the manager less diversified and giving
him the incentive to exert effort in a now-or-never setting. While not directly
comparable to the final model in Chapter 8,1 this serves as a useful point of
comparison to the results of that chapter.
The empirical trend demonstrated in Chapter 1 suggests that there has been
a “more is better” attitude towards equity linked compensation. However
we have demonstrated in Chapter 4 that a large α can reduce the manager’s
valuation of the project. This can cause the manager to pass up investment
opportunities that would be wealth increasing2 from the shareholder’s per-
1See Section 3.3 for a discussion of the different approaches taken to the shareholder
in this thesis.
2That is, from a shareholder’s perspective the project would have a positive Net Present
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spective. We also found in Chapter 5 that increasing α does not necessarily
cause the manager to exert more effort.
These observations naturally lead to the question of what is the optimal level
of managerial ownership? To answer this question we examine the share-
holder’s problem of choosing how much of the firm to give to the manager
given that the manager can exert effort and is also restricted from trading his
shares in the firm. Given that the proportion of the firm that the shareholder
gives to the manager is likely to depend on the “type” of manager, our focus
will be on manager-specific parameters.3
While our focus is on the manager, the literature surveyed in Section 2.5
shows that the optimal incentive given to managers decreases with the level
of “noise” in a firm’s share price. The corollary to this in our model is σy
and thus we will also examine the affect this has on optimal compensation in
our model,4 though we again note that this is not “noise” in the traditional
(i.e. Holmstrom (1979)) sense.
We begin this chapter by setting up the shareholder’s problem in Section 6.2.
The difference between the manager and shareholder in this setting is that
shareholders are properly diversified and value the project using the Cap-
ital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The manager on the other hand is not
diversified and can also exert effort to reduce the cost of the project. With
the shareholder’s problem framed, we then solve for the level of managerial
ownership (α∗) that maximises the payoff to the shareholder in Section 6.3.
Section 6.4 summarises the conclusions from this chapter.
Value (NPV).
3E.g. the manager’s risk aversion and “skill”.
4Recalling again that there is no assymetric information in our model.
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6.2 Setup
We assume that there is a representative shareholder who uses the CAPM
to value the firm’s cashflows. This means that shareholders only care about
systematic risk, in contrast to the constrained manager who we have shown
previously cares about both the systematic and non-systematic component of
the project’s risk. The CAPM valuation of a Simple Brownian Motion (SBM)
cashflow is simply the manager’s valuation of the cash flow (Equation (4.2))
with α = 0
Y
r
+
µ− ρσyΦ
r2
We assume that the shareholder has no skill (this means that either A = B
or λ = 0) and thus the cost of investment if no manager is hired is simply
A.5 Therefore the payoff to the shareholder from investing himself is
PCAPM =
Y
r
+
µ− ρσyΦ
r2
− A (6.1)
On the other hand if a manager is hired then the shareholder gives up α of
the firm, but the investment cost is now determined by Equation (5.1) and
thus depends on the manager’s optimal effort level. This gives the following
payoff if a manager is hired
PM [α] = (1− α)
(
Y
r
+
µ− ρσyΦ
r2
− I[eˆ]
)
(6.2)
Crucially, we assume that the manager’s level of effort is observable.6 Equa-
tion (6.2) shows that if a manager is hired there is a trade off between dilut-
ing the shareholder’s claim of the company, and increasing the total payoff
5While we could have assumed that the shareholder has some scope to reduce the
investment cost, the purpose of our analysis is to examine the shareholder’s decision given
that the manager is more skilled than the shareholder. The simplest way to achieve this
is to assume the shareholder has no skill.
6Equivalently, we assume A,B,λ and θ are observable.
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through the manager exerting effort. Thus if a manager is hired, the share-
holder will choose α∗ to maximize Equation (6.2). If hiring a manager does
not leave the shareholder any better off than if they did not, then they will
not bother. Thus the shareholder’s problem is to choose α∗ , subject to the
manager’s participation constraint and his own “hiring constraint”. We can
thus formally represent the shareholder’s problem as
max
α
(1− α)
(
Y
r
+
µ− ρσyΦ
r2
− I[eˆ]
)
(6.3)
subject to the following constraints
PC : J2(W − α∗I[eˆ], Y ) ≥ JM(W ) (6.4)
HC : (1− α)
(
Y
r
+
µ− ρσyΦ
r2
− I[eˆ]
)
>
Y
r
+
µ− ρσyΦ
r2
− A (6.5)
The hiring constraint (HC) states that the shareholder will hire a manager
only if this will lead to a higher payoff.7 The manager’s participation con-
straint (PC) simply states that the manager will invest with a given α∗ only
if his utility from doing so is greater than the utility he would receive if he
did not invest.
6.3 Results
By substituting the expressions for I[eˆ], eˆ, J2(W − α∗I[eˆ], Y ) and JM(W )
into Equations (6.3) - (6.5), we can solve for α∗. Given the non-linearity of
the resulting constrained maximization problem, we cannot obtain a closed
form solution for α∗ and thus we must numerically maximise Equation (6.3)
subject to the participation and hiring constraints. This is done using a
numerical maximisation procedure which simply compares the payoff to the
7Although it is not explicitly incorporated into our model, it is generally costly to hire
a manager and thus we assume that the payoff with a manager must be strictly greater
than the payoff without a manager to account for this cost.
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shareholder from investing himself (PCAPM) to that of hiring a manager
(PM [α∗]) for every level of α holding all other parameters constant. This is
graphically demonstrated in Figure 6.1 where PCAPMand PM [α∗] are calcu-
lated for the base case parameters from Chapters 4 and 5.
Figure 6.1: Calculating α∗
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In this graph the dashed line represents PM [α] while the solid line represents PCAPM .
In Figure 6.1, α∗ is simply the peak of the dashed line (i.e. the maximum of
PM [α]) since this is greater than PCAPM . Calculating α∗ for these parameters
yields a figure of 6.5%, which is a fairly significant proportion of the company
for the manager to hold. This figure is however specific to the parameters
we have chosen and thus it is important so see not only whether α∗ is very
sensitive to the parameters chosen, but also the specific effect that each
parameter has on α∗.
The hiring and the participation constraints make understanding the result
of comparative statics relatively complex. We will therefore plot three graphs
for each parameter we examine. To understand whether or not the hiring
constraint is binding (i.e. the shareholder is better off by hiring a manager),
we plot the shareholder’s payoff as a function of the variable in question with
(PM [α]) and without (PCAPM) a manager. This is panel (a) in each fig-
ure. To understand whether or not the manager’s participation constraint is
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binding we plot the manager’s utility as a function of the variable in question
when he is hired (Je(W,Y )) and when he is not hired/chooses not to invest
(JM(W )). This is panel (b) in each figure. The third graph (panel (c)) plots
α∗ as a function of the parameter in question and completes the story told
by the previous two graphs.
Consistent with the rest of this thesis we focus on manager-specific parame-
ters as well as volatility.
6.3.1 Managerial Skill/Scope for Cost Savings (B)
As our focus is on manager-specific parameters, we begin examining the
investment cost floor (B) which is a measure of the natural scope for cost
savings as well as the manager’s skill. Figure 6.2 shows three graphs which we
must analyse in order to understand the effect of B (or any other parameter)
on α∗.
We can see from Figure 6.2 (a) that as B increases, PM [α∗] decreases because
the manager’s ability to reduce the investment cost is diminishing. Similarly
Figure 6.2 (b) shows that the payoff to the manager decreases as B increases
and thus we witness Je(W,Y ) falling as well. From Figure 5.6 we know that
optimal effort decreases with B. Therefore as B increases we can see in
Figure 6.2 (c) that α∗ increases to offset this. Also, as B approaches A we
can see that we eventually get to the point where PM [α∗] = PCAPM and thus
the “hiring” constraint starts to bind and α∗ hits zero.
6.3.2 Managerial Skill (λ)
From Figure 5.5 we know that for very small levels of λ the manager exerts no
effort because it is almost entirely ineffective. Therefore the hiring constraint
binds and we witness α∗ = 0. For low values of λ, a small increase in λ causes
a very large increase in effort and thus we witness a large jump in α∗ once
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Figure 6.2: Comparative Statics For B
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the hiring constraint no longer binds. As λ increases further, α∗ falls. This
occurs because λ is a measure of the manager’s skill and tells us how much
effort is required to drive the investment cost down to B. This means that
as λ increases the manager can achieve an investment cost close to B with
lower effort. The result of this is that the manager needs less incentive to
exert effort and thus α∗ falls. This is why we see the shareholder’s payoff
rising in Figure 6.3 (b) and the manager’s payoff falling in Figure 6.3 (a).
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Figure 6.3: Comparative Statics For λ
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6.3.3 Risk Aversion (γ)
Figure 6.4 shows that the relationship between α∗ and γ is highly non-linear
and at the same time α∗ does not vary much with γ. To understand the
intuition behind the relationship between α∗ and γ shown in Figure 6.4, it is
necessary to have an understanding of Figure 5.3, which we will reproduce
here as Figure 6.5 for clarity’s sake.
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Figure 6.4: Comparative Statics For γ
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As Figure 6.5 shows, the relationship between γ and optimal effort is compli-
cated and depends quite heavily on α. Therefore it is unsurprising that there
is such an unusual relationship between γ and α∗. For the lower levels of α
that we are dealing with here, an increase in γ decreases optimal effort and
thus we witness that PM [α∗] is decreasing in γ. For the range of α∗ under
consideration, we know from Figure 6.5 that optimal effort is decreasing in
γ. Thus as γ increases the shareholder will wish to motivate the manager to
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Figure 6.5: The effect of α and γ on optimal effort
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exert more effort.
The effect that α has on effort depends upon risk aversion and this is the
reason that we witness α∗ increase, decrease and then increase in γ. This
occurs because when γ is small an increase in α increases effort because the
marginal utility of wealth is large (thus effort is very beneficial). Thus α∗
increases to offset the decrease in effort caused by the increase in γ. As
γ increases we move into the region where increasing α actually decreases
optimal effort due to the fact that increasing α makes the manager “richer”
and thus decreases marginal utility making effort less worthwhile. The result
of this is that in this region decreasing α will increase effort and we thus
witness α∗ falling. As γ starts to get very large we are in the region where
the manager really cares about diversification. Because an increase in α
makes the manager value the project less in this region, increasing α increases
optimal effort and thus α∗ begins to increase with γ.
Despite the very complex effects that γ has, it is interesting to note that the
absolute change in α∗ does not appear to be very large over a wide range of
γ. This suggests that the fact that managerial risk aversion is unobservable
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in practice is not that important for the optimal contract.
6.3.4 Managerial Wealth (W )
Figure 6.6: Comparative Statics For W
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Because the manager has diminishing marginal utility, as W increases the
manager’s optimal level of effort decreases. We thus witness PM [α∗] de-
creasing as W increases in panel (a) of Figure 6.6. To offset the manager’s
decreasing level of effort, α∗ rises until PM [α∗] = PCAPM in Figure 6.6 (a)
at which point the hiring constraint binds and α∗ drops to zero.
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6.3.5 Level of Cash Flow (Y )
Figure 6.7: Comparative Statics For Y
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Panel (a) of Figure 6.7 shows that for low values of Y we are in a situ-
ation where PCAPM < 0 and thus the shareholder gives away the whole
project (α∗ = 1). Panel (b) of Figure 6.7 shows that in this region J2(W −
α∗I[eˆ], Y ) < JM(W ) and thus the manager’s participation constraint is bind-
ing and he would not even invest. As Y increases the participation constraint
stops binding (as shown in panel (b)) and PM [α∗] becomes positive (as shown
in panel (a)). Because PCAPM is increasing in Y , α∗ decreases as the man-
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ager becomes unnecessary. Because the manager’s optimal level of effort is
decreasing in Y and α∗ is not increasing sufficiently to offset this, we see that
as Y gets large we eventually reach a situation where PM [α∗] = PCAPM .
Thus the hiring constraint binds causing α∗ to drop to zero in panel (c) of
Figure 6.7.
6.3.6 Cash Flow Volatility (σy)
The effect of σy on P
CAPM depends explicitly on ρ because this determines
whether or not an increase in σy increases (ρ > 0) or decreases (ρ < 0) the
project’s beta. An increase in the project’s beta decreases PCAPM and thus
we see in Figure 6.9 that when ρ is positive α∗ is increasing in σy as the
shareholder wishes to offset the fall in PCAPM by motivating the manager
to exert more effort. Figure 6.10 shows that the opposite logic applies when
ρ < 0 and thus α∗ is decreasing in σy. Under the CAPM investors do
not price idiosyncratic risk and thus when ρ = 0 (and the project’s risk
is entirely idiosyncratic) PCAPM does not depend on σy. Because P
CAPM
doesn’t depend on σy, neither does α
∗.
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Figure 6.8: Comparative Statics For σy, ρ = 0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Σy
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
(a) Shareholder’s Payoff
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Σy
-7.6
-7.4
-7.2
-7.0
-6.8
(b) Manager’s Utility
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Σy
0.055
0.060
0.065
0.070
Α
*
(c) α∗
(a) Solid Line:PM [α∗],Dashed Line:PCAPM
(b) Solid Line:J2(W − α∗I[eˆ], Y ) ,Dashed Line: JM (W ))
CHAPTER 6. THE SHAREHOLDER’S STATIC HIRING PROBLEM103
Figure 6.9: Comparative Statics For σy, ρ = 0.5
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Figure 6.10: Comparative Statics For σy, ρ = −0.5
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6.4 Conclusion
In the standard models analysing the optimal contract for a risk averse man-
ager, the manager can affect the stock price of the firm in an ad hoc fashion
by exerting effort. These standard models predict that the optimal incentive
for the manager is decreasing in the level of volatility. However, unlike the
present situation, in these models the shareholder can only observe a noisy
signal of the manager’s effort.
Efforts to separate the effect of idiosyncratic and systematic risk have shown
that it is idiosyncratic risk that matters when a manager is constrained to
hold the stock of his firm but can trade the market portfolio.8 The effect in
these models is still the same though because the more volatile a firm’s share
price is, the more likely it is that the manager’s effort just gets “lost in the
noise”. This result is however driven by the assumption that effort is unob-
servable. Crucial to our results is the assumption that effort is observable.9
Given the typically ad-hoc nature of the manager’s assumed impact on the
firm, we attempted to provide a more detailed analysis of the manager and
his impact on the firm. By starting from the firm’s cashflows we are able to
introduce the manager’s valuation problem and the implications that this has
for the shareholder. Allowing effort to reduce the cost of investment means
we now have an explicit relationship between effort and the value of the firm
that can be analysed in detail.
With respect to the previous literature on executive compensation, the pri-
mary finding of this chapter is that α∗ does not unambiguously decrease
with the level of the firm’s volatility (σy). We find that when the manager’s
subjective valuation and an explicit channel for effort are acknowledged, the
effect of volatility on α∗ depends crucially on the sign of ρ as this determines
8See Jin (2002).
9As discussed in Section 3.3, this is a weakness of our setup. It does however allow us
to isolate the agency issues caused by idiosyncratic risk and effort.
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the impact of volatility on the manager’s valuation of the firm. Analysis of
the impact that the manager’s level of skill and the scope for cost reductions
have on the optimal contract also yields some interesting insights. Unsur-
prisingly the lower the investment cost can be driven, the higher the optimal
incentive level. More interesting though is that the optimal contract is prac-
tically insensitive to the ceiling on the investment cost (i.e the cost when no
effort is exerted). The finding that a more skilled manager (high λ) is given a
lower level of α is also initially surprising, until one considers that this means
he can achieve cost reductions with less effort and thus needs less incentive
to work hard.
The personal characteristics of the manager also yield some surprising results.
The relationship between the manager’s risk aversion and the optimal level of
managerial ownership is very complex. Despite this, optimal firm ownership
for a low γ manager is not that different from that for a high γ manager.
This suggests that the real world un-observability of managerial risk aversion
is not of critical importance when determining managerial compensation.10
The fact that the more a manager dislikes effort, the more incentive he needs
to exert effort is unsurprising. Similarly, rich managers need more incentive
to exert effort than poor managers, because the financial benefit of effort in
utility terms is much lower when you have more money.
The key message of this chapter is that determining the optimal amount of
the firm a manager should own in order to maximise the value for shareholders
is a very complex problem. It requires specific examination of the project
the manager will be managing as well as the personal characteristics of the
manager - managerial share ownership is not a one size fits all proposition.
10Though as Figure 6.4 shows, the shareholder’s payoff is materially effected by γ.
Chapter7
Effort and the Timing Option
7.1 Introduction
The analysis of the manager’s investment decision has so far been in a static
setting, in which the manager makes a “now or never” decision of whether
or not to invest. The literature on real options has shown that investment
decisions can be quite different from what static models of investment predict.
Specifically in an environment of uncertainty there is “value in waiting” as
this allows the agent to gain new information and thus resolve some of the
uncertainty around the profitability of investment.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the majority of the work acknowledging the role
of managers has focused on the information asymmetry between shareholders
and managers, rather than the positive impact a manager can have. Given
the significant and independent impacts that effort and the ability to wait
have on investment behaviour, we will now extend the framework of Chap-
ter 5 in order to determine whether the interplay of these factors has any
interesting implications for managerial behaviour.
This chapter thus allows us to analyse how the manager’s decision of whether
107
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to invest or wait is affected by the ability to exert effort.
The rest of this chapter is set out as follows: Section 7.2 sets up the model,
Section 7.3 outlines the numerical solution method used to solve the model,
Section 7.4 discusses the results of the model and Section 7.5 summarises the
results of this chapter.
7.2 Setup
In this situation the manager is waiting to invest and thus at every point in
time he chooses his consumption, portfolio investment and whether or not
the firm will invest. If the manager decides to invest he pays his proportion of
the investment cost (αI[e]), exerts the optimal level of effort determined by
Equation (5.4) and moves to Stage 2 (i.e. the post-investment state). Thus
the investment payoff is simply the Stage 2 value function when the manager
can exert effort that we analysed in Chapter 5. Therefore the investment
payoff is simply Equation (5.3) evaluated at eˆ
Je(W,Y ) = − 1
γr
e
−γr(W−αI+αG[Y ]+ Φ2
2γr2
) − θeˆ (7.1)
Conversely if the manager chooses to defer the firm’s investment, his in-
tertemporal budget constraint is given by Equation (3.7). Following the
same process as for Stage 2 and using the 1 superscript to denote the Stage
1 value function we can simplify the General HJB (Equation (3.9)) down to
the following when the manager is waiting to invest
βJ1(W,Y ) = max
C,pi
[−1
γ
e−γC + J1t + J
1
w (rW + pi (µm − r)− C) + J1yµy
+
1
2
J1ww(piσm)
2 +
1
2
J1yy
(
φ2 + ρ2σ2y
)
+ J1wy(piρσyσm))] (7.2)
with the following first order conditions
FOCC : C
∗ = − ln(J
1
w)
γ
CHAPTER 7. EFFORT AND THE TIMING OPTION 110
FOCpi : pi
∗ = −J
1
w (µm − r)
J1wwσ
2
m
− ρJ
1
wyσy
J1wwσm
Therefore at every point in time the manager will compare the solution to
the HJB (Equation (7.2)) with the payoff from investment (Equation (7.1))
and if the payoff is greater he will invest, otherwise he will wait. Given the
non-linear nature of the HJB for this problem, it must be solved numerically.
7.3 Numerical Solution Method
7.3.1 Description of algorithm
The complexity of the differential equation that needs to be solved (Equa-
tion (7.2)) means that some modifications to standard finite difference tech-
niques are required to obtain a stable solution. While not as severe as that
considered in Chapter 9, the choice of boundary condition can have a large
impact on the stability of the solution. We also impose a finite length on the
option to delay.1
The solution procedure used is a “policy iteration”2 finite-difference algo-
rithm. The numerical algorithm begins by first defining a grid in (W,Y )
space for each point in time (ti), where the grid co-ordinates are defined as
dW =
Wmax −Wmin
WN
Wi = Wmin + dW (i− 1)
dY =
Ymax − Ymin
YN
Yi = Ymin + dY (i− 1)
1The option expires after a certain period of time at which point the manager faces a
now-or-never decision.
2See Judd (1998) for a description of policy iteration algorithms.
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dt =
tmax − tmin
tN
ti = tmin + dt(i− 1)
where (Ymax,Wmax, tmax) are the maximum values for the grid,(Wmin, Ymin, tmin)
are the minimum values and (WN , YN , tN) are the number of steps. Thus one
can either think of the grid as tN two dimensional matrices with dimensions of
WN×YN , or a single three dimensional matrix with dimensions WN×YN×tN .
The finite difference approximation of Equation (7.2) is obtained using the
following approximations for the derivatives.
Jt ≈ J [Wi, Yi, ti]− J [Wi, Yi, ti−1]
dt
JW ≈ J [Wi+1, Yi, ti]− J [Wi−1, Yi, ti]
2dW
JY ≈ J [Wi, Yi+1, ti]− J [Wi, Yi−1, ti]
2dY
JWW ≈ J [Wi+1, Yi, ti]− 2J [Wi, Yi, ti] + J [Wi−1, Yi, ti]
dW 2
JY Y ≈ J [Wi, Yi+1, ti]− 2J [Wi, Yi, ti] + J [Wi, Yi−1, ti]
dY 2
JWY ≈ J [Wi+1, Yi+1, ti]− J [Wi+1, Yi−1, ti] + J [Wi−1, Yi+1, ti] + J [Wi−1, Yi−1, ti]
4dWdY
That is, for derivatives with respect to either Y or W , central difference ap-
proximations are used, while for the time derivative (Jt) a backward difference
is used. The result of this is that it is possible to solve for the value func-
tion at date ti−1 (J1(Wi, Yi, ti−1)) as a function of the date ti value function,
consumption and portfolio investment functions. The consumption (Ct) and
portfolio investment (pit) functions are the “policy functions” for the “policy
iteration” algorithm.
With that in mind, the steps to the algorithm are as follows:
1. The value function at the last possible date for investment (tN+1) is
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calculated as J1(Wi, Yi, tN+1) = max[J
M(Wi), J
e(Wi, Yi, )]. In other
words the manager makes a now-or-never decision between investing
(Je(Wi, Yi, )) and not investing (J
M(Wi)).
2. The policy functions are calculated at tN+1 using J(Wi, Yi, tN+1).
3. Boundary conditions are imposed along the four boundaries (W1,WN+1, Y1, YN+1)
4. From here the algorithm progressively steps backwards in time, using
the solutions for the value function and policy functions at ti to calcu-
late the value function (and thus the policy functions) at ti−1.
7.3.2 Boundary conditions
Boundary condition at YN+1
Along this boundary Y is very large and thus the boundary condition we
impose is simply that the manager invests immediately. This is a common
approach in numerical option valuation work.3 The condition along this
boundary is
J1(Wi, Yn+1, ti−1) = Je(Wi, Yn+1) (7.3)
Boundary condition at Y1
Along this boundary Y is very small and thus the boundary condition we
impose is simply that the manager does not invest/abandons the project. In
other words he receives the Merton (1969) value function outlined in Sec-
tion 3.8.
J1(Wi, Y1, ti−1) = JM(Wi, Y1) (7.4)
3For financial (as opposed to “real”) option valuation, the corresponding assumption
is that the option is exercised immediately.
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Boundary condition at WN+1,Wi=1
Unlike the boundary conditions for Y , there is no clear theoretical condition
that can be imposed to govern behaviour at the two W boundaries. In this
situation a numerical boundary condition is typically imposed. The simplest
method used in this regard is to set the finite difference approximation for
the second derivative equal to zero.4 For example, we could evaluate the
second derivative with respect to W at tN , set it equal to zero and solve for
the value of J(WN+1, Yi, ti) as follows
0 = J(WN+1,Yi,ti)−2J(WN ,Yi,ti)+J(WN−1,Yi,ti)
dW 2
→ J1(WN+1, Yi, ti) = 2J(WN , Yi, ti)− J(WN−1, Yi, ti)
However, using this boundary condition along the W boundaries yields un-
stable solutions. We therefore implement boundary conditions related to the
slope of the Merton (1969) value function. More specifically, it can easily
be shown that the following relationship holds between the first and second
derivatives of the Merton value function.
JMWW = −γrJMW (7.5)
Using the finite difference approximations outlined above for JWWW and J
M
W
this becomes
J(Wi+1, Yi, ti)− 2J(Wi, Yi, ti) + J(Wi−1, Yi, ti)
dW 2
= −γrJ(Wi+1, Yi, ti)− J(Wi−1, Yi, ti)
2dW
(7.6)
To derive the condition at W1, we evaluate Equation (7.6) at W2 and then
solve for J [W1, Yi, ti]. This yields the following
4In other words the boundary condition is a linear projection of the previous values.
CHAPTER 7. EFFORT AND THE TIMING OPTION 114
J1(W1, Yi, ti) =
(dWrγ + 2)J(W3, Yi, ti)− 4J(W2, Yi, ti)
dWrγ − 2 (7.7)
Similarly we can derive an expression for J1[WN+1, Yi, ti] by evaluating Equa-
tion (7.6) at WN .
J1(WN+1, Yi, ti) =
(dWrγ − 2)J1(WN−1, Yi, ti) + 4J1(WN , Yi, ti)
2 + dWrγ
(7.8)
7.4 Results
Given that our results are based on a numerical solution method, we begin
by again setting out our base case parameters, which are identical to those
used in previous sections. Using these parameters the model is then solved
Table 7.1: Base case parameters for Chapter 7
γ = 1 r = 0.1 µm = 0.15 µy = 0.1 A = 100 λ = 1
β = r σm = 0.3 σy = 0.3 ρ = 0.0 B = 80 θ = 0.1
as outlined in Section 7.3. A useful starting point for examining the results
of this model is to compare the value function when the manager can delay
investment with that of the “now or never” case.
Figure 7.1 plots the manager’s value function for both the now-or-never case
(panel (a)), when delay is possible (panel (b)) and the difference between
them (panel (c)). As can be seen in Figure 7.1, once the ability to delay is
introduced ,the value function is no longer kinked. Instead it is smoothed
out over the region near the investment threshold. This smoothing out is
a result of the option value that is embedded in the project when delay is
possible. This option premium is best illustrated by examining the difference
between the “now or never” and dynamic value functions. As can be seen
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Figure 7.1: Comparison of the “Now or Never” and Dynamic Value func-
tions
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Calculated using the base case parameters.
from Figure 7.1 (c), the option premium disappears when Y is very small and
very large reflecting the fact that when Y is very small the ability to invest
has little value as it is very unlikely that investment will take place. On the
other hand when Y is very large there is little value having timing flexibility
since it is optimal to invest straight away. The source of this option value is
most easily understood in terms of the “Bad News Principle”, which is best
described by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) who state that
“... it is the ability to avoid the consequences of “bad news” that
leads us to wait.”
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In short the manager delays investment for fear of receiving bad news about
the profitability of the project after investment has taken place. The direct
result of this is that an increase in the magnitude of the potential bad news
that can be received will increase the value of waiting to invest. The direct
result of there being a value in waiting is that the investment threshold will
exceed the standard NPV threshold. In the context of the current model it
is difficult to express the NPV and option value because investment has both
a financial (αI) and non-financial cost (θe). To express a valuation of the
project and the option in dollar terms we turn to the concept known as “Util-
ity Indifference Pricing” which we also implement in Chapter 9. Henderson
(2009) defines the utility indifference price as follows
The utility indifference buy (or bid) price pb is the price at which
the investor is indifferent (in the sense that his expected utility
under optimal trading is unchanged) between paying nothing and
not having the claim CT and payingp
b now to receive the claim
CT at time T .
In other words, the utility indifference valuation is the dollar amount that
would leave the manager indifferent between having the option/project and
not having it. Therefore the utility indifference valuation of the project and
the option can be found by solving the following equations for UIRO and
UINPV
JRO(W,Y ) = JM(W + UIRO)
JE(W,Y ) = JM(W + UINPV )
Thus UIRO (UINPV ) is the amount of money which would make an agent
indifferent between having the option (project) and being in the Merton
(1969) world where he does not have the option. Substituting in the Merton
value function and solving for UIRO (UINPV ) yields the following
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UIRO =
−2Wγr2 − η2 − 2r log[−rγJRO(W,Y )]
2r2γ
(7.9)
UINPV =
−2Wγr2 − η2 − 2r log[−rγJE(W,Y )]
2r2γ
(7.10)
If we plot these two equations for the base case we see the familiar Dixit and
Pindyck (1994) story holds5 where the option value is strictly positive and
exceeds the NPV for relatively low values of Y . The region where the option
value exceeds the NPV is the area where the manager waits. For larger values
of Y the NPV and the option value converge, representing the fact that the
project is so attractive that option holder would invest immediately and thus
there is no value in waiting.
Figure 7.2: Utility Indifference Valuation of the Option and the Project
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Calculated using the base parameters where the solid line=UIRO, and the dashed line=UINPV
In the now or never setting the investment threshold is simply the point at
which the NPV is positive. In the dynamic setting, when investment occurs
it must be the case that the value of the option is simply the NPV. Therefore,
5See, e.g., Figure 5.3 of Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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we can characterize the dynamic investment threshold Yˆ as the point where
the option value and the project NPV first become equal.
To understand the dynamics of the model it is useful to examine the man-
ager’s optimal investment in the risky asset (pi∗) and the investment thresh-
olds. Figure 7.3 plots the manager’s optimal investment in the risky asset
while he is waiting to invest (panel (a)), the contours6 of that plot (panel
(b)) and the investment thresholds (panel (c)) all as functions of the man-
ager’s financial wealth (W ) and the level of the cash flow (Y ) for the base
case parameters. In panels (b) and (c) the purple region is the area where
immediate investment is optimal. In panel (c), the tan region is the area
where investment is not optimal in a now-or-never world (alternatively, de-
lay is optimal when waiting is possible) and the light blue region is where
investment would be optimal in a now-or-never world but delay is optimal
when waiting is possible.
For the base case we can see in Figure 7.3 that the investment threshold
exhibits the behaviour that would be expected when the option to wait is
introduced: the threshold when waiting is allowed is approximately a parallel
shift upward of the threshold from the now or never case (e.g. Figure 5.10).
However, once the manager’s portfolio behaviour is examined the similarities
between our model and the standard real options story end.
The thing that immediately stands out in Figure 7.3 is the spike in the
optimal investment in the risky asset. Like the static investment decision
of Chapter 5, for low levels of wealth the manager will exert enough effort
to drive the investment cost down to B and for high levels of wealth the
manager will exert no effort. It is the area between zero and “maximum”7
effort that the spike occurs. This can be thought of as the region where the
6A top-down, two dimensional view of panel (a).
7By maximum we simply mean the level of effort that sets I[e] ≈ B. Given that I[e]
is asymptotic around B the investment cost will never actually reach B, and thus there is
not a maximum level of effort.
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Figure 7.3: Waiting to invest: Optimal Portfolio Investment (pi∗), Portfolio
Contours and Investment Thresholds
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Calculated using the base case parameters. For the Investment thresholds the tan region represents the
region where investment is not optimal, the light blue region is where now-or-never investment is
optimal, but in the dynamic case it is optimal to delay investment and the purple region is where it is
optimal to invest in the dynamic setting.
manager has a “choice” over the level of effort he exerts: if the manager is
very poor he will exert maximum effort regardless, whereas if the manager is
very rich, his marginal utility of wealth is so low that he has no incentive to
exert any effort. This choice over effort is the defining feature of the model
and the driver of the portfolio spike.
But why does the ability to adjust effort result in the manager investing a
large amount of money in the risky asset? The answer is deceptively simple:
the manager can exert effort to offset adverse outcomes from his investment
in the risky asset. Put more simply, potential future effort acts as a hedge
against the manager’s portfolio.8 Following this line of logic it is unsurprising
to see that within the region where there is a choice over effort, the spike is
at its highest point as effort approaches zero (high wealth) and at its lowest
8 This is a similar logic to the result of Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992). In
this paper investors use the ability to alter their labour supply later in life as a hedge
for volatile investment returns. The key distinction between that model and the present
setting is that in Bodie et al the agent can continuously vary his labour supply, whereas
the manager here makes a one off, irreversible choice over effort when investment occurs.
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point when effort is high (wealth is low). This is because if the manager is
currently in a situation where he would exert little effort upon investment,
he has significant scope to alter his effort to offset any adverse shocks he
receives to his portfolio at the time of investment. Conversely if he is in a
situation where he would exert maximum effort upon investment, there is
little scope to alter effort and thus the spike dissipates.
In the standard real options framework the source of the value of waiting and
thus the key driver of the model, is the volatility of the cash flow. As it turns
out, in the current framework, despite the fact that we have assumed the
cash flow is uncorrelated with the risky asset, it is the volatility of the risky
asset that drives the interesting behaviour of the model. More interesting
though, is that an increase in market volatility actually reduces the value of
waiting, contrary to the standard model.
Figure 7.4 reproduces Figure 7.3 for various levels of σm. This is the standard
form that will be used for the graphical analysis of this chapter. In Figure
7.4 we can see that in the region where effort would either be zero or at
its “maximum”, there is a constant value in waiting. Given that effort is
essentially constant in these regions, the value in waiting in these regions is
simply related to bad news concerning Y . However, the striking feature of
Figure 7.4 is that as σm falls, a spike in the investment threshold begins to
emerge in the region where the manager has “choice” over effort and this
spike peaks near the point where effort would be zero if investment occurred.
This then poses two main questions that need to be answered: Why is there
value in waiting in this region? and why is this effect only relevant when
market volatility is low?
We now need to understand what bad news the manager can receive in the
region where he has a choice over effort, compared to the regions that he
does not. Given that uncertainty in Y is already accounted for, the only
other source of uncertainty the manager faces is wealth uncertainty due to
his holdings of the risky asset. But what bad news does the manager receive
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Figure 7.4: σm and the manager’s behaviour
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(a) σm = 0.3
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(b) σm = 0.2
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(c) σm = 0.15
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(d) σm = 0.1
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from wealth shocks and how can the consequences of this bad news be avoided
by delaying investment? To understand this it is essential to understand the
concept of diminishing marginal utility and its effect on the utility valuation
of the investment cost. Diminishing marginal utility simply states that as
wealth increases an agent will value an additional dollar of wealth less. Thus
as wealth increases, the utility valuation of the investment cost decreases
and vice-versa when wealth decreases. It is also important to note that the
actual cost of investment can be broken into the financial component and
the cost of effort exerted which is non-financial and thus does not depend
on the manager’s level of wealth. Because the cost of effort does not depend
on the manager’s level of wealth, as wealth decreases spending money on
the project becomes relatively more expensive than exerting effort. This is
the source of the bad news that the manager can receive since he is exposed
to wealth shocks: because investment is irreversible, if the manager invests
now and then subsequently receives a negative wealth shock, he will have
wished he had exerted more effort as the money he spent on the project is
now relatively more valuable to him.
This also explains why the peak of the investment threshold spike (and thus
the area where there is the greatest value in waiting) is at the area where effort
is very close to zero. The bad news principle states that as the magnitude
of the bad news that can be received increases, the value in waiting will
increase. To see why the potential bad news is worst when the manager
is exerting little to no effort it is useful to compare this point to the case
where the manager has exerted almost enough effort to drive the cost down
to B. In the case where the manager would exert close to maximum effort
upon investment, if he subsequently receives a negative wealth shock this is
not really bad news9 because he is already exerting maximum effort and thus
could not have reduced the investment cost even if he wanted to. In contrast,
when effort would be close to zero upon investment, if the manager receives a
9Clearly a negative wealth shock is “bad news”, just not with respect to the effort
decision in this context.
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negative wealth shock post investment this is very bad news because he could
have paid a large proportion of the investment cost through effort instead of
wealth.
Having established why there is value in waiting in addition to the standard
model, we must now answer the second question of why this effect dissipates
as market volatility increases. This is interesting because in standard models
of investment under uncertainty, an increase in volatility typically increases
the value of waiting. In other words an increase in volatility increases the
magnitude of the bad news that can be received after investment has oc-
curred. Yet we find that the opposite occurs. This initially counter-intuitive
result can actually be explained very simply if one thinks about the effective
volatility of the manager’s wealth rather than the volatility of the risky as-
set. As the volatility of the risky asset falls, all other things being equal, the
Sharpe ratio of that asset will increase.10 Therefore the risky asset becomes
relatively more attractive to the agent and he invests a greater amount of
wealth in the risky asset. This means that although the asset has become
less risky, the manager is holding much more of it which actually makes his
wealth more volatile. To illustrate this we can look at the polar cases of
σm = 0.3 and 0.1 in Figure 7.4. For σm = 0.3, the base line amount the
manager invests in the risky asset is around 5.5. This leads to an effective
volatility of wealth of piσm = 0.3 × 5.5 = 1.65. If we contrast this to the
case of σm = 0.1, the baseline amount invested in the risky asset is 50, which
gives an effective volatility of wealth of piσm = 0.1× 50 = 5. Thus the man-
ager’s wealth is more than three times as volatile compared to the case when
σm = 0.3.
Given that the volatility of wealth determines the magnitude of the bad news
that the manager can receive (i.e bigger wealth shocks are worse news), we
can see that the manager’s endogenous adjustment of his portfolio causes
the bad news to be less severe as volatility increases. Therefore the value
10Where the Sharpe ratio is defined as S = µm−rσm .
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of waiting decreases as volatility increases. In fact, this effect is not limited
to the volatility of the market asset, it depends on the Sharpe ratio of the
market asset. If the Sharpe ratio of the market asset increases11 the manager
will increase his holdings of the risky asset which will make his wealth more
volatile and thus increase the magnitude of possible bad news.
The other factor that affects the magnitude of wealth related bad news is
the extent to which effort can reduce the cost of investment. The simplest
way to think of this is holding A constant and reducing B.12 Given that the
lower B is, the more the cost of investment can be reduced, a lower B means
that the magnitude of possible bad news is greater. This is because the more
the manager can reduce the cost through effort, the more he will regret not
exerting effort if he receives a large negative wealth shock. This is shown
is Figure 7.5 where we can see that as B falls the spike in the investment
threshold becomes substantially larger. The second thing we notice about
Figure 7.5 is that as B falls the portfolio spike also becomes significantly
larger. This stems from the fact that the smaller B is, the more effort can
be used as a hedge to offset portfolio shocks
If we now turn to the volatility of the cash flow we can check to see whether
the standard real options result holds.13 In Figure 7.6 we can see that the
investment threshold increases as σy increases which is what we would expect.
We know that in the region where there is no choice over effort, the value
from waiting is purely related to bad news concerning Y and thus an increase
in σy scales up the threshold in these areas. Interestingly, as σy gets quite
large we can see that the spike starts to disappear, or get drowned out. This
suggests that as σy gets very large, bad news concerning Y starts to become
more important than bad news concerning W . Because an increase in σy
does not change the effectiveness of effort as a hedge against the risky asset,
11This occurs through an increase in µm or a decrease in σm or r.
12The same logic applies if we hold B constant and increase A.
13I.e. whether or not an increase in volatility of the cash flow causes an increase in the
value of waiting.
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Figure 7.5: B and the manager’s behaviour
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(a) B = 100
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(b) B = 90
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(c) B = 80
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(d) B = 70
Calculated using the base case parameters and σm = 0.1
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the height of the spike remains relatively constant as σy changes. However
what we do notice is that the contours begin to extend much further away
from the investment threshold as σy increases. This happens because when
σy is large, even if Y is currently quite far below the investment threshold,
the manager knows that it is quite likely that it will get there in the future
and thus the manager is willing to gamble with his portfolio now.
Another interesting aspect of Figure 7.6 is that when σy = 0 there is still
a value of waiting in the region where there is no choice over effort. Given
our hypothesis that the value from waiting in this region stems purely from
bad news concerning Y , one would expect that in the deterministic case the
threshold would be the same as the now or never case, i.e. there would be
no value in waiting in this region. However it has been shown that in the
deterministic case there can still be a value in waiting if the cash flow has a
positive growth rate.14 This value in waiting stems from the fact that if the
manager defers investment, the present value of both the revenues and the
cost will decrease, but the present value of the revenues will decrease by less
since the cash flow has a positive growth rate. Thus deferring investment
can increase the NPV of the project. To check that this is what is occurring
here we will set µy = 0 and check that there is no non-effort related value in
waiting when σy = 0. Figure 7.7 shows that this is the case.
Given the significant impact that the level of B has on the manager’s be-
haviour, one would expect that the manager’s skill (λ) and the personal cost
to him of effort (θ) would also have a significant effect on optimal behaviour.
As it turns out, λ and θ have opposite effects to each other and the impact
is not as significant as one would expect. In Figure 7.8 we can see that when
λ = 0 (and thus effort is completely ineffective) we have a flat investment
threshold. As λ increases and effort becomes more effective, all that happens
is that we get a much larger range where the manager will exert full effort.
Therefore the region where the manager has a choice over wealth occurs at
14For a detailed example see Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp138-139).
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Figure 7.6: σy and the manager’s behaviour
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(b) σy = 0.2
-60
0
60
W
5
7
9
11
13
Y
50
52.5
55
57.5
60
π
Effort timing results.nb 1
-120 -60 0 60 120
5
7
9
11
13
15
-120 -60 0 60 120
5
7
9
11
13
15
(c) σy = 0.4
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(d) σy = 0.6
Calculated using the base case parameters and σm = 0.1
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Figure 7.7: Investment Threshold when σy = 0
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Calculated using the base case parameters and σm = 0.1
a much higher level of wealth. Other than the fact that the spike shifts to
the right as λ increases, the shape of the investment threshold and portfolio
spikes are essentially unchanged. If we carry out the same exercise for θ we
find the opposite behaviour in that the spike shifts to the left and eventually
disappears as θ gets larger.
In the now or never model of Chapter 5 the proportion of the firm that
the manager owns (α) had a significant impact on the manager’s investment
decision. For the base case parameters α turns out to have little impact
on the manager’s investment decision. Figure 7.9 shows that as α increases
the investment threshold spike is relatively unchanged. This is interesting
given the significant impact α has on the investment threshold in the now or
never case. The way the spike does change is that it becomes “thinner” as α
increases. This occurs because all other things equal an increase in α increases
effort. Therefore as W falls, “maximum” effort is reached quicker and thus
the spike is not as wide. What does however change quite significantly is
the spike in the manager’s investment in risky assets. As α increases the
portfolio spike becomes significantly larger. This reflects the fact that as α
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Figure 7.8: λ and the manager’s behaviour
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(a) λ = 0
-60
0
60
W
5
7
9
11
13
Y
50
52.5
55
57.5
60
π
Effort timing results.nb 1
-120 -60 0 60 120
5
7
9
11
13
15
-120 -60 0 60 120
5
7
9
11
13
15
(b) λ = 0.01
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(c) λ = 0.5
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(d) λ = 1
Calculated using the base case parameters and σm = 0.1
CHAPTER 7. EFFORT AND THE TIMING OPTION 130
Figure 7.9: α and the manager’s behaviour
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(a) α = 0.05
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(b) α = 0.1
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(c) α = 0.15
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(d) α = 0.2
Calculated using the base case parameters and σm = 0.1
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increases, the benefit from effort (and thus the effectiveness of effort as a
hedge) increases.
The final parameter of interest is the manager’s risk aversion (γ). In the
now or never case we know that the area where the manager has a “choice”
over effort decreases as γ increases due to the concavity of the value function
increasing.15 In Figure 7.10 we can see that because this region is much
smaller, the area where there is an effort-related value in waiting is also
much smaller. Given that the manager has less “choice” over effort it is
unsurprising that the effort-related value in waiting starts to dissipate. This
is because it is the regret over the chosen level of effort that drives the value
of waiting in this model. Another interesting feature of Figure 7.10 is that
the portfolio spike also decreases as γ increases. Given that the portfolio
spike is a result of the manager using effort to hedge his risky asset exposure,
as the manager has less choice over effort it becomes a less effective hedge
and thus this result is expected. This also gives us the intuitive result that
as risk aversion increases the manager’s propensity to “gamble” in the risky
asset decreases.
7.5 Summary
In this section we examined the dynamic investment decision of a manager
who is constrained to hold a portion of the firm’s cash flow in his portfolio.
We found that interplay of the manager’s ability to invest in the market and
exert investment cost reducing effort significantly alters the results of a model
relative to standard models of investment delay.16 In the absence of effort,
15Recall that because the concavity of the value function increases with γ, marginal
utility quickly changes form being very high to very low as W changes. Because marginal
utility directly determines the benefits of effort, this makes the choice of effort more of a
all or nothing decision.
16See for example Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and the discussion of the delay option in
Section 2.3.2.
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Figure 7.10: γ and the manager’s behaviour
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(a) γ = 0.5
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(d) γ = 3
Calculated using the base case parameters and σm = 0.1
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this problem has been modelled by Miao and Wang (2007) and our model
obtains equivalent results when W is very large and thus the manager will
never exert any effort.17
However, when W takes on more moderate values and the manager has a
“choice” over his effort level, our results differ markedly from Miao and Wang
(2007). In particular there is a “spike” in the investment threshold in the
area where the manager has a “choice” over effort. This results in investment
being delayed beyond what standard real options models predict.
17A similar logic holds if W is very small as the manager will always exert enough effort
to drive the investment cost to B. When W is very small we thus obtain the same results
as Miao and Wang (2007) with an assumed investment cost of B.
Chapter8
The Shareholder’s Dynamic Problem
8.1 Introduction
We began our analysis by examining the manager’s valuation of a cash flow
that he cannot trade. This was then extended to allow the manager to
exert effort that reduces the cost of investment. With this in place we were
then able to examine the shareholder’s problem of determining the level of
managerial ownership that optimally trades off the detrimental and beneficial
effects of managerial ownership. At this point we stepped back and recognised
that the manager’s effort and investment decisions were static in that he was
making a now or never decision. We thus extended the manager’s problem
to a dynamic setting where he could delay investment.
In other words, we have examined the manager’s effort/investment decision
in both a static and dynamic setting and we have also examined the share-
holder’s problem in the static (now-or-never) setting. We have not examined
the shareholder’s hiring decision in the dynamic setting.
The purpose of this chapter is thus to extend the model of Chapter 7 to
examine how the manager’s dynamic investment and effort decisions affect
134
CHAPTER 8. THE SHAREHOLDER’S DYNAMIC PROBLEM 135
Chapter 1: Introduction
Part 2: The 
“clean path”
Chapter 4: CARA valuation
 of SBM cashflow
Chapter 5: Managerial Effort
Chapter 6: The Shareholder's
 Static Hiring Decision
Chapter 7: Effort and the 
timing option
Chapter 8: The Shareholder's
Dynamic Problem
Chapter 9: CRRA valuation
 of GBM cashflow
Chapter 10: Conclusion
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Chapter 3: General Setup
Part 1: 
Introduction/
Motivation
Part 3: 
Direct wealth 
effects
Appendices
Part 4: 
Conclusion & 
appendices
CHAPTER 8. THE SHAREHOLDER’S DYNAMIC PROBLEM 136
the shareholder’s decision of whether or not to hire a manager. While we
examine the shareholder’s decision to hire given certain parameters, it is also
important to determine what “type” of manager the shareholder would pre-
fer. We therefore also examine the impact on shareholder wealth of different
parameters.
This chapter is laid out as follows: Section 8.2 sets out the framework we use
to model the shareholder’s hiring decision, Section 8.3 analyses the share-
holder’s payoff from hiring a manager, Section 8.4 analyses the shareholder’s
decision when hiring is a now-or-never decision, Section 8.5 analyses the
shareholder’s decision when hiring can be delayed, Section 8.6 conducts com-
parative statics analysis of the effect of various parameters on shareholder
wealth and Section 8.7 summarises the results of this chapter.
8.2 Framework
The shareholder has the choice to hire a manager or run the project himself.
If the shareholder chooses to run the project himself, then the shareholder
incurs a monitoring cost κdt every period of length dt prior to investment. On
the other hand, the shareholder can choose to hire a manager in which case
he receives a payoff whose timing and level is determined by the manager.1
The key differences between the manager and the shareholder are that the
manager can exert cost-reducing effort and also monitor the project prior to
investment at a lower cost than the shareholder.2
The form of the shareholder’s hiring decision has significant implications for
how this problem is modelled. We propose two ways to model this decision:
• Static Hiring Decision
1The level is determined in the sense that the manager chooses at what level of Y he
will invest.
2For simplicity we normalise the manager’s cost of monitoring the project to zero.
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At time zero the shareholder makes an irreversible decision about whether
or not to hire a manager; or
• Dynamic Hiring Decision
The shareholder can delay the decision on whether or not to hire a
manager, but if and when he does hire a manager, the hiring decision
is irreversible.
These two models represent different ends of the spectrum of hiring flexi-
bility. The first model represents no flexibility, that is, the shareholder is
presented with the opportunity to hire a manager and if he delays the de-
cision he loses the option to hire that or any other manager.3 The second
model represents perfect flexibility in that any time prior to investment the
shareholder can decide to hire a manager. Real world hiring decision will
likely contain elements of both models and thus examining both ends of the
spectrum is a useful way to analyse the problem. Note that in neither case
can the manager be removed.
The reason for making the hiring decision irreversible is that reversibility
would alter the manager’s problem as we have framed it thus far. The impact
of the potential to be dismissed on the manager’s dynamic investment and
effort decisions is an interesting question that we leave to future research.4
In addition it is important to note that unlike Chapter 6, we will treat the
share of the firm given to the manager (α) as exogenous (this is analogous to
there being a market “price” for a manager). Endogenizing α in a dynamic
setting is another interesting question we leave to future work.
There are two inputs which we require to solve either problem. These are
3Note that one of the limitations of this set up is that there is only one potential
manager. Therefore the shareholder does not have to incur any search costs or choose
between multiple managers. This is an area left for future research.
4In a slightly different setting this question has been examined by Hugonnier and
Morellec (2007a). In their model the manager’s payoff was not directly linked to the
profitability of the firm.
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the market value of the project rights if it is managed by a shareholder (the
opportunity cost of hiring a manager5) and the payoff from hiring a manager.
Given we assume that the shareholder is well diversified and thus values the
project rights using the CAPM, calculation of the market value of the project
rights is a straightforward and is left to Appendix A. We now derive the payoff
to the shareholder from hiring a manager.
8.3 Payoff from hiring a manager
8.3.1 Setup
Given the characterizations of the problem, the starting point is to calculate
the shareholder’s payoff given that he has already decided to hire a manager.
In this situation the payoff to the shareholder depends on two stochastic vari-
ables, the level of the cashflow (Yt) and the level of the manager’s wealth (Wt).
The manager’s wealth determines the level of effort he will exert and thus
the eventual investment cost. In this sense the investment cost is stochastic
from the shareholder’s point of view. Thus there are parallels between this
and the real options analysis of projects where the cash flow and investment
cost are stochastic.6
Once the manager has been hired the shareholder waits for the manager to
invest. Given that shareholder’s value function now depends on the man-
ager’s wealth, it can be derived using the same methodology used for the
manager’s problem. Following the same procedure used for the manager,
Equation (3.8) becomes the following
S(W,Y, t) = e−βdtE[S(W (t+ dt), Y (t+ dt), (t+ dt)] (8.1)
5When the shareholder hires a manager, he gives up the value of the project if he
managed it himself.
6See, e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Section 6.5 pp207-211.
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where this differs from Equation (3.10) in that the shareholder’s consumption
and/or investment do not affect his valuation of the cash flow and he is not
maximising the function himself. The general value function (Equation (3.9))
thus becomes7
βS(W,Y, t) = E[Stdt+SwdW +SydY +
1
2
SwwdW
2 +
1
2
SyydY
2 +SwydY dW ]
(8.2)
The interesting feature here is that Wt is the manager’s wealth and thus dW
is defined in exactly the same way it was in the manager’s problem. Therefore
the manager’s consumption and (portfolio) investment decisions impact the
evolution of the Wt and thus the payoff to the shareholder. Substituting
in dW and dY from Equations (3.4) and (3.7) and simplifying gives the
differential equation that the shareholder’s payoff from hiring a manager
must satisfy:
βS(W,Y, t) = St + Sw (rW + pi (µm − r)− C) + Syµy
+
1
2
Sww(piσm)
2 +
1
2
Syy
(
φ2 + ρ2σ2y
)
+ Swy(piρσyσm)) (8.3)
We already know from Equation (6.2) that the shareholder’s payoff when the
manager invests is
PM [α] = (1− α)
(
Y
r
+
µ− ρσyΦ
r2
− I[eˆ]
)
(8.4)
Therefore if the manager invests the shareholder receives the payoff defined
by Equation (8.4) , otherwise he receives the solution to Equation (8.3). This
can be represented formally as
SM(W,Y, t) =
{
PM [α] if α(G[Y ]− I[eˆ]) ≥ V RO(W,Y, t)
Solution to (8.3) if α(G[Y ]− I[eˆ]) < V RO(W,Y, t)
7Note that this is not technically a Bellman equation since the shareholder does not
have any choice variables.
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We have already solved PM [α], G[Y ], eˆ and V RO(W,Y, t) when examining
the manager’s problem in Chapters 4, 5 and 7. Therefore all that is required
to calculate SM(W,Y, t) is to solve the differential Equation (8.3).
8.3.2 Solution
Because Equation (8.3) does not involve any policy functions that must be
solved, the problem can be solved using standard finite difference methods.
Given that the technique is standard, it is not reproduced here. Before
continuing it is worth repeating the parameters that we will use as the base
case for this section.
Table 8.1: Modified base case parameters for Chapter 8
γ = 1 r = 0.1 µm = 0.15 µy = 0.1 A = 100 λ = 1 W = 1 κ = 0.1
β = r σm = 0.1 σy = 0.3 ρ = 0.0 B = 80 θ = 0.1 Y = 10
Note that unlike the rest of Part II, we are assuming that σm = 0.1. This
is because we are interested in examining the implications of the investment
“spike”.
Figure 8.1 plots the shareholder’s value function in the first date (t = t1 = 0)
as well as the date at which the investment option expires (t = tn = 10).
We can see from Figure 8.1 that the standard real options intuition still
holds in that the shareholder’s payoff is smoothed out when delay is possible.
However, one has to keep in mind that the manager is making the decision
for the shareholder. The obvious distinction between the two graphs is that
when t = tn the graph is kinked as opposed to being relatively smooth.
This occurs because there is no longer any opportunity to delay investment
and thus the project value is simply the payoff from immediate investment.8
Conversely, at the first date, where the manager still has significant scope to
8Which could of course be zero if the manager does not invest.
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delay investment, the shareholder receives value from the manager delaying
the investment decision. This is evidenced by the smooth shape of the graph
along the Y axis. The reasons behind the smoothness is that even when the
project would have a negative immediate payoff, there is value in waiting to
see if the project improves. The graphs also have the expected shape when
one looks along the W axis in that the payoff increases as W decreases and
then hits an asymptote. This is due to the facts that the manager’s effort is
higher for a lower W and that there is a limit on how much effort can reduce
the investment cost.
Figure 8.1: Payoff from hiring a manager (SM(W,Y, t)) at t = t1 and t = tn
(a) t = t1 = 0 (b) t = tn = 10
Calculated using the base case parameters
It is important however to note that the undiversified manager is choosing
an investment policy that maximises his utility. This will not necessarily co-
incide with the policy that would maximise the market value of the project
rights. In fact, it turns out that in some situations the manager waits too
long to invest from the shareholder’s perspective - that is, the manager waits
when investing immediately would give the shareholder a higher payoff. This
is illustrated by comparing the shareholder’s payoff from hiring a manager
(SM(W,Y, t)) and the payoff to the shareholder if the manager invested im-
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mediately (PM [α, Y ]). This comparison is shown in Figure 8.2
Figure 8.2: SM(W,Y, t) vs PM [α, Y ] and PCAPM [Y ] vs FCAPM(Y, t)
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Calculated using the modified base case parameters and W = 0. The solid blue line represents the payoff
from hiring a manager (SM (W,Y, t)), the dashed green line represents the payoff to the shareholder if
the manager invested immediately (PM [α, Y ]), the solid red line is the CAPM valuation of the project
rights (FCAPM (Y, t), i.e. option) and the dashed brown line is the CAPM valuation of the cash flow
(PCAPM [Y ]).
In Figure 8.2 the solid blue curved line represents SM(W,Y, t) and the dashed
green line represents PM [α, Y ]. For comparative purposes we have also in-
cluded the CAPM valuation of the cash flow (PCAPM [Y ]) as the dashed
brown line and the CAPM valuation of the project rights9 (FCAPM(Y, t)) as
the solid red curved line. We can see that from just after Y = 7 the payoff
from the manager investing is greater than the payoff to the shareholder from
the manager delaying. Therefore in this situation the shareholder would be
better off if the manager invested immediately. Even though he would prefer
that the manager invested in this situation, he may still be better off than
if he managed the project himself. This is illustrated by the fact over the
range of Y we examine, SM(W,Y, t) exceeds FCAPM(Y, t) .
The fact that the shareholder’s payoff function (SM(W,Y, t)) is actually below
the payoff from immediate investment (PM [α]) for a wide range of Y , while
9i.e. the CAPM valuation of the project recognising the value of the delay option.
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not unexpected, is interesting in and of itself. Figure 8.2 is plotted at W = 0
which under the base case parameters is in the area where the manager’s
investment “spike” occurs (see Chapter 7). Recall that in the “spike” region
the manager delays investment beyond what a standard real options model
predicts. Thus it makes sense that in this region the manager is delaying
investment beyond what is optimal from the shareholder’s perspective. To
confirm this logic we re-plot Figure 8.2 for values of W outside of the “spike”
region. Figure 8.3 does so for W = −50 and W = 50. The solid dark blue line
is SM(−50, Y, t) while the solid brown line represents SM(50, Y, t). Given that
the manager’s optimal effort is a decreasing function of his wealth, it is not
surprising that we find that SM(−50, Y, t) > SM(50, Y, t). More importantly
we find that in both cases the shareholder’s value function from hiring a
manager does not fall below the immediate payoff from investing. Thus for
values outside of the “spike” region the manager doesn’t appear to delay
investment beyond what is optimal from the shareholder’s perspective. It is
also easy to show that as other parameters are changed in a way that reduces
the spike10 we get a similar result. This occurs because the smaller the spike
is, the less likely the manager is to delay investment beyond what is optimal
from the shareholder’s perspective.
It is useful to recall the results of Miao and Wang (2007) at this point. They
found that relative to the risk-neutral model, investment would be delayed
but that this is a second order effect. Our model is slightly different in that
the point of comparison is a shareholder who uses the CAPM and incurs a
monitoring cost. The assumption of the CAPM does not make a significant
difference and thus (ignoring the monitoring cost) when W is very large or
very small the effort decision is no longer a factor and thus we should obtain
the same results as their model.
The only direct comparison that can be made between the shareholder’s in-
vestment threshold absent a manager and the manager’s investment thresh-
10For example setting A = B or increasing σm. See Chapter 7.
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Figure 8.3: SM(W,Y, t) vs PM [α, Y ] for W = −50 and W = 50
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Payoff
Calculated using the modified base case parameters. The dark blue line is SM (−50, Y, t) while the green
line represents SM (50, Y, t).
old is when W is very large and thus the manager exerts no effort. This
ensures that the investment cost is the same for the shareholder and the
manager. For the base case parameters we find that the investment thresh-
olds are the same for the manager and the shareholder. However, if the
project’s volatility (σy) is increased we get the second order effect of Miao
and Wang (2007) in that the manager delays investment beyond what the
shareholder would. In addition, if the monitoring cost (κ) is increased (which
the shareholder bears but the manager does not), the manager invests later
than the shareholder would in the absence of a manager. Intuitively, the
monitoring cost makes the shareholder want to invest earlier to avoid the
cost of monitoring, while idiosyncratic volatility makes the manager want to
invest later for the reasons outlined in Miao and Wang (2007).
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8.4 The Static Hiring Decision
8.4.1 Setup
As discussed in Section 8.2, we are going to model the shareholder’s decision
to hire a manager in two ways. The simplest way to model this is for the
shareholder to examine a now-or-never (and irreversible) decision on whether
or not to hire a manager at the initial date. In other words, if the shareholder
delays they lose the opportunity to hire the manager. Given that the share-
holder is making a now-or-never decision, the problem is static even though
the valuation problem is dynamic.
In other words, the shareholder is choosing between SM(W,Y, t) (the value
function from hiring a manager derived in Section 8.3.2) and FCAPM(Y, t)
(derived in Appendix A). FCAPM(Y, t) is the market value of the project
rights if the project is managed by the shareholder who incurs a monitoring
cost of κdt while waiting to invest. Mathematically the static hiring decision
is represented as
V static(W1, Y1) = max[S
M(W1, Y1, 0), F
CAPM(Y1)] (8.5)
As we have already calculated SM(W1, Y1, 0) and F
CAPM(Y1) , calculating
V static(W1, Y1) is straightforward.
8.4.2 Solution
The shareholder’s value function, V static(W1, Y1), is plotted in Figure 8.4
using the modified base case parameter values.
This figure looks almost identical to Figure 8.1. Therefore it is useful to ex-
amine the difference between the payoff from hiring a manager (SM(W,Y, t))
and the value function when the shareholder optimally chooses whether or
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Figure 8.4: Value function (V static(W1, Y1)) given optimal hiring decision
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Calculated using the base case parameters
not to hire (V static(W1, Y1)). This is shown in Figure 8.5.
Figure 8.5: V static(W1, Y1)-S
M(W1, Y1, 1)
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Calculated using the base case parameters
We can see from Figure 8.5 that the difference is in the region where W is
large. This is because when W is large the manager exerts little to no effort.
In other words if the shareholder hired a manager he would be receiving
nothing in return. Therefore the shareholder is better off managing the
project himself.
CHAPTER 8. THE SHAREHOLDER’S DYNAMIC PROBLEM 147
To more carefully examine the shareholder’s decision we can use a contour
plot to graphically show which decision is optimal for the shareholder in each
region. For the base case this is presented in Figure 8.6.
Figure 8.6: The Static Hiring decision: Base Case Parameters
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In this plot W is plotted on the x-axis and Y is plotted on the y-axis. The dark purple region is where a
manager is hired who invests immediately, the blue region is where the shareholder invests immediately,
the light blue region is where a manager is hired who then delays investing and the tan region is where
the shareholder delays investing.
Figure 8.6 is very similar to the graphs of Chapter 7 examining the manager’s
dynamic investment decision. To understand the shareholder’s decision in
Figure 8.6, it is best to think about how the manager’s optimal investment
and effort decisions are affected. The general breakdown of the regions is
easily understood in this light. When Y is large both the shareholder and
the manager will invest immediately given that there is little to be gained
from waiting in terms of exploiting cash flow volatility. Conversely, when Y
is small both the shareholder and the manager would wait. With respect to
W , for a lower W the manager exerts more effort and vice-versa.11 Therefore
we can make the following general characterizations of Figure 8.6:
11See Chapter 7.
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• Low W , High Y : Hire a manager who invests immediately
• High W , High Y : The shareholder does not hire a manager and invests
immediately
• High W , Medium Y : The shareholder does not hire a manager and
delays investment
• High W , Low Y : The shareholder hires a manager who delays invest-
ment
• Low W , Low Y : The shareholder hires a manager who delays invest-
ment
Moving past generalizations, there are three features of Figure 8.6 that war-
rant further discussion: the shape of the boundaries between hiring (light
blue) and not hiring (tan) in the waiting region, the observation that the
shareholder hires a manager in the “spike” region (which was discussed ex-
tensively in Chapter 7) and the reason for hiring a manager in the “high W ,
low Y ” region. With respect to the “spike”, in this region if the manager’s
wealth remains unchanged or increases, he will exert little to no effort. On
the other hand, if his wealth is lower he will exert more effort. Therefore
from the shareholder’s perspective the downside risk from hiring a manager
is significantly mitigated.
The fact that the shareholder hires a manager in the “high W , low Y ” region
is initially counter-intuitive. When W is high the manager is unlikely to
exert any effort upon investment while a low Y means that investment is un-
likely to occur in the first place. The intuition behind this result is explained
by the difference in monitoring costs between the manager and the share-
holder. In this region the prospect of investment occurring is quite low yet
the shareholder must continue to incur the monitoring cost because we have
not introduced an explicit abandonment option. Because the shareholder
avoids the monitoring cost by hiring a manager, the project is effectively
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abandoned in this region through hiring a manager. This raises the question
of the manager’s participation constraint, i.e. would he actually accept the
job? Because we have assumed that the manager bears no monitoring cost
this is not an issue. However, if the manager did incur a monitoring cost this
would need to be considered. The introduction of an explicit abandonment
option and monitoring cost for the manager is left to future work.
With respect to the boundaries, we denote the vertical boundary between
the tan and light blue regions the “left boundary” and the horizontal bound-
ary the “bottom boundary”. We will discuss what happens “along” each
boundary, but the reader must keep in mind that the current analysis is
static and thus the shareholder is not actually waiting to make a decision
along these boundaries. Nonetheless it is a convenient way to describe what
is happening.
The interesting feature of the left boundary is that as Y is reduced it slopes.
This implies that for a lower Y the shareholder is more likely to hire a man-
ager. Along this boundary, the shareholder is effectively making a decision
as to whether it is more likely W and Y will end up in the region where it
will be ex post optimal to hire (the purple region) or to invest himself (the
blue region). The reason this boundary slopes is that as Y is decreased, the
increase in Y required to end up in the blue region is greater than the fall in
W required to end up in the purple region. Put simply, when Y is small, the
probability that it will be ex post optimal to hire a manager increases and
thus it is ex ante optimal to hire now. As we show in Section 8.4.3 the slope
of the left boundary depends on the relative volatility of W and Y as this
determines which decision (hiring/not hiring) is more likely to be optimal ex
post.
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8.4.3 Comparative statics
Having examined the base case, it is useful to examine how the shareholder’s
decision changes as we make (ceteris parabus) changes to the parameters
of the model. In this section we conduct comparative statics for the same
variables as we considered for the manager’s dynamic investment decision
(Chapter 7). To illustrate the effect of the different variables we simply
redraw the decision plot presented in Figure 8.6 for various parameters. The
graphs in this section can thus be interpreted in the same way as Figure 8.6.
We begin by examining the effect of the monitoring cost the shareholder
incurs while waiting to invest (κ). Figure 8.7 graphically represents the
shareholder’s hiring decision for different levels of κ in {W,Y } space. We can
see from these graphs that as κ increases, the tan area in the contour plots
becomes smaller and thus the shareholder is more likely to hire a manager
prior to investment. This occurs because the manager can costlessly monitor
the project and thus the shareholder avoids the monitoring cost when he
hires a manager. In fact we can see that when κ is quite large and so is W ,
the shareholder will hire a manager even though the manager will exert no
effort upon investing (and thus if Y was larger the shareholder would invest
himself without a manager). This occurs because when the monitoring cost
is high, the costs saved by avoiding the monitoring cost can outweigh the
costs incurred from hiring a manager (i.e. giving them αY ).
We now examine the effect of the manager’s skill/the natural scope for cost
savings by examining the effect of B (the investment cost floor) on the static
hiring decision. Figure 8.8 presents the hiring decision for various levels of
B. Recall that the potential efficiencies of the project are represented by
(A − B) and that in the base case A = 100. Therefore as B decreases the
potential cost savings increase. The results of Figure 8.8 are not surprising.
When A = B there are no potential cost savings and thus a manager is only
hired when Y is very low in order to avoid the monitoring cost (effectively
abandoning the project). Conversely, when B is quite low (and thus the
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Figure 8.7: κ and the static hiring decision
(a) κ = 0 (b) κ = 0.01
(c) κ = 0.1 (d) κ = 0.5
potential cost savings are high), a manager is hired over a much larger range
of W and Y . This is shown by the dark purple and light blue areas in
Figure 8.8 getting larger as B falls.
Figure 8.9 plots the shareholder’s static hiring decision for various levels of the
volatility of the market asset (σm). To understand Figure 8.9, we must first
review the effect that σm has on the manager’s dynamic investment decision.
In Chapter 7 we found that as σm increases, the “spike” gets smaller.
12 The
reason this occurs is that by making ceteris parabis changes to σm, we are
changing the “Sharpe Ratio” of the market asset, the end result being that an
increase in σm actually makes the manager’s wealth less volatile because he
12See Figure 7.4.
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Figure 8.8: B and the static hiring decision
(a) B = 100 (b) B = 90
(c) B = 80 (d) B = 70
decreases his holdings of the market asset. In other words, as σm increases the
volatility of W decreases. We are now in a position to understand Figure 8.9.
As σm increases, the spike in Figure 8.9 dissipates because it is dissipating for
the manager too. The more interesting feature of Figure 8.9 is the change
in the slope of the boundary between the light blue (hire a manager who
waits) and tan (do not hire a manager and wait) areas as σm increases. As
discussed above, the reason that the “left boundary” is sloped is because as
Y decreases, it becomes less likely the shareholder will invest and more likely
that the manager will invest (because the manager can invest at lower cost).
However, as σm is increased, the W becomes relatively less volatile than
Y . Therefore it is less likely W will end up in a region where the manager
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will exert effort. Thus at the margin the shareholder is less likely to hire a
manager. As outlined previously, as σW
σy
falls, the “left boundary” becomes
steeper.
Figure 8.9: σm and the static hiring decision
(a) σm = 0.1 (b) σm = 0.15
(c) σm = 0.2 (d) σm = 0.3
Figure 8.10 shows the effect of the volatility of the cashflow (σy) on the hiring
decision. While increasing σy decreases the value of the cash flow, Figure 8.10
shows that an increase in σy also results in the shareholder not hiring a
manager over a much greater range of Y . Using our previous terminology, the
“left boundary” becomes steeper and the “bottom boundary” shifts down.
The “bottom boundary” shifts down because when W is large, a high σy
means the shareholder is much more likely to end up in the region where he
invests himself (high W , high Y ) than the region where the manager would
invest and exert a high level of effort. The “left boundary” becomes steeper
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for the same reason as when σm increases,
σW
σy
falls. While in the waiting
region, the decision of whether or not to hire at the margin is determined by
the relative volatility of W and Y . The more volatile Y is relative to W , the
more likely it is that the shareholder will invest himself and thus he is less
likely to hire a manager. On the other hand, when σy is low, W is relatively
more volatile than Y so at the margin the shareholder is more likely to hire
a manager, since he is more likely to end up in the region where the manager
exerts effort.
Figure 8.10: σy and the static hiring decision
(a) σy = 0 (b) σy = 0.2
(c) σy = 0.4 (d) σy = 0.6
Figure 8.11 plots the static hiring decision for various levels of the manager’s
risk aversion (γ). In Chapter 7 we found that the “spike” gets “wider” in
that it spans a greater range of W as γ gets smaller. This occurs because
the curvature of the manager’s utility function is less when γ is small. The
CHAPTER 8. THE SHAREHOLDER’S DYNAMIC PROBLEM 155
result of this is that the manager exerts effort over a greater range of W . It is
therefore not surprising that the shareholder is more likely to hire a manager
when γ is smaller. There is however another factor at play. Figure 8.11 also
shows that in “left boundary” becomes steeper as γ increases. As we have
discussed previously, the slope of this boundary is determined by the relative
volatility of W and Y . While γ has no effect on σy, it does have an effect on
the volatility of W through the manager’s portfolio decision. As γ increases
the manager is becoming more risk averse and thus all other things being
equal he will alter his asset allocation away from risky assets. The result of
this is that the manager’s holdings of the market asset decrease and thus the
volatility of his wealth decreases. That is, σW
σy
falls. Therefore, for the same
reasons as discussed above, the “left boundary” is steeper as γ increases.
Figure 8.11: γ and the static hiring decision
(a) γ = 0.5 (b) γ = 1
(c) γ = 2 (d) γ = 3
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In this chapter we are treating the manager’s share of the firm (α) as ex-
ogenous and thus we also consider the effect of this on the hiring decision.
Figure 8.12 plots the static hiring decision for various levels of α. Figure 8.12
shows two main effects of α on the hiring decision. The first and easiest to
understand is that the “bottom boundary” in the waiting region shifts down
as α increases. Recall that at this boundary the trade off being made is
saving the monitoring cost (κ) and giving the manager a proportion α of
the firm. As α increases the cost of hiring a manager increases and thus it
unsurprising that the shareholder is less likely to hire a manager.
The second effect is that the boundary between hiring and not hiring in the
investment region (i.e. high Y ) becomes sloped as α increases. In other
words, the shareholder is less likely to hire a manager. That the shareholder
is less likely to hire a manager as the cost of hiring increases is easy to under-
stand. The slope however changes because the benefit of hiring a manager
also decreases when α is large. In Chapter 5 we examined the manager’s
optimal effort decision and found that as Y increases the manager’s optimal
effort decreases.13 This is very similar to a wealth effect in that the util-
ity benefit from exerting effort is smaller when Y is high. Because α scales
Y , it also makes this “wealth”effect stronger. That is when α is high, the
manager’s effort decreases more quickly when Y is increased than when α is
small. Therefore the benefit to the shareholder from hiring is decreasing at
a faster rate when Y increases when α is large.
13See the discussion about Figure 5.3 in particular.
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Figure 8.12: α and the static hiring decision
(a) α = 0.05 (b) α = 0.1
(c) α = 0.2 (d) α = 0.25
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8.5 The Dynamic Hiring Decision
8.5.1 Setup
We now turn to the general model where the shareholder can delay the de-
cision on whether or not to hire a manager. The model of Section 8.4 is
a specific case of this model where the shareholder must make an upfront
irreversible decision on whether or not to hire a manager. In this situa-
tion the manager has the following possible actions to choose from prior to
investment/hiring:
• Hire a manager and receive the payoff SM(W,Y, t) calculated in Sec-
tion 8.3.2.
• Invest himself and receive the market value of the cashflow (PCAPM)
denoted by Equation (6.1).
• Delay making a decision on whether or not to hire the potential man-
ager/invest and incur the monitoring cost κdt.
In this situation the decision to wait encompasses both a decision to defer
hiring a manager and a decision to delay investment. Thus neither of the
shareholder’s options are extinguished by waiting.
We assume that if the shareholder has not hired a manager, he incurs a
monitoring cost of κdt while waiting. This represents the cost/effort the
shareholder must incur to monitor the project when he does not have man-
ager. Without this assumption the shareholder would never hire a manager
prior to investment which would appear to be an unrealistic result.14
With respect to the payoff from the different decisions the shareholder can
make, we have already calculated PCAPM and SM(W,Y, t). Therefore the
14This stems from the fact that hiring a manager prior to investment would destroy the
shareholder’s option to invest himself without providing the shareholder any other benefit.
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only additional calculation we need to make is the payoff from waiting. In
this situation, because the shareholder incurs a cost of κdt while he waits,
the shareholder’s general value function becomes
SD(W,Y, t) = e−βdtE[SD(W (t+ dt), Y (t+ dt), t+ dt]− κdt (8.6)
which can be expanded out to
βSD(W,Y, t) = E[SDt +S
D
w dW+SydY+
1
2
SDwwdW
2+
1
2
SDyydY
2+SDwydY dW ]−κdt
(8.7)
which is then simplified to
βSD(W,Y, t) = SDt + S
D
w (rW + pi (µm − r)− C) + SDy µy +
1
2
SDww(piσm)
2
+
1
2
SDyy
(
φ2 + ρ2σ2y
)
+ SDwy(piρσyσm)− κ (8.8)
We can thus formally represent the shareholder’s value function as
SD(W,Y, t) =

PM [α] if the shareholder invests
SM(W,Y, t) if the shareholder hires a manager
Solution to (8.8) if the shareholder waits
8.5.2 Solution
Similarly to Section 8.3, SD(W,Y, t) is solved using standard finite difference
techniques which are not reproduced here. A good starting point for a dis-
cussion of the results from the dynamic model is a comparison to the static
model. This allows us to make a ceteris paribus evaluation of the effect of
flexibility in the hiring decision. Figure 8.13 shows the contour plots for the
dynamic and static hiring decision when investment can be delayed.
Three differences are immediately apparent between the dynamic and static
hiring decisions; the “left boundary” has shifted left, the “bottom boundary”
has shifted down and the “spike” extends much further up creating a “ridge”
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Figure 8.13: The dynamic vs static hiring decision: the effect of flexibility
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between the regions where it is optimal for the shareholder to invest now or
hire a manager who invests now.
This “ridge” is particularly interesting as it represents a saddle point of
sorts. This is because along the ridge the shareholder is waiting but will
either invest himself or hire a manager if there is a shock to W . Intuitively
this occurs because if the shareholder hired a manager, the manager would
invest now and exert no effort. Thus in the absence of the ability to wait it
would be optimal for the shareholder to invest himself. On the other hand,
when delay is available the shareholder can wait and see if there is a shock
to W that would induce the manager to exert effort upon investment. Thus
the shareholder waits in the hope of a larger future payoff even though in
a now-or-never setting it would be optimal to hire a manager or invest now
himself.
The movement of the left boundary is also interesting. Notice that this results
in the shareholder delaying hiring in the region below the “spike”. In this
region the shareholder delays hiring because the manager still has a “choice”
over his effort level. This choice occurs because W is not low enough that the
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manager always exerts “maximum” effort,15 nor is it high enough that the
manager always exerts no effort. Therefore in this region there is uncertainty
over the effort level the manager will exert upon investment if hired. Thus
it makes intuitive sense that the shareholder delays the decision of whether
or not to hire.
To understand the shift in the bottom boundary, it is useful to recall that this
boundary represents the effective abandonment region - the shareholder hires
a manager to avoid the monitoring cost, not because he expects investment to
occur. With that in mind, the downward shift in the lower boundary means
that the shareholder is less likely to abandon the project when waiting is
allowed. Intuitively this is easy to understand, the shareholder does not want
to hire a manager (for abandonment purposes) and find out subsequently not
only that investment is worthwhile, but that it would have been optimal ex
post to not hire a manager.
There is a common theme running through each of these explanations, the
shareholder makes an ex ante decision to delay hiring a manager because
of uncertainty over whether it will have been optimal to hire a manager ex
post. In other words the “bad news” principle discussed in Chapter 7 can
be appealed to in order to explain the shareholder’s behaviour. It is thus
worth repeating yet again the description of the “bad news” principle given
by Dixit and Pindyck (1994):
“...it is the ability to avoid the consequences of “bad news” that
leads us to wait.”
15Recall that “maximum” in this context refers to exerting enough effort to drive the
investment cost very close to B.
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8.5.3 Comparative statics
Given the similarity between this model and the model where hiring cannot
be delayed, many of the comparative statics are qualitatively the same. The
key differences introduced by allowing hiring to be delayed are the “ridge”
and the shift in the left boundary.16 The comparative statics analysis will
thus focus on understanding these areas in greater detail.
In this context the volatility of the market asset (σm) has a significant effect
on both areas. Figure 8.14 plots the shareholder’s investment/hiring decision
for various levels of σm. From this graph we can see that as σm increases the
“ridge” disappears and the left boundary shifts right. With respect to the
“ridge”, recall that in the absence of the ability to delay hiring, in this region
it would be optimal to either invest now or hire a manager who would invest
now. Thus the shareholder is waiting along the ridge in case there is a nega-
tive shock to W which will induce the manager to exert effort. In this context
the effect of σm is quite simple. As we discussed in Chapter 7, increasing σm
actually decreases the volatility of W .17 Therefore as σm increases, shocks
to W become smaller. This means that the benefit of delaying investment
is reduced since any shock will be unlikely to induce the manager to exert a
large amount of effort. Therefore along the ridge we have a situation similar
to that in Chapter 7 where an increase in σm spurs action rather than delays
it.
The intuition behind the shift in the left boundary is similar to that for the
“ridge”. The rightward shift of the boundary means that prior to investment
the shareholder is more likely to commit to hiring a manager. This occurs
because as σm increases, the magnitude of the “bad news” the shareholder
can receive reduces. In other words, because the manager’s wealth is not very
16The comparative statics analysis of the bottom boundary are little different from when
hiring cannot be delayed.
17All other things being equal, an increase in σm decreases the Sharpe ratio of the
market asset and thus the manager reduces his holdings of the market asset.
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volatile, if his wealth is low prior to investment, it will also likely remain so
at the time investment occurs.
Figure 8.14: σm and the dynamic hiring decision
(a) σm = 0.1 (b) σm = 0.15
(c) σm = 0.2 (d) σm = 0.3
The next parameter that sheds light on the “ridge” and the left bound-
ary is the investment cost floor B. Figure 8.15 plots the shareholder’s hir-
ing/investment decision for various levels of B. Beginning with the “ridge”,
we can see from these graphs that as B decreases (and thus the benefit of ef-
fort increases) the ridge becomes wider. Along the “ridge” the shareholder is
delaying investment in case W falls and thus a higher payoff can be obtained
by hiring a manager. As B is decreased the benefit of a manager exerting
effort increases. Therefore it is intuitively sensible that for a lower B the
shareholder is willing to defer hiring over a wider range.
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Figure 8.15: B and the dynamic hiring decision
(a) B=100 (b) B=90
(c) B=80 (d) B=70
Perhaps more interesting is the behaviour around the left boundary as B
decreases. Notice that the “bottom boundary” stays a fixed distance from
the threshold where the shareholder invests himself (the boundary between
the tan and dark blue areas). This occurs because the bottom boundary is
the abandonment threshold when W is large (and thus the manager would
exert no effort) and thus is unrelated to B. On the other hand, for a lower
B the threshold where the manager invests when W is low (and thus the
manager exerts “maximum” effort) shifts downwards. This results in an
“overhang” of sorts whereby the shareholder waits for intermediate values
of W but will hire a manager if W rises (to abandon) or if W falls (in
anticipation of the manager exerting effort and investing). To confirm this
logic we can examine what happens to the “overhang” when ρ changes as
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this determines the relationship between changes in W and Y . Figure 8.16
plots the shareholder’s hiring decision for ρ = {0.5,−0.5} when B = 70.
Figure 8.16: ρ and the dynamic hiring decision when B = 70
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(b) ρ=-0.5
Figure 8.16 shows us that when ρ is positive the “overhang” extends into
the low W region whereas when ρ is negative the overhang disappears. The
intuition behind this is quite simple: when ρ is positive, if Y increases W is
also likely to increase. Thus in the region where investment is being delayed,
the shareholder is more likely to end up in the region where it is optimal
to invest himself (i.e. high Y , high W ) and thus he is less likely to hire a
manager prior to investment.
8.6 Impact on shareholder wealth
The results of this chapter so far have focused on the shareholder’s decision
(i.e. hire a manager, delay hiring/investing or invest himself) as certain pa-
rameters are changed. This however does not answer the question of whether
or not the shareholder is better off if a parameter takes one value over an-
other. In particular, while we do not directly model the decision in this
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thesis, analysing the shareholder’s payoff allows us to partially answer the
question “what type of manager would a shareholder want?”. In addition, if
a managerial parameter has little effect on the shareholder’s payoff, if there
are search costs the shareholder will be relatively indifferent to the level of
this parameter that their manager has.
As it turns out the effect of the different parameters is qualitatively quite
similar whether or not the shareholder is able to delay the hiring decision. We
will thus examine the effect of managerial parameters on the shareholder’s
payoff jointly for both models.
Given the complexity of our numerical solutions, the way we will get at this
question is to simply calculate the shareholder’s payoff for a “high” and “low”
value of each parameter of interest and then look at the difference between
these payoffs in {W,Y } space.
The first parameter we will examine is the investment cost floor (B). Recall
that this parameter determines the achievable cost savings and thus is a
measure of not only the manager’s “skill”, but also the natural scope for cost
savings in the project. Figure 8.17 plots the difference in the shareholder’s
payoff for B = 70 and B = 90. In this graph the payoff when B = 90 is
subtracted from the payoff when B = 70 and thus positive values indicate
that the shareholder is better off when B = 70.
The immediate observation from Figure 8.17 is that when W is relatively
high there is no difference in the shareholder’s payoff. This occurs because
the manager would not exert any effort in this region and thus the amount
by which the manager could reduce costs does not impact the shareholder’s
payoff. Similarly in the “low W , high Y ” area the difference is flat and
equals 18. In this region the manager is exerting enough effort to drive the
investment cost very close to B and thus the difference in the payoff is simply
1− α (0.9) multiplied by the change in B (20).18
18For different parameter values or if Y is sufficiently large the difference begins to
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Figure 8.17: Difference in shareholder’s payoff: {B=70,B=90}
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These graphs calculate the shareholder’s payoff when B=70 and then subtracts from that the shareholder’s
payoff when B=90. Thus a positive value indicates that the shareholder is better off when B=70 and vice
versa.
When Y is very low there is no difference because it is unlikely that invest-
ment will occur. To explain why the difference increases with Y when W is
low, we need to remember that when W is low the manager will generally
exert “maximum” effort. Therefore as Y increases the difference becomes
positive because the investment option is much more valuable when B = 70
then when B = 90. That is, the expected payoff from the waiting to invest
is higher when the investment cost is lower.
The “bump” in the middle is the unusual feature of this graph. This bump
is related to the effort-related delay option. In the region where the manager
has a “choice” over his level of effort, the shareholder’s option value of waiting
(to see if the manager exerts more effort) is much greater when the potential
cost reductions are greater (i.e. B is lower).
The next parameter we consider is λ, another measure of the manager’s
“skill”. This parameter determines how much effort the manager must exert
reduce to zero since effort is a decreasing function of Y as shown in Chapter 5.
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to drive the investment cost close to B (where a higher value of λ results
in less effort being required to reach B). Recall that this parameter has the
exact opposite effect to θ (the utility cost of exerting effort) and thus we only
need to examine one to infer the effect of the other. Figure 8.18 plots the
difference in the shareholder’s payoff between λ=1 and λ=0.5.
Figure 8.18: Difference in shareholder’s payoff: {λ=1,λ=0.5}
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These graphs calculate the shareholder’s payoff when λ=1 and then subtracts from that the shareholder’s
payoff when λ=0.5. Thus a positive value indicates that the shareholder is better off when λ=1 and vice
versa.
To understand Figure 8.18 we need to remember the effect that λ has on the
manager’s timing/effort decision in Chapter 7. The key result in this context
is that increasing λ simply moves the investment “spike” to the right, without
changing its shape (i.e. the manager exerts “maximum” effort over a wider
range of W ). This rightward shift in the “spike” is effectively what we are
witnessing here. The area where the “ridge” occurs in Figure 8.19 is an area
where investment would occur immediately and the manager would not exert
“maximum” effort when λ = 0.5 yet does when λ = 1. The ridge disappears
to the left because in this area maximum effort is exerted for both parameter
values while to the right no effort is exerted for both parameter values. The
“spike” that occurs for lower values of W occurs because the region where
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the effort option has value has shifted right in W space.
The next managerial parameter of interest is the manager’s level of risk
aversion (γ). Figure 8.19 plots the difference in the shareholder’s payoff
between γ = 0.5 and γ = 2, where higher levels of γ represent greater risk
aversion.
Figure 8.19: Difference in shareholder’s payoff: {γ=0.5,γ=2}
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These graphs calculate the shareholder’s payoff when γ=0.5 and then subtracts from that the shareholder’s
payoff when γ=2. Thus a positive value indicates that the shareholder is better off when γ=0.5 and vice
versa.
There are two things occurring in this graph, a positive “ridge” in the region
when Y is large and a negative “dip” when W and Y are relatively lower. The
ridge occurs because γ has a negative effect on effort and thus a lower value
of γ results in the manager exerting effort (and thus being hired) for a wider
range of W . To understand the “dip” it is worth reexamining Figure 8.11
which is reproduced in Figure 8.20 with only the figures for γ = {0.5, 2}.
Figure 8.20 illustrates that the negative dip (i.e. the shareholder getting a
higher payoff from a more risk averse manager) occurs because the transition
from no effort to “maximum” effort is much less sudden as W changes when γ
is low. This results in an area (the “dip”) where when γ is large the manager
exerts “maximum” effort and invests whereas with a lower γ he is waiting to
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Figure 8.20: γ and the static hiring decision
(a) γ = 0.5 (b) γ = 2
invest or exerting a lower level of effort and investing.
Unlike the model of Chapter 6, in this model we have treated the proportion
of the firm owned by the manager (α) as exogenous. The interpretation of
α is therefore the market price of hiring a manager. In this context it is
therefore worthwhile considering whether or not the shareholder is better
off if the manager desires a high or low share of the firm (holding all other
parameters constant). Figure 8.21 plots the difference in the shareholder’s
payoff between α=0.2 and α=0.05.
Figure 8.21 shows that if W is sufficiently large then the shareholder is indif-
ferent between a high and low α. This occurs because when W is relatively
large the manager will exert no effort and thus the shareholder does not
hire a manager. The two interesting features of Figure 8.21 are the positive
“ridge” around where the investment spike occurs for the manager and that
the difference becomes increasingly negative as Y increases when W is rela-
tively low. The explanation for the increasing negative difference is relatively
simple. We know from Chapter 5 that as Y increases the manager’s optimal
level of effort decreases. Given that α effectively scales Y , an increase in α
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Figure 8.21: Difference in shareholder’s payoff: {α=0.2,α=0.05}
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These graphs calculate the shareholder’s payoff when α=0.2 and then subtracts from that the share-
holder’s payoff when α=0.05. Thus a positive value indicates that the shareholder is better off when
α=0.2 and vice versa.
amplifies this effect.19 Therefore, at a sufficiently low W , when α is higher
an increase in Y causes a greater reduction in effort relative to when α is
small, leaving the shareholder worse off.
The “ridge” is slightly more complicated. To understand why this occurs
we will reexamine the manager’s investment decision from Chapter 7. Fig-
ure 8.22 plots the manager’s investment decision for α=0.2 and α=0.05.
Recall that the dark purple area is where the manager invests and the light
blue area is where the manager waits but would invest in a “now or never”
world. Figure 8.22 therefore shows that when α=0.2 the area where invest-
ment occurs is now larger (i.e. the light blue waiting region has shrunk).
This is the reason behind the “ridge” in Figure 8.21, it represents the region
in Figure 8.22 where investment occurs when α=0.2 but the manager waits
when α=0.05.
19This is the same reason for the curved boundary in Figure 8.12.
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Figure 8.22: The manager’s investment decision: {α=0.2, α=0.05}
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The final managerial parameter we consider is the shareholder’s monitoring
cost (κ). While this may not directly be a manager-specific parameter, it does
represent the cost the shareholder avoids by hiring a manager. Put another
way, it is the manager’s relative monitoring cost advantage. Figure 8.23 plots
the difference in the shareholder’s payoff between κ=0.1 and κ=0.01.
Figure 8.23 is simple relative to other graphs we have examined in this sec-
tion. This occurs because κ only affects the shareholder’s payoff in regions
where he is waiting to make a decision. Therefore if the shareholder in-
vests himself or hires a manager, κ has no effect on the shareholder’s payoff.
Unsurprisingly in the areas where the shareholder is waiting,20 his payoff is
higher when κ is lower.
20Which of course change as κ changes.
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Figure 8.23: Difference in shareholder’s payoff: {κ=0.1,κ=0.01}
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These graphs calculate the shareholder’s payoff when κ=0.1 and then subtracts from that the shareholder’s
payoff when κ=0.01. Thus a positive value indicates that the shareholder is better off when κ=0.1 and
vice versa.
8.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we examined the shareholder’s decision whether or not to hire
a manager who has the ability to exert effort to reduce the cost of a project
whose timing is flexible. The hiring decision was examined in two different
contexts:
• the choice of whether or not to hire is a “now or never” decision; and
• the hiring decision can be delayed.
In our model the shareholder incurs a monitoring cost while waiting to invest.
Because the shareholder avoids the monitoring cost (but incurs the cost αY )
when a manager is hired, as the monitoring cost increases the shareholder
hires a manager over a wider range of parameters. In the limit, if the mon-
itoring cost is large enough the shareholder always hires a manager prior to
investment.
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The key result in the “now-or-never” model is that prior to investment the
relativity between the volatility of W and Y is crucial as this affects what
will be ex post optimal from the shareholder’s perspective. At the margin on
the “left boundary”, the more volatile W is relative to Y , the more likely it
is that it will be optimal to hire a manager. This is because it is more likely
that we will end up in the area where the manager exerts effort.
The decision at the margin along the “bottom boundary” is driven by the
implicit abandonment option available to the shareholder. Because the share-
holder incurs a monitoring cost, he can effectively abandon the project by
hiring a manager.21 Because an increase in the volatility of Y makes it more
likely that the project will eventually be profitable, the bottom boundary
shifts downwards as σy increases.
Turning to the model where hiring can be delayed, the key difference is
that in regions where the manager has a “choice” over how much effort he
exerts, the ability to delay hiring will often cause the shareholder to delay
hiring relative to a “now or never” world. This can be explained using a re-
expression of the famous “bad news” principle. Essentially, the shareholder
will delay hiring now to avoid hiring a manager who subsequently exerts no
effort. The other interesting distinction between these two models is that
when Y is very large and immediate investment is optimal in the absence of
the ability to delay hiring, we find a “ridge” where the shareholder will delay
hiring. The shareholder does this in the hopes of an effort-inducing negative
shock to the manager’s wealth. In simple terms the shareholder is willing to
wait another day in the hope of higher payoff.
Examining the shareholder’s decision under different parameters only tells
one side of the story. To understand what type of manager the shareholder
desires we must examine the payoff to the shareholder for different levels
21Note that the lack of explicit abandonment option is a weakness of this framework.
However, in this region the shareholder loses nothing by giving the project to the manager
since he would have abandoned the project anyway.
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of the relevant managerial parameters. The general results of this exercise
are unsurprising, the shareholder will generally prefer a manager who is less
risk averse, more skilled (low B and high λ) and who requires a lower level of
firm ownership (α). However, when one moves past generalisations, there are
situations where the opposite is true and also situations where the shareholder
is indifferent.
Part III
Direct wealth effects
176
Chapter9
CRRA Utility with GBM Cash Flow
9.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 we discussed two possible utility functions that could be used
for our analysis: CARA and CRRA. CARA was used for the “clean path”
because the manager’s valuation of the cashflow does not depend on his
financial wealth and thus the rest of the analysis was tractable. The purpose
of this chapter is to go back to the first step of the clean path and see what
difference direct wealth effects1 have on the initial valuation problem. This
chapter is thus a parallel analysis to Chapter 4 using CRRA utility instead
of CARA.2
Because the manager’s valuation will depend directly on his financial wealth,
the dimensionality of the problem has increased (i.e. the valuation now
depends on W as well as Y ). This changes the analysis of Chapter 4 in two
key areas:
1This is in contrast to the indirect wealth effects we witness through the manager’s
effort decision n the “clean path”.
2As will become clear shortly, we also use a GBM cashflow instead of SBM to be
consistent with the literature on CRRA valuations.
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• there is no closed form solution to the manager’s valuation problem
and thus the problem must be solved numerically; and
• The implicit valuation (IV) concept used in Chapter 4 is not equal to
the utility indifference (UI) valuation and thus there are two measures
of value.
In simple terms, the IV valuation is the marginal valuation and the UI val-
uation is the average valuation. The distinction between these two concepts
is discussed in more detail in section 9.3. A lack of a closed form solution
and two measures of value complicates the analysis significantly relative to
that carried out in Chapter 4. In Chapter 4 there was a closed form solution
and only one measure of value needed to be considered since the IV and UI
valuations were equivalent.
The numerical solution also turns out to be relatively complex and thus,
unlike Chapter 4, a significant portion of this chapter is devoted to solving the
model. Part of this complexity lies in the fact that the UI and IV valuations
are not equivalent meaning there are multiple choices for numerical boundary
conditions.
The only paper to have presented numerical solutions to the CRRA problem
is Munk (2000). Munk examined the valuation problem of a CRRA investor
who has a non-traded GBM cash flow that can be partially hedged by the
market asset. However, the numerical method Munk implements has some
shortcomings which we seek to address. The use of a numerical (as opposed
to theoretical grounded) boundary condition is the weakness of Munk’s anal-
ysis. We therefore extend the work of Munk (2000) by using a numerical
finite difference method which uses theoretically grounded conditions at the
upper boundary as opposed to the numerical condition imposed in Munk
(2000). The analytical results of Munk (2000), Duffie, Fleming, Soner, and
Zariphopoulou (1997) and Koo (1998) provide a menu of alternative condi-
tions that can be imposed at the model’s upper boundary. We compare the
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accuracy of these results and contrast them with Munk’s results in order to
select the most appropriate boundary condition. The use of theoretically
grounded boundary conditions significantly alleviates the problems encoun-
tered by Munk at the upper boundary. While the selection of a small value
for the upper boundary (i.e. a smaller computational grid) introduces more
error into the computations, we find that selection of an appropriate bound-
ary condition can significantly mitigate this error. This allows the use of
smaller, less refined grids in computation.
Munk’s model also considers an agent who owns the entire cash flow, whereas
we are interested in the situation where the manager is constrained to own an
exogenous portion of the cash flow (α). We can thus think of Munk’s model
as a special case of the partial ownership model when α = 1. As it turns out,
because of the way the problem reduces, the solution method is actually no
different when α < 1. We thus focus on improving the solution method for
Munk’s model first. Then, with the solution method and preferred boundary
condition in place, we examine the case where the manager only owns part of
the firm. This allows us to examine the impact that changes in the manager’s
ownership level have on his valuation of the firm in a wealth dependent
setting.
This chapter differs from the rest of the thesis in that the majority of it is
devoted to the “journey” of solving the model. The complexity of the solution
method and the differences between this model and that of Chapter 4 do
however mean that this journey is interesting in its own right.
The rest of this chapter is laid out as follows: Section 9.2 sets up the model,
Section 9.3 discusses the different measures of value relevant to our analy-
sis, Section 9.4 draws on the literature to discuss the limiting behaviour of
the value function (which is relevant for determining boundary conditions),
Section 9.5 outlines our numerical solution method, Section 9.6 discusses our
results and contrasts them to those obtained by Munk (2000), Section 9.7
analyses the implication of our results for the discount rate used by a man-
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ager who owns part of the firm, Section 9.8 introduces effort to the model
and Section 9.9 summarises the results of this chapter.
9.2 The Model
By substituting the CRRA utility function U(C) = Cγ, and the process for
the GBM cashflow (Equation (3.5)) into Equation (3.9) we get a highly non-
linear second order partial differential equation for the manager’s HJB. The
choice of CRRA utility means that the solutions will be wealth dependent
and thus standard numerical solution procedures are difficult to implement3.
We follow the approach of Duffie, Fleming, Soner, and Zariphopoulou (1997)
and show that the problem can be reduced to a single state variable Z = W
αY
.
We also follow Duffie, Fleming, Soner, and Zariphopoulou (1997) and impose
the restriction that Z > 0.4 To reduce the problem we recognize that we can
write the value function as J(W,Y ) ≡ (αY )γF [Z].5 Substituting this in gives
the following reduced form for the HJB
βF [Z] = max
C¯
[C¯γ(αY )−γ − C¯F
′(Z)
αY
] +
1
2
Z2F ′′(Z)σ2y + F (Z)
(
1
2
(γ − 1)γσ2y + γµ
)
+
(
Z
(
r − µ− (γ − 1)σ2y
)
+ 1
)
F ′(Z)
+ max
p¯i
[
p¯i
1
2(αY )2
(((
p¯iσ2m − 2Wρσyσm
)
F ′′(Z)− 2αY (r − µm − (γ − 1)ρσmσy)F ′(Z)
))]
3This is because there are two state variables; Wt and Yt.
4Note that no restrictions were placed on the manager’s financial wealth in the CARA
models of the clean path given that the variable Z was not necessary.
5For details of this transformation see Duffie, Fleming, Soner, and Zariphopoulou
(1997).
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Following Munk (2000) we define the following policy functions
ξ =
C¯
αY
− 1
ψ =
p¯i
αY
Substituting these into the HJB equation allows us to write it as a second
order non-linear ordinary differential equation with a single state variable
and two policy functions
βF [Z] = max
ξ
[(ξ + 1)γ − (ξ + 1)F ′(Z)] + 1
2
Z2F ′′(Z)σ2y + F (Z)
(
1
2
(γ − 1)γσ2y + γµ
)
+
(
1 + Z
(
r − µ− (γ − 1)σ2y
))
F ′(Z)
+ max
ψ
[
ψ (µm − r − (1− γ)ρσmσy)F ′(Z) +
(
1
2
ψ2σ2m − ρσmσyZψ
)
F ′′(Z)
]
Again following Duffie, Fleming, Soner, and Zariphopoulou (1997) we make
use of the following notation to simplify the HJB
βˆ = β − µmγ + 1
2
σyγ(1− γ)
k1 = µm − r − (1− γ)σmσyρ
k2 = r − µ+ σ2y(1− γ)
which gives the following reduced form for the HJB and policy functions
βˆF [Z] = max
ξ
[(ξ + 1)γ − (ξ + 1)F ′(Z)] + 1
2
F ′′(Z)σ2yZ
2 + F ′(Z)(1 + k2Z)
+ max
ψ
[(
1
2
ψ2σ2m − ρσmσyZψ
)
F ′′(Z) + ψk1F ′(Z)
]
,
ξ¯[Z] =
(
F ′[Z]
γ
) 1
γ−1
− 1,
ψ¯[Z] =
σyρZ
σm
− k1F
′[Z]
σ2mF
′′[Z]
. (9.1)
Although we have defined Z differently, this is the exact system of equations
of Munk’s model. Therefore once we improve the numerical solution to his
model, we can take advantage of the duality of the problems to analyse our
partial ownership case.
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9.3 Measures of Value
In Chapter 4 (and the rest of the clean path) we only had to consider one
measure of value. As noted by Miao and Wang (2007) in the context of the
CARA framework used in Part II of this thesis:
The two interpretations of G(x) - the certainty-equivalent wealth
and the implied option value - are the same in our setup. This
is due to the absence of the wealth effect under CARA utility.
We will thus use certainty-equivalent wealth (from the consump-
tion literature perspective) and implied option value (from the in-
vestment literature perspective) interchangeably throughout the re-
mainder of the paper.
Given that CRRA has wealth effects, this is no longer the case and we thus
have to consider two different measures of value (the IV and UI values). As
mentioned previously, the IV valuation is effectively the manager’s marginal
valuation of the cashflow while the UI valuation is his average valuation.
The reason it matters that the UI and IV valuations are not equivalent is
that the model must be solved numerically, and the UI and IV valuations
are candidates for theoretically grounded boundary conditions. In addition,
once the model is solved, we want to analyse the manager’s valuation of the
cash flow. With that in mind, it is worth examining in detail the definition
of each valuation and how they relate to each other.
The UI concept is what Miao and Wang (2007) refer to as the “certainty-
equivalent” valuation. It is defined as the least increase in initial wealth
the manager would require to forgo the entire income stream. It therefore
gives a natural measure of the value of the entire income stream. The IV
valuation is slightly different in that it is the value of the cashflow implied
by the manager’s consumption and asset allocation decisions.
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The implicit value is derived by Koo (1998). This was done by showing that
the value function and optimal polices can be written as
J(W,Y ) = A(Z)γ−1(W +B(Z)Y )γ
C(W,Y ) = A(Z)(W +B(Z)Y )
pi(W,Y ) =
σm − r
σ2m
W +B(Z)Y
1− γ +B′(Z) +
σyρ
σm
(
W − 1− γ
1− γ +B′(Z)(W +B(Z)Y )
)
Where B(Z) and A(Z) are defined as
B(Z) =
JY (W,Y )
JW (W,Y )
A(Z) =
(
J(W,Y )
(W +B(Z)Y )γ
) 1
γ−1
Based upon the form of the value function, Koo interprets the implicit valu-
ation as
V I = B(Z)Y
Thus he describes the manager’s “Accounting Total Wealth” as W + V I .
Given that V I is by definition the marginal value of the income stream it
is sensible that this is the valuation that drives the manager’s consump-
tion/savings decision.6 However, as Munk (2000) points out, this is an un-
natural measure of value, especially when one is looking at decisions to buy
or sell an income stream as one would want to examine the total value of the
stream as opposed to the marginal values.
Munk notes that the UI valuation provides a more natural valuation of the
entire cashflow and thus prefers it to the IV value. He shows that the UI
valuation can be derived as
V UI = B∗(Z)Y,
B∗(Z) = A
1−γ
γ F (Z)
1
γ − Z (9.2)
For the case of CRRA, these two valuations do not in general coincide. We
therefore use the complete markets valuation as benchmark to compare the
6Given that optimality is based upon the equalization of the marginal utility from
consumption with the marginal utility of deferring consumption.
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two value. This is the valuation the agent would reach in the absence of
liquidity constraints and if markets were complete. Koo (1998) derived this
measure by solving for the manager’s Certainty Equivalent Present Value
(CEPV) of the income stream in the unconstrained, complete markets case.
V C =
1
λ
Y
λ ≡ r − µy + (µm − r)σy
σm
> 0 (9.3)
As we are interested in asset pricing and investment decisions it is natural
that we focus on the utility indifference value as this determines the amount
the manager is willing to pay for the income stream. However, in the limit as
Z becomes large, the distinction does not matter as Munk (2000) has proved
that the two valuations converge. He does this by showing that the implicit
income multiplier can be written as
B(Z) = A(Z)
1−γ
γ F (Z)
1
γ − Z (9.4)
Using the fact that Koo (1998) proved that the following limits hold
lim
Z→∞
A(Z) = A (9.5)
lim
Z→∞
B(Z) =
1
λ
, (9.6)
Munk showed that the following holds
lim
Z→∞
B(Z) = B∗(Z).
Therefore it must be the case that
lim
Z→∞
B∗(Z) =
1
λ
. (9.7)
Thus we can see that in the limit both measures of value converge to the
complete markets valuation.
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9.4 Limiting Behavior of the Value Function
Given the model is going to be solved numerically and that we aspire to
have theoretical relationships governing the behavior at the boundaries, it
is essential that we examine the behavior of the model in the limit as we
approach the imposed boundaries.
As we have imposed the restriction that the investor’s financial wealth must
be non-negative at all times,7 this is equivalent to requiring that Z ≥ 0 at
all points in time given that Z ≡ W
Y
. It is therefore necessary to examine
the behavior of the value function as Z → 0. This has been done by Duffie,
Fleming, Soner, and Zariphopoulou (1997) who showed that the following
limit holds
lim
Z→0
ZF ′′[Z] = 0
The other limit we need to consider is when Z gets very large. We therefore
must consider the behavior of the model as Z → ∞. This is equivalent to
looking at the behavior as Y → 0 and/or W → ∞. It is important to note
that because we have assumed that Yt follows GBM it must be the case that
once the income process hits zero, the investor behaves as if he is in a Merton
(1969, 1971) world since the income process is zero thereafter. Therefore it
must be the case that
J(W, 0) = JM(W )
For the general case when Y 6= 0, as Z → ∞ Duffie, Fleming, Soner, and
Zariphopoulou (1997) show that the optimal polices and value function be-
come asymptotically equivalent to the Merton no-income case. Thus their
7See Section 9.2.
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Theorem 6 states that as W
Y
→∞
J(W,Y )→ JM(W )
C(W,Y )→ C¯M(W
pi(W,Y )→ p¯iM(W )
which essentially states that as the ratio of wealth to income becomes very
large, the investor will behave as if he is not receiving an income stream.
Koo (1998) puts forward a slightly different proposition. As discussed previ-
ously, he shows that the implicit income multiplier (B(Z)) converges to the
complete markets income multiplier (Equation (9.6)) and that the consump-
tion multiplier (A(Z)) converges to the Merton (1969) consumption multiplier
(Equation (9.5)). Koo shows that the complete markets value function can
be written as
JC(W,Y ) = Aγ−1
(
W +
1
λ
Y
)γ
Given the form of the value function, this shows that the value function
converges to the complete markets case
lim
Z→∞
A(Z)γ−1(W +B(Z)Y )γ = Aγ−1
(
W +
1
λ
Y
)γ
(9.8)
It is interesting to note that while very similar, this is slightly different from
the proposition put forward by Duffie, Fleming, Soner, and Zariphopoulou
(1997). We must therefore check to see whether these two propositions are
consistent. Consistency requires that the following holds
lim
Z→∞
Aγ−1W γ = Aγ−1
(
W +
1
λ
Y
)γ
To show that this holds we rewrite the proposition of Koo as
lim
Z→∞
J(W,Y ) = Aγ−1W γ
(
1 +
1
λZ
)γ
Which we can see implies that
lim
Z→∞
J(W,Y ) = Aγ−1W γ
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Therefore the two propositions are consistent with each other.
It is interesting to note that this consistency holds for any finite value of
the complete markets multiplier 1
λ
and thus the proposition of Duffie et al
says nothing about the investor’s valuation of the income stream, just that
income becomes insignificant relative to financial wealth.
9.5 Numerical Solution Method
Because the HJB is a non-linear second order differential equation, we can-
not use standard finite difference methods. Reduction of the problem to one
state variable reduces the dimensionality of the problem and thus the compu-
tational complexity of the problem, but does not eliminate the non-linearity
of the differential equation. We therefore implement the “Policy Iteration”
Algorithm8 on the system (9.1). This is essentially a two step variation of the
standard finite difference algorithm where non-linearity is circumvented by
alternating between calculating the policy functions and the value function
implied by those policies.
9.5.1 Description of Algorithm
We begin by defining a grid in Z space with an imposed upper (Zmax) and
lower (Zmin) boundary. Selecting a number of steps (N) for the grid allows
us to define the grid co-ordinates as
dZ =
Zmax − Zmin
N
Zi = Zmin + dZ(i− 1)
Once values are chosen for Zmax,Zmin and N the following steps are used to
implement the “Policy Iteration” algorithm
8See Judd (1998) for an overview of this method.
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1. The initial values for the policy functions are specified as the optimal
policies for the Merton (1969) no-income case
ξ[Zi] = AZi ∀ i
ψ[Zi] =
µm − r
(1− γ)σ2m
Zi ∀ i
2. Boundary conditions are imposed at the upper and lower boundaries
for Zi and the HJB is solved for F [Zi] using the current specification
of the policy functions;
3. “Policy Improvements” are estimated by calculating the optimal value
for the policy functions implied by the current estimate of F [Zi]; and
4. Steps (2)-(3) are repeated until convergence is reached.
9.5.2 Finite Difference Approximations
To estimate the function F [Z] and the policy functions (ξ[Z], ψ[Z]) we take
central difference approximations of the first and second derivatives of F [Z]
F ′[Zi] ≈ Fi+1 − Fi−1
2dZ
F ′′[Zi] ≈ Fi+1 − 2Fi + Fi−1
dZ2
where the shorthand F [Zi] ≡ Fi has been used. Substituting the derivative
approximations into HJB gives our finite difference approximation for F [Zi]
βˆFi ≈ (1 + ξ[Zi])γ + (Fi+1 − Fi−1)(k2Zi − ξ[Zi] + k1ψ[Zi]))
2dZ
+
(Fi+1 − 2Fi + Fi−1)(σyZ2i − 2σyρσmZiψ[Zi] + σ2mψ[Zi]2)
2dZ2
Similarly the finite difference approximations for the policy functions are
ξ [Zi] ≈ 2−
1
γ−1
(
Fi+1 − Fi−1
dZγ
) 1
γ−1
− 1
ψ[Zi] ≈ −4σyρσmFiZi + Fi−1 (dZk1 + 2σyρσmZi)− Fi+1 (dZk1 + 2σyρσmZi)
2σ2m (Fi−1 − 2Fi + Fi+1)
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9.5.3 Boundary Conditions
In this study we consider three different boundary conditions for large values
of Z. As general rule, a straight numerical boundary condition should be
used as a last resort, but in many applications the solution is unaffected by
the boundary condition and thus numerical boundaries perform quite well.
In Munk (2000), as well as previous work on numerical solutions to Merton’s
no income problem9, the solutions for the optimal controls were found to
perform very poorly near the upper boundary.10
In this situation we have several theoretical boundary conditions available
and thus we will compare the performance of these against the numerical
condition.
Numerical
A very simple numerical boundary condition that can be imposed is to assume
that F ′′[Z] = 0 at the boundary. This has the effect of making the value at the
boundary a projection of the previous values. We can express this condition
in finite differences as
FN+1 = 2FN − FN−1 (9.9)
This is a simple and often effective boundary condition for numerical algo-
rithms when the exact behavior at the boundary is not known. However, as
we will see in the next section, a numerical boundary condition of this sort
performs quite poorly in the context of an HJB style problem
9Munk (2003), Munk (1997a), Munk (1997b).
10Munk (1997b), pg 196 states that “The numerically computed controls can therefore
not be trusted for values of z larger than approximately 70% of zˆ”.
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Convergence to the Merton (1969) Value Function
Duffie, Fleming, Soner, and Zariphopoulou (1997) proved that as the ratio of
wealth to income tends towards infinity, the value function becomes asymp-
totically equivalent to the Merton (1969) value function. We can use this
result to directly calculate the value function at the upper boundary ZN+1.
We do so by exploiting the following limit
lim
Z→∞
J(W,Y ) = Aγ−1W γ
Using the fact that J(W,Y ) ≡ Y γF [Z], we can rewrite this as
lim
Z→∞
Y γF [Z] = Aγ−1W γ
Evaluating the above expression at ZN+1 gives our boundary condition
FN+1 = A
γ−1ZγN+1 (9.10)
Quasi-Merton
While the simple Merton (1969) boundary condition allows for direct com-
putation of the level of the value function, this may not be appropriate if
the upper boundary Zmax is too small. This is because if Zmax is too small
relative to infinity, where the Merton (1969) solution holds, imposing a value
for the level might be quite inaccurate. It thus may be more appropriate to
look at the shape of the function. To do this we build a boundary condition
based on the derivative of the Merton value function. As shown above as Z
tends towards infinity the following holds
F [Z] = Aγ−1Zγ
Differentiating this with respect to Z yields
F ′[Z] = γAγ−1Zγ−1
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From this it is easy to show that the following equality holds
ZF ′[Z] = γF [Z]
Evaluating this equality at Zn using finite differences gives the Quasi-Merton
boundary condition
ZN
(
FN+1 − FN−1
2dZ
)
= γFN (9.11)
Convergence of Implicit Income Multiplier to the Complete Market
Income Multiplier
As previously discussed, Koo (1998) proved that the implicit income mul-
tiplier converges to the complete markets income multiplier as the ratio of
wealth to income goes to infinity. Using the fact that Munk (2000) showed
that we can express the implicit income multiplier as
B(Z) =
γF [Z]
F ′[Z]
− Z
we can rewrite (9.6) as
γF [Z]
F ′[Z]
− Z = 1
λ
Simplifying this expression and converting to finite differences gives our con-
dition for the upper boundary of Z
γFN =
(FN+1 − FN−1)(ZN + 1λ)
2dZ
(9.12)
Convergence of Utility Indifference Income Multiplier to the Com-
plete Market Income Multiplier
We also know that the utility indifference multiplier converges to the com-
plete markets income multiplier. We can therefore combine (9.2) and (9.7)
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and evaluate the resulting expression at ZN+1 allowing us to directly calculate
the value of FN+1
FN+1 =
(
A
γ−1
γ
(
1
λ
+ ZN+1
))γ
(9.13)
Hybrid
We can also construct a hybrid boundary condition that combines both of
the income multiplier boundary conditions. This is done by evaluating (9.13)
at ZN instead of ZN+1. This then gives an expression for FN which can be
substituted into (9.12) giving the following boundary condition
γ
(
A
γ−1
γ
(
1
λ
+ ZN
))γ
=
(FN+1 − FN−1)(ZN + 1λ)
2dZ
(9.14)
9.6 Numerical Results
9.6.1 Review of Munk’s (2000) Numerical Results
The base case parameters for Munk’s analysis are as follows
γ = 0.5 r = 0.1 µm = 0.15 µy = 0.05
β = 0.2 σm = 0.3 σy = 0.1 ρ = 0.0
Thus Munk is examining the case where the the risk of the cash flow is
completely idiosyncratic. Munk solves (9.1) using the “Policy Iteration”
variant of the Markov Approximation Method. This method uses a tri-nomial
tree structure for the state variable Z. Thus for each value of Z, there is
an associated transition probability for Z evolving up, down or staying the
same. Since a finite grid is used for the state variable a condition must be
imposed at the artificial upper boundary for Z to approximate the behavior as
Z →∞. Munk does this by assuming that at Zmax the transition probability
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for Z increasing is 0. This condition is not based upon theory and is roughly
equivalent to our boundary condition where it is assumed that the second
derivative of the value function is constant at the upper boundary.
In addition to the qualitative results concerning the value function and opti-
mal controls described in Section 2.4.2, Munk conducts comparative statics
analysis to determine the effect of the correlation parameter (ρ), income
volatility (σm), income drift (µm) and the time preference rate (β) on the
agent’s relative optimal consumption, relative optimal investment in the risky
asset11 and utility indifference income multiplier.
For ρ the results are intuitively straightforward and appealing. For low levels
of Z the income stream is relatively important and thus the agent has a
greater desire to hedge against fluctuations in the income stream. This results
in a negative relationship between the proportion of wealth invested in the
risky asset and ρ due to the diminished hedging ability of the risky asset as it’s
correlation with the income stream increases.12 The flip side of this reduction
in risky investment is that the agent consumes more as ρ increases. For high
levels of Z, the income stream is relatively unimportant to the investor which
results in consumption and investment being roughly constant across ρ. This
is because the income stream is relatively insignificant and thus hedging the
income stream does not factor into the agent’s optimal policies. Using the
same intuition about the ability to hedge the income stream, it is no surprise
that the income multiplier is a strictly decreasing function of ρ and that the
more significant the income stream is to the agent’s total wealth (low Z), the
steeper the function is.
11The fraction of financial wealth (W ) that is optimally consumed and invested in the
risky asset.
12This is because the investor cannot short sell. If the investor were able to shortsell the
risky asset, we would see a convex relationship centered around ρ = 0 since the investor
could perfectly hedge the income stream at ρ = ±1, whereas the income stream would be
entirely idiosyncratic at ρ = 0.
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The effect of σy on consumption is consistent with the standard precautionary
saving motive whereby the agent reduces consumption and increases savings
in the face of uncertainty over the future. Again this effect is most prominent
for low values of Z where the income stream is relatively important. The
effect of σy on investment in the risky asset is initially less clear. At high
levels of Z when the income stream is relatively less important the fraction
of wealth invested in the risky asset decreases with σy, whereas for low levels
of Z when income is relatively important the proportion of wealth invested
into the risky asset increases. Munk attributes the negative relationship at
high levels of Z to the agent substituting away from the risky asset since the
income stream is becoming a closer substitute to it as σy increases. Munk
however makes no argument for the increasing positive relationship at low
levels of Z. The positive relationship can be explained by acknowledging
that there is another force affecting the agent’s investment saving decision.
When an investor engages in precautionary saving he is reducing current
consumption and thus by definition saving more. Some of these savings will
be put into the risky asset. The fact that investment in the risky asset
increases with σy at low levels is not surprising when one considers that
consumption decreases substantially as σy increases at low levels of Z . Thus
at low levels of Z it is simply the case that the desire to shift away from the
risky asset is offset by the larger proportion of wealth that is being saved
instead of consumed.
Munk next goes on to show that relative consumption increases with the drift
of the income process (µy), and that the effect of µy on consumption is greater
when the income stream is relatively significant. As Munk recognizes, the
effect of µm on investment in the risky asset is harder to understand. Munk
notes that when income is relatively significant, the optimal investment in
the risky asset is decreasing in µm, but when the income stream is relatively
less important, investment in the risky asset is marginally increasing in µm.
A simple explanation can be offered for why optimal investment decreases
with µm when income is important if one recognizes that the risky asset and
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the income stream are in some sense substitutes for each other. Therefore as
the growth rate of the income stream increases the investor can obtain the
same portfolio return with a lower holding of the risky asset, something that
would benefit any risk averse investor. The positive relationship between
µm and investment in the risky asset when income is insignificant can be
explained by recognizing that when income is insignificant the investor will
not be as averse to holding the risky asset since a significant portion of his
wealth is not already made up by a holding in the risky non-traded income
stream. Therefore just as a higher consumption rate can be achieved with a
higher µm, more wealth can be invested in the risky asset. The distinction
between the case of high and low Z values comes from the fact that when
income is very substantial the investor is over exposed to risky assets and
thus where possible will want to shift away from them, whereas this is less
of a problem when income is insignificant.
There are however some weaknesses in the numerical procedure employed
by Munk (2000). As noted in Munk (1997b), the computed optimal policies
cannot be trusted for values of Z larger than approximately 70% of the
upper boundary Zˆ. The primary cause of this is the error introduced by
the boundary condition Munk selects and the fact that he generally uses
relatively small values of Zˆ which amplify the propagation of the error to the
interior solutions13.
9.6.2 Our Results
Using Munk’s base case parameters we use the policy iteration algorithm
described in Section 9.5 to solve the system set out in Equation 9.1. For all
the boundary conditions we examined we found the same general qualitative
13This stems from the fact that behavior around Zˆ is supposed to approximate behavior
as Z →∞ and thus it is expected that too small a value for Zˆ would introduce error into
the computations.
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results for the value function and optimal policies. Figure 9.1 plots the
manager’s value function (J(W,Y )), optimal consumption (C(W,Y )) and
optimal investment in the risky asset (pi(W,Y )) using the hybrid boundary
condition.
Figure 9.1: The Value Function, Optimal Consumption and Optimal In-
vestment
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Calculated using the Hybrid boundary condition and Zmax = 1000
Because the qualitative results are consistent with Munk regardless of the
boundary condition used, the focus of our analysis will be on the accuracy of
the different boundary conditions. As the key problem with Munk’s method
is that the optimal controls are only reliable up to 70% of Zmax,
14 a useful
starting point in our analysis is to compare the optimal controls for the
14Munk (1997b).
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different boundary conditions we are examining.
Figure 9.2 shows the Value Function, Implicit Income Multiplier, The Utility
Indifference Income Multiplier, consumption policy function (ξ(Z)) and the
risky investment policy function (ψ(Z)). Examination of the graphs for F (Z)
reveals that all of the boundary conditions do a good job of calculating the
value function. In fact we get nearly identical results for the value function
across all of the boundary conditions. What stands out about Figure 9.2
is that although we get nearly identical results for the value function, the
calculated optimal policies and income multipliers vary drastically across
different boundary conditions.
If we look at the optimal polices for the numerical condition we see that we
are experiencing similar problems near the upper boundary to those docu-
mented in Munk (1997b), in that at approximately 75% of Zmax the solutions
begin to fall apart. We also witness a similar collapse for the Merton bound-
ary condition which is surprising given that the condition is theoretically
based. The Quasi-Merton boundary condition performs much better as we
can see that the solution is accurate for roughly 80-90% of Zmax after which
point the solution deviates, but still remains stable. This is expected as the
Quasi-Merton condition is imposing behavior around the shape of the curve,
rather than the level and thus is likely to be more accurate at approximating
behavior as Z → ∞. The final three boundary conditions we examine all
produce similarly accurate and stable solutions for the optimal policies over
the whole range of Zmax and thus so far seem to significantly outperform the
other boundary conditions as well as the methodology of Munk (2000).
The most striking feature of Figure 9.2 is the income multipliers. Despite the
fact that the value function is accurate over the whole range of Zmax and the
policy functions are accurate over 75% of Zmax, we see that for the Numerical,
Merton and Quasi-Merton boundary conditions, the solutions for the income
multipliers fall apart spectacularly after approximately 30% of Zmax. For the
Numerical and Merton boundary conditions the same behavior is observed
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Figure 9.2: Value Function,Policy Functions and Income Multipliers for
Zmax = 1000
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(a) Numerical
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(b) Merton
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(c) Quasi- Merton
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(d) Implicit Valuation Multiplier
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(e) Utility Indifference Multiplier
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(f) Hybrid
In the first column we present the graphs for F (Z) where J(W,Y ) ≡ Y γF (Z).In the last column the horizontal line
represents the Complete Markets Income Multiplier as defined by Equation (9.3), the dashed line represents the Implicit
Income Multiplier and the solid curved line is the Utility Indifference Income Multiplier
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whereby the Implicit Value (IV) Multiplier ascends towards infinity and the
Utility Indifference (UI) Multiplier decreases to 0 as Z → ∞. We already
know that this does not make sense because (9.6) and (9.7) show that both
multipliers converge to the Complete Markets (CM) multiplier as Z → ∞.
The fact that the income multipliers degenerate significantly sooner than
the policy functions suggests that it is the instability of the solution for
the income multipliers that is driving the instability of the computed policy
functions, rather than the other way round. For the Quasi-Merton boundary
condition the behavior is the opposite but is equally bad. Here we observe the
IV Multiplier decreasing towards zero while the UI multiplier rises towards
infinity as Z →∞. It is interesting that we still get behavior for the income
multipliers that cannot be reconciled with theory, despite the fact we have a
smooth solution to the value function and relatively smooth solution to the
optimal policies. For the IV and Hybrid boundary conditions we see that the
solution remains stable for approximately 90% of Zmax, after which point the
IV Multiplier is dragged up towards the CM Multiplier and actually crosses
the UI Multiplier. Given that we are forcing the IV Multiplier to equal
the CM Multiplier at Zmax it is unsurprising that we see this happen. The
UI boundary condition exhibits the smoothest solution of all the boundary
conditions as we don’t see either curve getting artificially “dragged” in any
direction.
Given that we have five theoretical boundary conditions, why do some per-
form so poorly relative to the others? The answer to this question is directly
related to the discussion in Section 9.4 on whether or not the propositions of
Koo (1998) and Duffie, Fleming, Soner, and Zariphopoulou (1997) concern-
ing the limiting behavior of the value function are consistent with each other.
Recall that Duffie, Fleming, Soner, and Zariphopoulou (1997) show that the
value function converges to the Merton (1969) value function which is equiv-
alent to acting as if you are not receiving any income. This is contrasted with
the result of Koo (1998) who shows that the value function converges to the
complete markets case where income is valued using the complete markets
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income multiplier 1
λ
. As discussed earlier these two propositions are consis-
tent with each other, but the Duffie et al proposition states only that income
becomes so insignificant that it does not effect the agent’s decisions. Since
it does not make any statement about how the income stream is valued, it
is actually not surprising that when we use the proposition of Duffie et al to
formulate a boundary condition, it gives nonsensical results for the income
multipliers and as a result inaccurate computations for optimal consumption
and investment.
Having established that the Numerical, Merton and Quasi-Merton boundary
conditions provide unstable solutions, it now necessary to determine which
boundary condition is the most accurate. From Figure 9.2 one might conclude
that because the UI boundary condition provides the smoothest solution that
it is also the most accurate. This is not necessarily the case and thus we
will compute the value function, Policy Functions and Income Multipliers at
Z = 100 and Z = 500 for a range of different values for Zmax in order to
investigate the error that is propagated to the interior solutions at they get
closer to the artificially imposed upper boundary.
In Figures 9.3 and 9.4 we can see that as long as the point at which any
of the functions is being calculated is far enough from the upper boundary,
the choice of boundary condition does not have any effect as we get identical
results across all of the boundary conditions. If we accept that the value
calculated when quite far away from the upper boundary represents a fair
approximation of the true value, then the deviation away from that value
represents a good measure of how accurate each boundary condition is. Ap-
plying this criteria to Figures 9.3 and 9.4 allows us to make a judgement on
the accuracy of each boundary condition. When we look back at Figure 9.2 it
is unsurprising that the Numerical, Merton and Quasi-Merton boundary con-
ditions are all incredibly inaccurate and deviate substantially from the true
level as Z → Zmax. On the other hand we can see that the other boundary
conditions all give relatively accurate computations as Zmax → Z, with the
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Figure 9.3: Key Variables at Z = 500
F(500)
42.7
42.8
42.9
43
43.1
43.2
43.3
43.4
43.5
43.6
43.7
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
Zmax
ξ(500)
0
50
100
150
200
250
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
Zmax
ψ(500)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
Zmax
B*(500)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
Zmax
B(500)
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
Zmax
F(100)
19.2
19.4
19.6
19.8
20
20.2
20.4
20.6
20.8
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
Zmax
Numerical
quasi
Merton
IV multiplier
UI Multiplier
Hybrid
CHAPTER 9. CRRA UTILITY WITH GBM CASH FLOW 203
Figure 9.4: Key Variables at Z = 100
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most accurate results being provided by the Hybrid Boundary condition. The
Hybrid Boundary condition is closely followed by the IV boundary condition
which is only slightly less accurate. Interestingly the UI boundary condition,
while still being substantially more accurate than the numerical and Merton
based boundary conditions, is much less accurate than the Hybrid and IV
conditions. This is despite the fact that it provides a much smoother solution
as evidenced by Figure 9.2. It is also interesting to note that the deviation
across all boundary conditions as Zmax → Z is much larger for Z = 100 than
for Z = 500. This is actually to be expected as we are imposing the boundary
conditions for much lower values of Zmax and thus we cannot expect behavior
that holds as Z →∞ to hold when Zmax takes a relatively small value.
To illustrate the dangers of using a small value for Zmax with a numerical
boundary condition, it is useful to recreate Figure 4 from Munk (2003). In
this graph Munk plots both income multipliers and the complete markets
multiplier to illustrate how slowly they converge. The multipliers are cal-
culated using Zmax = 200 yet he only plots the graph out to Z = 100. In
Figure 9.6(a), we recreate Munk’s plot with inclusion of the same result using
the Hybrid Boundary Condition, in addition we also show the full plot out
to Z = 200 for comparison.
Just like in Munk’s Figure 4, panel (a) of Figure 9.5 shows that when we plot
the graph out to Z = 100 we see that the lower dashed line representing the
implicit multiplier calculated using the numerical boundary condition starts
to veer upwards as Z → 100, while the corresponding line for the Hybrid
boundary condition continues to change at the same rate. Given that these
plots are calculated using Zmax = 200 this is suspicious. While panel (b) of
Figure 9.5 is not presented in Munk (2003), the fact that our plots in panel
(a) for the numerical boundary condition are identical suggest that Munk
must have experienced something similar. The results presented in panel (b)
illustrate the failing of the numerical boundary condition by providing a stark
contrast with the Hybrid boundary condition. We can see that soon after Z
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Figure 9.5: Comparison of Hybrid and Numerical Boundary Conditions In-
come Multipliers for Zmax = 200 and ZN = 2000
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Where the dashed lines correspond to the numerical boundary condition and the solid lines are the Hybrid
condition. The horizontal solid line at 15 is again the complete markets multiplier.
becomes greater than 100, the two income multipliers veer off sharply, the
implicit towards infinity, the utility indifference towards zero and actually
cross. This makes no sense theoretically and thus is purely a manifestation
of the method used to solve the problem. While the multipliers from the
Hybrid condition do veer off and cross each other, the change is nowhere
near as drastic and in fact does not occur until after Z = 150. This suggests
that while any boundary condition is going to have problems if a small grid
is used (i.e small Zmax), the use the of an appropriate theoretical boundary
condition can help mitigate this significantly.15
15Where the word appropriate is used because even the Merton and Quasi-Merton
boundary conditions performed poorly.
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9.7 Manager’s subjective discount rate
To gain more insight into the significance of the base case parameters it is
useful to calculate the complete markets income multiplier
1
λ
=
1
r − µy + σyσm (µm − r)
Calculating this for the base case parameters gives an income multiplier of
15. Since this is essentially a complete markets, continuous time version of
the Gordon growth model, λ can be interpreted as the discount rate applied
to the project’s cashflows. Thus we can say that the complete markets dis-
count rate for this project is λ = 1
15
= 6.7%. This transformation is useful
because the discount rates are a more natural measure to use when discussing
investment decisions than multipliers. Applying the same transformation to
the UI multiplier16 allows us to analyse the discount rate a constrained agent
would use for a non-traded cashflow. Thus if the UI income multiplier is
B∗(Z), then this implies the discount rate is 1
B∗(Z) .
If we recall that we can define Z ≡ W
αY
, we can analyse the decision of a
manager who is constrained to own the fraction α of the firm’s cashflow.
To analyse this decision and its implications for shareholders, we can fix the
ratio W
Y
at various levels and examine the impact that changing α has on the
discount rate used by the manager to evaluate the project.
Figure 9.6 plots the discount rate used by the manager depending on how
much of the firm he owns for various levels of the ratio W
Y
. Three things
are apparent from this graph. First, unless they are independently wealthy
(“rich”) and they do not own “too much” of the firm, managers adopt a
discount rate that exceeds the complete markets rate. The reason is sim-
ple: the inability to trade their stake in the firm makes managerial wealth
dependent on the fortunes of the employing firm, and so managers adopt
16Given we are interested in investment decisions, the UI value is a more natural measure
since it describes what the manager would give up to obtain the cash flow.
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Figure 9.6: UI Discount Rate vs α
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a safety-first approach that screens out projects of marginal profitability
(but which would nevertheless add to shareholder wealth). Thus there is
an ‘under-investment’ problem: managers generally invest in fewer projects
than shareholders would like. Second, “poor” managers (those who are not
independently wealthy) choose a higher discount rate than “rich” managers
because firm ownership has a greater impact on the diversification of their
portfolio. That is, they care more about the firm’s specific risk. Third, for
similar reasons, the discount rate chosen by “poor” managers is much more
sensitive to their ownership share.
The most important thing to take from Figure 9.6 is that the impact of
under-diversification on investment decision making can be severe: even a
tiny amount of firm ownership can approximately double the hurdle rate
adopted by a manager with little wealth.
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9.8 Adding Effort to the CRRA Model
The analysis of this chapter has thus far demonstrated that wealth effects
the manager’s investment decision through its impact on the valuation of the
cash flow. For a higher W , the manager’s subjective discount rate decreases
which makes investment more likely. This contrasts to the CARA model of
Chapter 4 where the manager’s valuation of the cash flow is independent of
his financial wealth. The introduction of effort in Chapter 5 changed this
and wealth affected the manager’s investment decision through the impact
of wealth on optimal effort. Increasing W reduces the marginal utility of
wealth and thus the manager has less incentive to exert cost reducing effort.
Therefore investment is less likely as W increases in the CARA/SBM model
with effort.
The purpose of this section is to introduce effort into the CRRA/GBM model
and determine if a similar result to Chapter 5 (wealth reducing optimal effort)
still holds.
9.8.1 Solution method
The setup for this problem is essentially the same as for Chapter 5. The
manager’s value function and the investment cost function are defined as
Je(W,Y ) = J2(W − αI[e], Y )− θe
I[e] = exp(−λe)A+ (1− exp(−λe))B e ≥ 0
As in the previous section of this chapter, we make use of the transformation
J2(W,Y ) = (αY )γF [ W
αY
], where F [ W
αY
] is the interpolated solution for the
manager’s value function solved in the previous part of this chapter. The
manager’s value function can thus be expressed as
Je(W,Y ) = (αY )γF
[
W − αI[e]
αY
]
− θe (9.15)
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Because we are interested in solving for the level of effort (e∗) that max-
imises Equation (9.15), and e appears inside the interpolated function F , the
problem must be maximised numerically. This is done by specifying a grid
for W and Y and then using the NMaximise command in Mathematica to
find the level of e that maximises Equation (9.15) subject to the following
constraints:
1. e ≥ 0
2. W ≥ αA
The first constraint is the same “non-shirking” constraint as imposed in
Chapter 5, while the second constraint is introduced because the GBM/CRRA
model of this chapter constrains wealth to be positive. In the absence of this
second constraint the manager could have negative wealth at the time of in-
vestment which results in the interpolated function F being undefined. This
could also be dealt with by constraining the manager to exert enough effort
to make wealth non-negative if he invests, but this introduces another di-
mension to the manager’s effort decision which limits comparability with the
results of Chapter 5.
9.8.2 Results
To solve for e∗ we use the same base case parameters as Section 9.6 to solve
for the interpolated function F and the base case effort related parameters
from Chapter 5, which for the sake of completeness are
Table 9.1: Effort related parameters
A = 100 B = 80 θ = 0.1 λ = 1
The grid over which we will solve for e∗ is specified in Table 9.2 below.
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Table 9.2: grid parameters
Wmin = αA Wmax = Wmin + 10 WN = 20
Ymin = 5 Ymax = 15 YN = 20
Using this grid and the effort related parameters specified in Table 9.1, the
solution for e∗ is shown in Figure 9.7. This graph demonstrates that optimal
effort is a decreasing function of both W and Y . This is the same result as we
found in Chapter 5, thus the inclusion of wealth effects does not qualitatively
change the manager’s optimal effort decision.
Figure 9.7: e∗ as a function of W and Y
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However, the manger’s investment decision is different. Figure 9.8 shows
a contour plot of the manager’s threshold. The light area represents those
areas where the manager would invest while the dark shaded area represents
those areas where he would not. This graph shows that as W increases, the
investment threshold decreases (i.e. investment is more likely).
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Figure 9.8: Investment threshold in the CRRA/GBM model with effort
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This contrasts to the results of Chapter 5 where the investment threshold
increases with W and thus investment is less likely. This occurs because
an increase in W increases the manager’s valuation of the cash flow in the
wealth dependent CRRA model. Therefore, despite effort decreasing as W
increases, the impact of this on the investment decision is more than offset
by the increased value placed on the cashflow.
9.9 Summary
This chapter set out to consider the implications of CRRA on the manager’s
valuation problem by conducting a parallel analysis to that of Chapter 4. By
using CRRA utility and a GBM cash flow, the “first step” of the analysis
this thesis seeks to carry out requires a complex numerical solution. This
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chapter therefore examined these numerical issues in isolation given they
made “continuing down the path” intractable. The main methodological les-
son learned from this chapter is that the choice of boundary condition can
be critical when conducting numerical analysis. In particular, theoretically
grounded boundary conditions perform much better than numerical condi-
tions, although some theoretical boundary conditions perform much better
than others and some are even as bad as the numerical condition. The key for
this model appears to be selecting a boundary condition that says something
about the manager’s valuation of the cashflow, rather than general conditions
surrounding the value function.
Once the “journey” of solving the model was complete, the CRRA model
was used to examine how wealth dependence affects the manager’s valuation
problem. It is commonly argued that remunerating managers with stock and
options grants will make them think like shareholders (since they are entitled
to a share of profits), and hence run the company in a manner desired by
shareholders. However, this overlooks the fact that such grants paradoxically
create a conflict-of-interest problem: managers use a higher discount rate
than is optimal for shareholders and hence pass up investment projects that
would enhance shareholder wealth.
In designing managerial remuneration policy, shareholders must therefore
trade off the benefits of incentive alignment with the conflict-of-interest cost
caused by over exposing the manager to the firm. In this chapter we have
shown that if managers have CRRA utility functions, then it is not just the
level of their firm ownership that impacts how much idiosyncratic risk they
take into account when making investment decisions, but that the hurdle rate
they select depends crucially on their levels of wealth. In fact, the results of
this chapter suggest that it is a “rich” manager that is most likely to think
like a shareholder, but interestingly he will generally do this even if he owns
only a small portion of the firm. On the other hand, the more firm ownership
a “poor” manager is given the less he thinks like a shareholder as his personal
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wealth becomes overly dependent on the fortunes of the firm and he will thus
make overly cautious investment decisions as evidenced by the high hurdle
rate he selects.
Introducing effort doesn’t appear to change this result either. In the wealth
dependent CRRA setting, the impact of wealth on the manager’s valuation
of the cash flow more than offsets his lowered incentive to exert effort as
wealth increases.
Part IV
Conclusion and Appendices
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Chapter10
Summary and Conclusion
This thesis began by asking two questions:
1. if managers own too much stock, how does this affect the investment
decision they make for the firm? and
2. given the answer to (1), how does this affect the shareholder’s decision
to hire a manager?
The fact that the answer to the first question is required to answer the second
had implications for the structure of this thesis. We initially considered two
utility functions for the manager, Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA)
and Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA). However, the problem is
significantly complicated by the fact that financial wealth affects the man-
ager’s valuation of the cashflow when he has a CRRA utility function and is
constrained to own part of the firm.
Therefore, with the goal of having a “clean path” to answering the second
question, Part II focused on the CARA model and completed the various
steps required to analyse both questions.
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Chapters 4 and 5 analysed the first question in a now-or-never setting. The
key result from Chapter 4 is that constraining the manager to hold “too
much” of the firm causes him to value the firm’s project less than a well
diversified shareholder would. Chapter 5 attempted to analyse the “other
side of the coin” by introducing effort into the model. The key result here
was the manager’s optimal level of effort is highly non-linear in the proportion
of the firm he owns and depends heavily on how risk averse the manager is.
In other words, more is not always better when it comes to incentivising
managers.
Chapter 6 analysed the second question in a static setting by using the model
of Chapter 5. The shareholder is effectively trading off three things when
determining how much of the firm to give to the manager:
1. making the manager less diversified;
2. incentivising the manager to exert more effort; and
3. diluting his own share of the firm.
The factors that have the greatest impact on the optimal level of managerial
ownership are, perhaps unsurprisingly, those specific to the manager. More
interesting is that market and project specific parameters have smaller ef-
fects on the optimal level of managerial ownership. This is interesting as it
suggests that the type of firm a manager works for is not that important
when determining his compensation.
Chapter 7 addressed the first question when the manager is able to delay
investment. The interesting finding from this chapter is that because effort
can be used to hedge the market,1 managers will delay investment beyond
the standard predictions. This is in order to preserve the ability hedge. Put
another way, they do not want to invest now, exert no effort and subsequently
receive “bad news” that will make them wish they had worked harder.
1I.e. you work harder when your portfolio investments perform poorly.
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To finish Part II, Chapter 8 addressed the second question when investment
can be delayed both when the shareholder must make a now-or-never decision
to hire and when the decision to hire can be delayed. In both the now-or-
never and dynamic hiring models, the more likely it is the manager will exert
effort upon investment, the more likely it is that a manager will be hired now.
When the ability to delay hiring is introduced, the shareholder will delay his
decision in some regions where he would have hired a manager in a now-or-
never setting. This region corresponds to the area where the manager has
“choice” over his level of effort.2 Intuitively, the shareholder delays hiring in
this region to avoid hiring a manager who subsequently exerts no effort upon
investment.
Chapter 8 also attempted to address the question of what type of manager
a shareholder would prefer, keeping in mind that in the model there is only
one manager and no search. The general results of this exercise are largely as
expected - the shareholder is better off with a manager who is less risk averse,
more skilled and requires a smaller share of the firm as payment. However,
the non-linearities in the model mean that there are situations where the
shareholder is indifferent and in fact where the opposite occurs.
In Part III of the thesis we returned to the CRRA model. Because this utility
function causes the manager’s valuation to depend on his financial wealth,
the numerical solution method becomes complicated. However, the com-
plications to the numerical solution method are particularly interesting and
thus Chapter 9 analysed the unique numerical issues introduced by wealth
dependent valuations. The key methodological insight from this chapter is
that the choice of boundary condition can be of crucial importance. While
not to the same extent as in Part II, this model also gives some insight into
how the introduction of wealth effects alters the answers to the first question
addressed above. In particular, a “rich” manager is likely to make investment
2The “choice” in this context stems from the fact that the manager is not so rich that
he never exerts effort and not so poor that he never exerts effort.
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decisions more in line with shareholder interests than a poor manager. This
is because being undiversified is relatively less important for a rich manager.
This thesis has also identified many areas for future research. In Part II
of the thesis this would involve introducing the following features into the
models (either individually or collectively):
• make the manager’s level of effort unobservable to the shareholder
• make the manager’s characteristics initially unobservable to the share-
holder3
• allow the manager to be dismissed
• introduce multiple managers that the shareholder must choose from
and more importantly search for
• endogenise α in the model of Chapter 9
• introduce an explicit abandonment option
• examine the interplay between the executive compensation and the
level of investment flexibility4
The key extension that could be made to Part III of this thesis would be to
introduce effort into the CRRA/GBM model. This would allow examination
of how wealth dependant valuations affect the effort decision. That is, the
interaction of indirect and direct wealth effects could be analysed.
3This would be done in the style of a learning over time model.
4Note that the period for which investment can be delayed has effectively been fixed
throughout this thesis.
AppendixA
ROA Valuation Using the CAPM
A.1 Setup
In this appendix we discuss the solution method used value the project rights
when an investor is compensated for risk according to the capital asset pric-
ing model (CAPM). As discussed in Section 2.2, the key assumption of the
CAPM is that investors are not compensated for idiosyncratic risk.
The setup for this model is the same as for Part II of this thesis (the “clean
path”) in that the shareholder can pay a lump sum I to receive a cashflow
(Y ) which follows simple brownian motion and the investment decision can
be delayed. The difference between the shareholder and the manager, besides
using the CAPM to value the project rights, is that the shareholder incurs a
monitoring cost of κ while waiting to invest.
Given that we are assuming the CAPM holds, solving the shareholder’s val-
uation of the project rights is relatively straightforward. Equation 3.27 of
Trigeorgis (1996) is the differential equation that any contingent claim with
a single state variable (V ) must satisfy, subject to a terminal condition and
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to a lower and an upper boundary condition.
1
2
σ2V 2FV V + (α− λσ)V FV − Fτ + d = 0 (A.1)
As noted by Trigeorgis (1996,p97), if the CAPM holds then λ = (µm− r) ρσm .
Therefore, Equation 3.27 of Trigeorgis (1996) can be re-written using the
notation of this thesis for the CAPM valuation of the project rights (F (Y, t)).
1
2
σ2yY
2FY Y + (µy − (µm − r) ρ
σm
σy)Y FY − Ft − κ = 0 (A.2)
The terminal and boundary conditions are discussed in the next section in
the context of the numerical solution method.
A.2 Numerical Solution
To solve this model we use what is effectively the explicit finite difference
method. The steps of the algorithm are as follows:
1. The value function at the last possible date (tN+1) is calculated using
the terminal condition
2. boundary conditions are imposed along the upper (YN+1) and lower
boundaries (Y1)
3. the algorithm progressively steps backwards in time, using the solutions
for the value function at ti to calculate the value function at ti−1
To implement this algorithm we must define the numerical grid, choose finite
difference approximations for the derivatives of the value function and specify
the terminal, upper boundary and lower boundary conditions.
Given we only have the single state variable (Y ) and a time variable (t), the
grid is defined as follows
dY =
Ymax − Ymin
YN
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Yi = Ymin + dY (i− 1)
dt =
tmax − tmin
tN
ti = tmin + dt(i− 1)
where (Ymax, tmax) are the maximum values for the grid, (Ymin, tmin) are the
minimum values and (YN , tN) are the number of steps for each variable.
To obtain a finite difference approximation of equation (A.2), the following
approximations are used for the derivatives of F (Yi, ti)
Ft ≈ F [Wi, Yi, ti]− F [Wi, Yi, ti−1]
dt
FY ≈ F [Wi, Yi+1, ti]− F [Wi, Yi−1, ti]
2dY
FY Y ≈ F [Wi, Yi+1, ti]− 2F [Wi, Yi, ti] + F [Wi, Yi−1, ti]
dY 2
That is, for derivatives with respect to Y central difference approximations
are used, while for the time derivative a backward difference is used. The
result of this is that it is possible to solve for the value function at date
ti−1 (F [Yi, ti−1]) as a function of the date ti value function. This is why the
algorithm can solve the value function by stepping backwards in time starting
from the terminal values.
For the terminal condition, we assume the investor must make a now-or-
never decision of whether or not to invest, and that the cashflow is valued
using the CAPM. Using the CAPM valuation of an SBM cashflow set out in
Section 2.2, the terminal condition is therefore
F (Yi, tn+1) = max
[
Yi
r
+
µy − ρσyΦ
r2
− I, 0
]
(A.3)
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For the boundary conditions, we assume that when Y is very large, invest-
ment occurs immediately and that when Y is very small FY Y = 0.
1,2 There-
fore the upper and lower boundaries can be expressed as
F [Yn+1, ti−1] =
Yn+1
r
+
µy − ρσyΦ
r2
− I (A.4)
F [Y1, ti−1] = 2F [Y2, ti−1]− F [Y3, ti−1] (A.5)
Note that the lower boundary is not bounded at 0. This is because no explicit
abandonment option has been included in the model, though as discussed
in Chapter 8 the shareholder has an implicit abandonment option through
giving the project to the manager.
1This is the numerical boundary condition discussed in Section 9.9 of this thesis. In
effect it is assumed that the value at the boundary is a linear projection of the interior
values.
2Note that to obtain a boundary condition for Y1, the finite difference approximation
for FY Y is evaluated at Y3 and then solved for F (Y1, ti−1).
AppendixB
Additional Comparative statics:
Chapter 5
B.0.1 Investment Cost Ceiling (A)
For low values of A the manager doesn’t exert enough effort to warrant hiring
him so the shareholder sets α∗ = 0 which means the manager’s utility is
JM(W ). As A increases the manager starts to exert effort and thus the hiring
constraint stops binding and we get a positive value for α∗. The interesting
feature of Figure B.1 is that α∗ is insensitive to changes in A. The fact that
the ceiling for the investment cost doesn’t affect the choice of α∗ other then
satisfying the participation and hiring constraints is interesting. Intuitively
this makes sense as it implies that it is the lower limit of the investment cost
that matters, not the upper limit. Given that the whole point of hiring a
manager is to reduce the investment cost, it makes sense that it is the level
the investment cost can be reduced to that determines α∗.
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Figure B.1: Comparative Statics For A
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B.0.2 Aversion to effort (θ)
The effect of θ on α∗ is essentially the opposite of λ which is unsurprising
given that λ is essentially the benefit of effort while θ is the cost. As the cost
of effort increases, the manager’s optimal level of effort decreases and thus
α∗ increases to offset this. Because optimal effort is falling, the payoff to the
shareholder is falling and thus if θ is large enough the hiring constraint starts
to bind and α∗ drops to zero.
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Figure B.2: Comparative Statics For θ
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B.0.3 Correlation Co-efficient (ρ)
The effect of ρ is quite simple. An increase in ρ increases the systematic
risk of the cashflow and thus lowers the payoff to the shareholder. To offset
this the shareholder increases α∗ to induce the manager to exert more effort.
The result of this is that Payoffmanager[α∗] decreases at a slightly lower rate
than PayoffCAPM . However this difference isn’t that pronounced because
the change in α∗ is very small due to the fact that ρ doesn’t have a very
significant impact on the CAPM valuation of an SBM cashflow.
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Figure B.3: Comparative Statics For ρ
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B.0.4 Cash Flow Growth Rate (µ)
We already know from Chapter 5 that all other things being equal, the man-
ager’s optimal effort is decreasing in µ which would lead one to think that
α∗ would increase in µ. As Figure B.4 shows this isn’t the case and α∗ de-
creases in µ. To understand why this occurs it is useful to examine how the
manager’s level of effort and thus the investment cost change as µ changes
when α∗ is endogenised and thus depends on µ.
Figure B.5 shows that when α∗ is endogenous, an increase in µ decreases the
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Figure B.4: Comparative Statics For µ
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manager’s optimal effort which in turn increases the investment cost. Given
that the investment cost is increasing, for this policy to be the optimal for the
shareholder, it must be the case that the gain from diluting the manager’s
claim on the firm (decreasing α∗) is greater than the loss from the increased
investment cost. Given that the payoff to the shareholder from employing the
manager remains approximately parallel to the payoff from not employing a
manager, this trade off is satisfied.
Another way to think about why this is happening is in terms of the marginal
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Figure B.5: Optimal Effort (eˆ) and the Investment Cost (I(eˆ)) when α∗ is
endogenous
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costs and benefits from a shareholder’s perspective. As µ increases, all other
things being equal the manager will exert less effort. Therefore to cause the
manager to exert the same level of effort, the manager require a higher level
of α. The result of this is that the marginal cost of reducing the investment
cost rises as µ increases, and thus the shareholder’s optimization results in a
lower α∗.
AppendixC
Additional Comparative Statics:
Chapter 9
Aside from the “ridge” in the investment region and the shift of the “left
boundary”, the comparative statics for the shareholder’s dynamic hiring de-
cision (i.e. when hiring can be delayed), differ little from when hiring cannot
be delayed (Section 8.4). For the interested reader, the graphs that were
shown in Section 8.4, but not in Section 8.5 because they did not shed light
on the “ridge” or the left are produced here.
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Figure C.1: κ and the dynamic hiring decision
(a) κ = 0 (b) κ = 0.01
(c) κ = 0.1 (d) κ = 0.5
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Figure C.2: σy and the dynamic hiring decision
(a) σy = 0 (b) σy = 0.2
(c) σy = 0.4 (d) σy = 0.6
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Figure C.3: γ and the dynamic hiring decision
(a) γ = 0.5 (b) γ = 1
(c) γ = 2 (d) γ = 3
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Figure C.4: α and the dynamic hiring decision
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